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ABSTRACT 
Following Nigeria’s adoption of the neo-liberal policy symbolized by structural 
adjustment or economic reforms since the 1980s, the informal sector has witnessed 
massive growth both in form and content. However, the sector’s effective participation 
in national development over the last two decades has been faced with a variety of 
constraints including high social costs burden, lack of access to resources, markets, 
land and basic infrastructure. The sector is also perceived as operating in a hostile 
political, social, economic and institutional environment. All these challenges have 
adversely affected the socio-economic and working conditions of operators, resulting 
in the overall decline in their standards of living. Though there exists commentaries 
about the fate of this sector, there does not appear to be an in-depth analysis of the 
intersections of relevant variables that will determine the effectiveness of this sector as 
a catalyst for development. This study therefore investigates the socioeconomic 
implications of the neo-liberal policy reforms of government on the human 
development of operators in the informal sector. Since human development reflects 
achievements in the most basic human capabilities, the study evaluates the degree to 
which the neo-liberal policy has brought about improvement in the welfare of 
operators in the sector.   
The study was conducted in six Local Government Areas of Lagos State. Both 
quantitative and qualitative methods of data collection were employed. The study 
utilized the survey approach through the administration of questionnaire which was 
complemented with Focus Group Discussions. A sample of 575 respondents was 
selected for the study using the systematic sampling technique. The quantitative data 
were analyzed using the chi-square test. The institutional theory was used to explain 
the nature of the Nigerian state and its implications for addressing the basic social 
needs of the people which indeed remain the core of development.   
The findings of the study established that the neo-liberal policy on social service 
expenditures, subsidy removal, interest/exchange rates, trade liberalization and oil 
sector deregulation had an adverse influence on the demand and supply sides of 
xi 
 
informal sector operations. These measures did not only aggravate the poverty state of 
operators but also invariably undermined human development in the sector. The chi-
square test shows that there was a significant association between neo-liberal policy 
measures and the decline in the socioeconomic conditions of operators (281.41 at p < 
0.05), performance (171.47 at p < 0.05), and social welfare (39.50 at p < 0.05).  
The study concludes that for human development to occur in the informal operators, 
the country needs a developmental state where the leadership and policy makers would 
see the investment in the people as the central element in the entire development 
process. The study further recommends the development of a bottom-up policy 
approach that will incorporate the informal sector into the mainstream economy by 
harnessing its comparative advantage; besides removing the discriminatory legislations 
and regulations that hamper the growth of the sector. Furthermore, for the national 
economy to achieve sustained development, investment must be channeled toward the 
provision of inputs, raw materials, infrastructure and social services. This is the basic 
ingredient for stimulating economic growth, productivity of labour and incomes in the 
informal sector. In all, for the Nigerian state to achieve any meaningful economic 
development that would advance human development, its policies and programmes 
must engage and incorporate the genuine participation of the end beneficiaries, 
recognizing and respecting their needs and priorities.   
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY   
No society can surely be flourishing and happy, of which the far greater part of the 
members are poor and miserable. 
                                                    Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (2003:110-111). 
The overall purpose of development is to promote social progress. In the specific case 
of Africa, it is to reduce poverty, unemployment, diseases, and other social ills. These 
problems are closely linked to human development dilemmas which ultimately limit 
people’s ability to live a long and healthy life. As such, it is the provision of basic 
social needs of life such as food, housing, clothing, healthcare, education, 
infrastructure and the capacity of persons to access them that invariably determine the 
level of development in various societies. It is these views, therefore, that provide the 
groundwork for evaluating how a government socioeconomic policy has met these 
objectives.  
Nigeria since the early 1980s has been experiencing socioeconomic crises which have 
manifested in persistent internal and external macroeconomic imbalances (Sanusi, 
1986:52). The internal disequilibrium became evident following the drop in world 
market price for crude oil that created an instant revenue shortfall for the state which 
immediately triggered off a major crisis in the economy (Olukoshi, 1991b:30-31). 
Arising from the external front is the structural imbalance associated with the modes of 
production (allowing the dominance of foreign capital) upon which the Nigerian 
economy was organized from colonial times, thus making the country a producer and 
exporter of primary products (see Onyeonoru, 2005:93; Umoren, 2001:30). This 
process has not only affected the social structure of the nation, but also the social 
relations of production which have consistently exposed the weakened state of the 
domestic economy and the country’s development (Olukoshi, 1993:4-5).  
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Due to cases of managerial ineptitude, indiscipline, corruption and inappropriate policy 
formulation and implementation the government was unable to adequately manage the 
crises (Yesufu, 1996:89). Also, the state failed to finance the social sectors and 
maintain infrastructure, with the result that the quality of life and welfare of the 
citizenry began to deteriorate (see Olukoshi, 1993: 4). The nation started to run huge 
budget deficits whilst at the same time embarking on imprudent foreign borrowing 
from private and official international sources such as the World Bank/IMF, the Paris 
and London Clubs. This borrowing spree was to lay the foundation for the country’s 
debt crisis which has served to compound the problems afflicting the wider economy 
(Adepoju, 1993:2; Olukoshi, 1990). At the level of industry, many firms either 
suspended production or scaled down capacity utilization drastically because of 
inability of the national government to continue to meet its foreign exchange needs 
given the import-dependent nature of their production (Bangura, 1982:1). For instance, 
while industrial capacity utilization in Nigeria before the advent of SAP was around 70 
percent in 1980, it dropped to 34.6 percent in 1999, increased to 55.70 percent in 2004 
and dropped again to 53.3 percent in 2006 (CBN, 2007).  
In order to cope with the socioeconomic situation, many workers employed in the 
public and private sectors were laid off. In tandem with these happenings, social 
services provision, including the health and educational sectors suffered severe neglect 
and decline. Consumer goods and imported food items like rice, vegetable oil, sugar 
and milk were in acute shortage as well. The living and working conditions of many 
Nigerians deteriorated sharply as the crisis deepened. To redress these socioeconomic 
crises, various austerity and stabilization measures geared toward tackling the rapid 
economic decline were pursued by successive governments between 1982 and 1985 
without any positive improvement. By 1986, the Babangida regime adopted the World 
Bank/IMF inspired Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) based on neo-liberal 
approach which was viewed as been in line with economic globalization which 
professes free market ideology. The SAP measures were to give greater weight to 
growth strategy than to income distribution objectives, which is reminiscent of the 
neoclassical economic models of the 1950s and 1960s. Consequently, SAP’s principal 
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objective was to restore equilibrium in the balance of payments, control inflation and 
to realign overall domestic expenditure and production patterns through expenditure-
switching measures designed to reduce the level of aggregate demand (see Phillips, 
1987; World Bank, 1983). 
The neo-liberal policy thrust as adopted by Nigeria was aimed at institutional reform, 
including public enterprises and parastatals, use of market-determined prices to 
influence production and consumption patterns, withdrawal of state intervention and 
giving preference to organized private sector over those in the public sector (see 
Macleans and Mangum, 2001; Olukoshi, 1991b). The actualization of these objectives 
entail meeting a number of conditions which include: fiscal discipline, removal of 
subsidy, trade liberalization, competitive exchange rates, privatization, deregulation, 
public spending priorities, tax reforms and financial liberalization. It was the 
implementation of these measures that set Nigeria on the road to neo-liberal economic 
reforms which have remained the nation’s core development policy and albatross till 
date (see Olukoshi, op cit: 8).    
Consequently, scholars and development experts have raised doubts about the capacity 
of the Bretton Woods Institutions prescriptions to revamp the ailing economy and 
bring about improvement in the social welfare needs of the populace (see Obadan and 
Ekuerhare, 1993). It has also been highlighted that the neo-liberal policy has failed to 
resolve a number of thorny issues, including those of unemployment, poverty and 
social inequality, all of which are critical for economic development (see Mengisteab, 
1995). Furthermore, studies have also pointed out the inhuman prescriptions of the 
adjustment policies especially in areas of low social sector expenditures, subsidy 
removals, declining exchange rates and cost recovery measures which have impacted 
the poor inordinately (Cornia, Jolly and Stewart, 1987). Besides, the economic reform 
measures have been implemented at high human costs and sacrifices, thus significantly 
aggravating the socio-economic problems of income inequality in the African society 
(Khartoum, 1988).  
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These conditions have brought negative societal consequences on some social groups, 
especially the vulnerable poor in the urban and rural areas (Aigbokhan, 2000:5). For 
instance, the poverty level rose from 27.2 percent in 1980 to over 54 percent in 2006 
with a poverty index of 40.6 percent, more than 70 percent of the population live on 
less than a dollar per day, unemployment which rose from between 5.3-6.4 percent 
during the 1980-85 period to 5.3 percent in 1986; 7.27-8.0 percent between 1990-1998, 
12.2 percent in 2002 and 12.4 percent in 2007 (IMF,2007; FOS, 1997:99 ; 2003:2), 
while the nation’s GDP per capita between 1980-2004 has dropped from US$2,262.68 
to US$ 673.01 (CBN, 2007:9; ADB, 2006:205).  
In the same vein, small and medium scale enterprises’ activities were also 
marginalized by high interest/exchange rates and trade liberalization measures of SAP 
(Adepoju, op cit: 3). The direct consequence of these measures was a sharp decline in 
employment opportunities which left many paid workers without jobs due to the 
incidence of forced retirement, retrenchment. Before now, precisely about the 1960s 
and late 1970s, the development of the informal sector took place in a policy 
environment where the formal sector was regarded as the engine of economic growth 
and the informal sector as a soak pit for the unemployed. This was manifested by the 
nature of lack of clear-cut policy for the sector, underfunding and show of insensitivity 
by government in addressing the needs of the sector, although it acknowledged in its 
third development plan (1975-1980) that the sector generated about 30 percent of non-
agricultural wage employment (Meagher, 1991b; Federal Republic of Nigeria, 
1975:384).  
Despite the lack of interest by government which tended to limit its potentials for 
contributing to development, the sector continue to grow, fueled by the limits of 
industrialization, neglect of the agricultural sector and rural-urban migration (see 
Meagher and Yunusa, 1996). However, this framework was completely altered in the 
1980s as the state and formal enterprises failed to adjust rapidly to the adjustment 
policies in terms of employment generation. This event set the pace for the rapid 
expansion of a variety of informal sector activities which currently constitute a 
significant segment of the Nigerian economy, given its capacity to provide a source of 
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livelihood for the large majority of urban poor, illiterate and educated and even the 
working class in response to the constraints of the economic measures (De Soto 2000; 
1989; Danida, 1997). Since the mid 1980s, the consequences of the economic reform 
measures on urban informal sector incomes have been highly uneven, widening the 
gap between low and high income activities in the sector where many operators are 
unable to sufficiently support their basic needs, thus causing more and more families to 
fall below the poverty line (Meagher and Yunusa, op cit).  
This position was perceptively attested to by the United Nations former Secretary 
General, Javier Perez de Cuellar who observed that:  
The most vulnerable population groups …have been severely and 
adversely affected, directly and indirectly, by such measures as 
the withdrawal of subsidies on stable food items, the imposition of 
limits on wage increases…the retrenchment of civil servants and 
private sector personnel frequently belonging to the lowest salary 
categories, and the cutting of expenditures on social services, 
including health and education and on basic infrastructure (UN, 
1988).   
This statement establishes that a strong association exists between SAP measures and 
urban poverty which is closely associated with informal sector employments which 
have had negative influence on the socioeconomic well-being of operators in the sector 
(see Mead and Morrison, 1996; Firduasy, 1995; Portes, Castells and Benton, 1989). It 
is this political economic challenge, especially the urgency to address the 
consequences of neo-liberal policy measures on the socioeconomic and working 
conditions of operators in this sector that informs this study. This is fundamentally so 
because incomes, employment and business performance problems constitute key 
determinants of poverty which relate to human development. 
To achieve this objective, the study was organized accordingly in the following format. 
The first chapter includes the statement of the problem, research questions, objectives 
of the study, justification of the study, scope of the study, history of Lagos State and 
definitions of key terms used in the study. The second chapter focuses on the review of 
relevant and current literature and theoretical framework that address key issues and 
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concepts relevant to the subject-matter under investigation. The third chapter presents 
the research design and method of study. The fourth chapter focuses on data 
presentation, analysis and discussion of findings. The fifth chapter provides us with the 
summary, conclusion and recommendations. In addition, the chapter also encompasses 
the contributions of the work to knowledge, limitations of the study and areas that 
require further scholarship.        
1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
Development at its very core is a multi-dimensional process that concerns itself with 
the basic differences in the well-being enjoyed by human beings. According to 
Obasanjo and Mabogunje (1991:119) development is a process concerned with 
people’s capacity in a defined area, over a defined period, to manage and induce 
change.... The more people develop, the more they become instruments for further 
change. In all its ramifications, development is a movement from existing conditions 
that are no longer conducive to societal or group goals and aspirations to those that can 
meet those goals and aspirations. It entails moving from a set of assets based on 
primary products exploited by unskilled labour to a set of assets based on knowledge 
exploited by skilled labour (Amsden, 2001:2; Moemeka, 1994; Rodney, 1972:9-21). 
The strong connection between economic development and human welfare has 
provoked inquiry into how development policy or strategy stimulates human 
development in societies. This study examines the social costs of neo-liberal policy 
measures on the socioeconomic and working conditions of operators in the informal 
sector of Lagos State. This is based on the slow pace of advancement in human welfare 
in a developing nation like Nigeria following the implementation of SAP or economic 
reforms measures since 1986. With the cuts in government spending on the social 
sector and removal of subsidies on essential goods and services, the state has 
increasingly found it difficult to perform its traditional roles of providing employment 
and social welfare to the people (Adepoju, 1993:6).   
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Thus the informal sector since then has risen as a matter of economic necessity to fill 
the economic vacuum by serving as the sponge which provides employment and 
income generation for the people. But in spite of its rapid growth and contributions to 
the economy over the past two decades, its activities and development have been 
characterized by a variety of constraints, including operating in a hostile economic, 
institutional, political and social environment, characterized by high social costs 
burden which have been particularly worsened by the consequences of adjustment and 
economic reform measures (see Dike, 1997). The concerns about SAP or economic 
reform measures on the informal sector boarder on issues based on its social welfare 
agenda. For instance, the measures of subsidy removal particularly on food items and 
petroleum products, cut-back spending on the social sector, currency devaluation and 
so forth have been attacked for aggravating human conditions and social imbalance of 
the people, resulting in much suffering and deprivation.  
These conditions have been decried as having negative influence on operators’ real 
incomes, nutrition, health and education, as adjustment or economic reforms has not 
been matched with transformation with regard to improving the distribution of income 
and satisfying basic human needs compared to its main focus of correcting 
macroeconomic imbalances (see UNECA, 1988:12). Other problems associated with 
the sector are lack of access to resources (capital and raw materials) and markets, 
infrastructure, skill training and development, regulations regarding land use, 
ownership, transfer, rental, multiple taxation and fine obligations which have made 
their participation in development ineffective (see Roberts and Tybout, 1997, World 
Bank, 1992).  
These circumstances have adversely affected the demand and supply sides of informal 
microenterprises, limiting the capacity of informal units to produce goods and services 
and hence limit the real incomes earned in the sector. For instance, the 
CBN/FOS/NISER (2001) study on the informal sector in Nigeria revealed that while 
the informal sector (wholesale and retail trade) constituted over 70 percent of the total 
work force for non-manufacturing sub-sectors, its contributions (excluding agriculture) 
to the GDP was only 7.2 percent in 1998 for both manufacturing and services 
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operations which goes to buttress the deplorable conditions in the sector (CBN, 
2001:17). This fact was corroborated by Loayza (1996) and Friedman et al., (2000) in 
their study of Latin American countries, where they found the size of the informal 
sector to positively correlate with tax burdens, labor market restriction and inefficient 
government institutions; but negatively correlated with real per capita GDP. The 
consequence of this happening is such that the costs of previously affordable 
household necessities and other essential items (including food, fuel, water, inputs, and 
healthcare) have become too expensive for this vulnerable group, thus bringing about 
their maldevelopment.  
Besides, entry into the sector has been concentrated in the lower ends of the sector 
which has brought about the problem of increased levels of competition and declining 
returns wherein the level of capital to output is low (see Wickware, 1998; Trager, 
1987). These situations have affected informal sector operators’ ability to meet their 
basic social needs and achieve improvement on their business/working conditions due 
to fall in purchasing power which has further exacerbated the conditions of urban 
poverty (CBN 2001:17; Fapohunda, 1985:72-8).  
What this brings to mind is the fact that while the structural conditions in informal 
sector since the 1980s has negatively changed both quantitatively and qualitatively due 
to cases of unemployment and underemployment following the implementation of the 
neo-liberal policy, the sector has not been given due recognition by the state through 
clear-cut policy legislations and regulations to encourage its effective development and 
incorporation into the mainstream economy. Consequently, government in the course 
of implementing the neo-liberal policy has consistently favoured the organized private 
sector at the expense of the informal sector and others, with little or no effort made to 
foster concrete formal-informal sector linkages which have made the units in the latter 
sector to function in a sub-optimal manner (see Sethuraman, 1997).  
Consequently, the neo-liberal policy induced exchange rates, import/export rules, 
monetary and fiscal measures have tended to stifle entrepreneurship and the realization 
of the full potentials of the sector for the development of consumer and capital goods 
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(Meagher and Yunusa, 1996:4; Olukoshi, 1993:2; Durand-Lasserve, 2002). This is 
crucially so as the sector is still vulnerable, with little capital, limited markets and 
inadequate economic returns on their business activities. These issues have therefore 
raised the critical question regarding the capacity of the operators’ in the sector to 
respond productively to the influence of the neo-liberal policy measures whose 
consequences have further aggravated not only the working conditions of operators, 
but also their overall well-being.  
These circumstances have, therefore, brought to fore the question of what neo-liberal 
policy mean for the informal sector given its huge human and social costs on the 
operators’ well-being and units/ operations and in the sector. How well has the 
informal sector as a whole performed given the burdens of economic reforms under the 
neo-liberal policy? It also raises the question of what is the significance of adjustment 
or economic reforms for development in Nigeria and what socioeconomic policies are 
appropriate to deal with the challenges of the sector in order to stimulate its 
development? This is evident from the nature of the living and working conditions of 
workers in the sector which are characterized by a cycle of impoverishment and 
subsistence living. It is in the light of these and other considerations, including the 
non-affordability of its social and political costs, resource misappropriation and 
massive corruption by the state leadership which has compounded the challenges of 
operations in the informal sector as well as the social welfare of the operators that 
motivate this study.  
This investigation is a significant departure from most studies on the informal sector 
which tend to focus on the role and importance of the sector in development process, 
skill development, labour absorption, formal and informal sectoral linkages and its 
implications for development policies and actions. These include Fapohunda (1985) 
comprehensive survey of informal sector in Lagos in which he examined factors 
affecting the size and structure of enterprises in terms of income and employment 
generation; Abumere et al (1998) study of informal sector enterprises in six cities of 
Nigeria: Lagos, Ibadan, Kano, Aba, Nnewi and Suleja where they looked at the 
working and future direction of informal sector enterprise in Nigeria. Besides, very 
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limited study has been carried out on the social costs implications of the neo-liberal 
policy on the human development of operators in the sector. It is the recognition of 
these gaps in knowledge that underline the importance of this study which is to 
investigate the state of human development of operators involved in this often 
neglected sector of the Nigerian economy. Thus, a study on the nature of conditions of 
informal sector operators and their response to the neo-liberal policy of government 
will not only expose salient issues peculiar to them, but also provide means by which 
they can be tackled.   
It focuses on the socio-economic implications of the neo-liberal policy on the informal 
sector as this is evidenced by its effects on the people’s worsening standard of the 
living, where over 70 percent of the population live below the poverty line, besides the 
rising rates of unemployment and underemployment in Nigeria which stood at 12.4 
percent in 2007 (NBS, 2005; Fadahunsi, 1993:45). As such, the investigation on the 
consequences of the neo-liberal policy for human development of operators in the 
informal sector is not only well-timed but fundamentally critical. After all, central to 
the entire development process today is the development by, of and for people 
irrespective of the prevailing political economic milieu.   
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
From the foregoing statement of the problem, the research questions for which the 
study seeks answers include the following: 
i. What are the prevailing socio-economic conditions of operators in the 
informal sector as result of the neo-liberal policy measures?  
ii. To what extent have the neo-liberal policy measures undermined 
informal sector operators’ capacity to achieve improvements in their 
well-being? 
iii. How have the neo-liberal policy measures influenced the human 
development needs in the informal sector?  
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iv. What are those institutional and structural factors that hamper the 
business performance and capacity building of operators in the informal 
sector?  
1.4 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
The main objective of the study is to investigate the social cost implications of neo-
liberal policy on the social well-being, incomes and working conditions of operators in 
the informal sector. This aligns with the position that the focus on human element 
should be the central goal of every development process (UNDP, 1990). Consequently, 
the specific objectives of study are as follows   
i. To examine the socioeconomic conditions of operators in the informal 
sector especially in terms of their income level.  
ii. To investigate the influence of the neo-liberal policy measures on the 
social welfare conditions of operators in the informal sector. 
iii. To analyze the appropriateness or inappropriateness of neo-liberal 
policy measures to transform the activities of the informal sector and its 
operators toward effective participation in the national economy. 
iv. To identify the main barriers to development and productivity of 
informal sector operations.              
1.5 JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY 
In a nation where social security system in the form of unemployment benefits, 
healthcare insurance and free education at all levels is non-existent, the need to 
investigate the prevailing living and working conditions existing in the informal sector 
given the prevailing economic reform policies in Nigeria cannot be overemphasized.  
This is rightly so as the sector has served the crucial role of a ‘safety valve’ that 
provides employment opportunities for the ever increasing millions of persons who are 
using the sector as a means of survival. It is also the sector that has kept the economy 
going given the virtual collapse of the formal sector, besides its contributions to 
income and productivity which are equally considerable. Thus, the significance of this 
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study lies in the need to examine the informal sector activities as a “target” group in 
order to analyze the pervasive incidence of urban poverty brought by the neo-liberal 
policy which has affected the socioeconomic well-being of operators in the sector. 
Also, taking a critical cognizance of this sector and the constraints hampering its 
growth and development is of vital significant if we are to achieve the desired goal of 
formulating any meaningful public policies and programmes for overall national 
development. 
The study also provides insightful information that emphasizes a holistic approach 
toward tackling the fundamental challenges associated with informal sector activities. 
Evidence suggests that infrastructure (notably land use and rental, power supply, water 
and business premises and capital) play a critical role in raising the incomes of 
microenterprises, using the Lagos informal sector as an example. The fact that the 
informal sector activities which accounts for over half of the employment 
opportunities in most cities in the developing world is deprived of access to basic 
infrastructure, social services, access to capital, markets and returns on investment 
which have implications for their standards of living should be a matter of public 
concern to us as scholars, thus demanding our investigation. Therefore the choice of 
examining informal sector activities in Lagos State given its metropolitan make-up and 
status as Nigeria’s commercial and industrial economic centre is critical. This is 
fundamentally so as the huge population is ravaged by urban poverty, with majority 
living in slum communities with its attendant consequences on development in all its 
ramifications (see Lagos State Government, 2004:70-71; Lagos State Economic 
Summit, 2003:8).   
Besides, this study is a significant departure from earlier studies on the informal sector 
which focus on the role of the sector in development and its implications for 
developmental policies and actions by focusing majorly on the adverse social cost of 
the neo-liberal policy on promoting employment and productivity, incomes and social 
welfare of operators in the sector. This is critically so as the neo-liberal policy ignores 
the informal and traditional sectors while striving to adjust one segment (public and 
organized private sector) of the economy. In all, the findings from the study would 
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provide government, informal sector organizations, private and non-governmental 
organizations, researchers and the Nigerian public, useful information and insights on 
the need to recognize the dynamic role of the sector in economic development as well 
as its challenges. Besides, it also stresses the imperative for supporting the 
advancement of the sector, stressing the need for bottom-up policies to integrate the 
sector into the mainstream economy rather than just “accommodating” it.  
1.6 SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
From a political economic perspective, it is crucial to note that the incidence of 
poverty has become a major challenge facing mankind today as many people 
particularly the poor in Africa continue to suffer pronounced deprivation. This study 
attempted to evaluate the influence of neo-liberal policy on the socioeconomic 
conditions of informal sector operators in Lagos State, Nigeria given the country’s low 
ranking in the UNDP Human Development Reports in the last seven years (1999-
2006). This period covers the tenure of the Obasanjo administration (1999-2007) when 
the economic reform measures of privatization, liberalization and deregulation was 
vigorously implemented.  
The study focuses on informal sector operators and their activities in Lagos State. The 
target operators examined in this study comprises those involved in transport, 
production, wholesale and retail and social service operations. It covers six out of the 
twenty Local Government Council Areas, namely Apapa, Ibeju-Lekki, Ikeja, Ikorodu, 
Lagos Island and Lagos Mainland Local Councils. These councils were chosen to 
constitute our population of study as it was impossible to study all informal sector 
operations in Lagos state. The study attempted to explain the prevalence of urban 
poverty among informal sector workers as reflective of the nation’s low human 
development. It also investigates the structural factors that marginalize this rapidly 
expanding sector in both economic and physical terms and its non integration into 
mainstream national economy. 
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1.7 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF LAGOS STATE 
The history of Lagos State is traceable to 27th  May, 1967 when it was created by virtue 
of decree No 14 (State creation and Transitional Provision) of 1967 promulgated by 
the Federal Military Government of Nigeria. The federation was restructured into 
twelve (12) States. Lagos State occupies an area of 3,577 square kilometers, 
representing 0.4 percent of the federation’s total territorial landmass with a population 
estimated at 1.4 million at the period (Lagos State Ministry of Information, 1998:9). In 
terms of its geographical make-up, 787 square kilometres or 22 percent of the 
landmass is made up of creek, lagoons, rivers and swamps. Following the 1991 census, 
the provisional population for Lagos State was put at 5.7 million, and the recently 
concluded 2006 census puts the population of Lagos State at 9 million. The State 
ranked as the most densely populated State in Nigeria. 
Lagos State is one of the most economically viable and buoyant States of the 
federation. This is borne out of its unique position and status as Nigeria’s industrial 
and commercial nerve centre. Well over 2,000 small, medium and large scale 
industries are sited and concentrated in the State. In addition, the State alone gets more 
than half of the federation’s industrial investments. About 65 percent of the country’s 
commercial activities are also generated in Lagos State. At present, Lagos has 20 
Local Government Council Areas. During the past thirty years, Nigeria has become 
more urbanized than any other period in the history of the country. With an annual 
growth rate of 3 percent and total fertility rate of 6 between 1970- 2005 (HDR, 2006) 
urban population has been increasing at a faster rate.  
Given the dense nature of the population of Lagos and its status as a melting pot for 
people from all parts of Nigeria, the population growth has brought pressure on the 
available social services and infrastructure which has over time created socio- 
economic and environmental problems of overcrowding, poor sewage system and 
limited employment opportunities. The result is that many people now live in sub-
standard squatter houses, slums and suburbs, thus exacerbating incidence of high 
unemployment and rise in criminal activities. This has been the experience of Lagos 
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over the past two decades despite the relocation of the nation’s capital from Lagos to 
Abuja. 
Studies of urban areas like Lagos in Nigeria seem to show a pattern of assimilation of 
migrants. Most of the migrants are usually between the ages of fifteen (15) and twenty-
four (24). These categories of persons come to Lagos State from other states and Local 
Government Council Areas to look for a job, to learn a trade or to go to school. In 
pursuit of a means of livelihood, many of the migrants often end up as apprentices to 
master-craftsmen in order to learn a trade, and many often end up in the informal 
sector of the economy. Since the implementation of neo-liberal policy by the Nigerian 
governments, the problem of unemployment has worsened following the contraction in 
both public and private sectors. As a result, the general conditions of living for the 
majority of Nigerians have been adversely affected as many people have been 
retrenched from their jobs. According to FOS (1998) statistics on unemployment by 
age group 15-24 years was 41.6 percent (1993-97), 49.7 percent and 6.0 percent for 
ages 24-44 and 45-49 years respectively. In order to survive, many of them between 15 
and 49 years have relocated to the informal sector which has resulted in the sectors’ 
rapid expansion over the years. In spite of the several years of economic reforms, 
many of the urban poor who belong to the sector have faced stringent difficulties in 
their social welfare conditions as a result of the effects of the economic reform 
measures. This explains the decline in the people’s purchasing power which has made 
it impossible for them to access basic social needs of existence due to the escalating 
prices of goods and services, thus making many to live below the poverty line (see 
Sancho, 1996).  
Given the stage of development of Nigeria, with its concomitant level of sophistication 
in the recording of socioeconomic data, information on the actual size and employment 
structure in the informal sector in Nigeria is difficult to obtain and where available 
they are hardly reliable. However, estimates suggest that that sector accounts for 
between 45 and 60 percent of the urban labour force, up from 25 percent in mid 1960s 
(Okulola, 2001). Also, the CBN/FOS/NISER (2001) nation-wide study of urban 
informal sector reported that a whooping 12.14 million jobs were generated by 8.6 
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million of enterprises in urban informal sector in Nigeria. The development of the 
informal sector in Lagos and other city centres follow closely the general pattern of 
urban development in the country. Each phase in the development of the cities and 
economy has its own dynamics on informal sector development.  
1.8 DEFINITION OF TERMS 
A number of concepts were used in this study. To avoid any form of ambiguity in the 
meanings they may convey, we have provided the following working definitions. 
DEVELOPMENT 
The process of improving the quality of all human lives, which include raising 
people’s living levels-their incomes and consumption levels of food, medical care 
services and education; creating conditions conducive to the growth of their self 
esteem through the establishment of social institutions that promote human dignity and 
respect; and increasing people’s freedom by enlarging the range of their choice 
variables, as by increasing varieties of consumer goods and services.  
DEVELOPMENTAL STATE 
A developmental state is one that possesses a variety of institutionalized channels 
wherein the state apparatus and the private sector continually interact in a constructive 
manner via a “joint project” of fostering economic development. The developmental 
state is clearly endogenous; it is broadly embedded in civil society via a dense web of 
networks. These broad and dense institutionalized channels of communication and 
interaction provide the links where the state is continually in the process of 
constructive negotiation and renegotiation of policies and goals intended to move a 
society toward a higher level of social and economic development. 
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GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (GDP)  
 It is the annual total value (value of final output) of all income created within the 
borders of a country, regardless of whether the ultimate recipient of that income 
resides within or outside the country. It is used along with the Gross National Product 
(GNP), which is the total value of all income (value of final output) accruing to 
residents of a country, regardless of the source of that income to measure economic 
growth. It also facilitates comparisons as to the level of development of different 
nations. 
HUMAN CAPITAL 
It refers to productive investments embodied in human persons. These include skills, 
abilities, ideals and health resulting from expenditures on education, on the job training 
programme and medicare. 
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 
This refers to the process of enlarging people’s choices, in order to enable them to lead 
a long and healthy life, to be educated, to have resources needed for a decent standard 
of living and to be able to participate in the life of the community. It entails creating an 
environment in which people can develop their full potential and lead productive lives 
in accord with their needs and interests.  
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX 
 It looks at national socioeconomic development of a country based on measures of 
longevity, knowledge and income. Longevity is measured solely by life expectancy at 
birth, while knowledge is measured by the adult literacy rate and mean years of 
schooling weighted at 2:1 respectively. For income, purchasing power parity (PPP) 
(based on real GDP) per capita adjusted for the local cost of living is used. This 
combines a measure of purchasing power with measures of physical health and 
educational attainment to indicate progress or retrogression in human life. This index 
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gives comprehensive and reliable information on the critical indicators of poverty and 
deprivation in a nation.  
INFORMAL SECTOR  
This encompasses all income-producing activities outside formal wages and social 
security payments. It consist of enterprises involved in heterogeneous set of activities 
which includes trading, hawking, carpentry, brick making, mechanics, welding and 
tailoring. Typically, it consists of units established, owned and operated by self-
employed persons either alone or in partnership with others for the primary purpose of 
generating their own employment and income through the production or distribution of 
goods or provision of services. 
NEO-LIBERAL ECONOMIC REFORM 
This refers to two broad types of policies: stabilization and structural adjustment. 
While stabilization is a set of fiscal and monetary policies aimed at reducing inflation, 
cutting budget deficits, and improving balance of payments; structural adjustment or 
reform means revamping the institutional framework of a country’s development 
model. It stresses reducing trade barriers, enlarging the role of the private sector, and 
changing a country’s development strategy from import substitution to export 
promotion. 
POVERTY 
 This is a state in which an individual is not able to cater adequately for his or her basic 
needs of food, clothing and shelter; is unable to meet social and economic obligations, 
lacks gainful employment, skills, assets and self-esteem; and has limited access to 
social and economic infrastructure such as education, health, portable water, and 
sanitation. There are two types of poverty namely absolute and relative poverty. 
Absolute poverty is a state where human beings suffer a condition of life so degraded 
by disease, illiteracy, malnutrition and squalor as to deny its victims basic human 
necessities. Relative poverty is a condition that can only be defined by comparing 
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circumstances of one group of people or an entire economy with another one. The 
poverty line is measured by the inability of persons to obtain incomes, own assets, find 
stable job and maintain basic health needs and qualitative education. The concept of 
poverty gap captures the severity of the poor’s plight. It is the additional amount of 
consumption (or income) that must be generated by a country to bring the poor above 
the poverty line. 
REDISTRIBUTIVE POLICY 
It refers to policy aimed at reducing income inequality, poverty and deprivation, and 
expanding economic opportunities in order to promote development.  
PRODUCTIVITY  
It refers to measure of how resources are being brought together by individuals or 
organizations and utilized for accomplishing a set of results. It is reaching the highest 
level of performance with the least expenditure of resources. Besides, it is also viewed 
as the instrument for continuous progress, and of constant improvement of activities. 
In all, it is often seen as output per unit of input.   
SELF RELIANCE 
It refers to reliance on one’s own capabilities, judgment, resources and skills in a bid to 
enhance political, economic, social, cultural, attitudinal and moral independence. 
SOCIAL BENEFITS 
It refers to socioeconomic gains that accrue to the society as a whole rather than solely 
to a private individual. It includes the provision of security and protection of lives and 
property, effective healthcare delivery, qualitative education and transportation. 
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SOCIAL CAPITAL 
It refers to the productive value of a set of social institutions and norms, including 
group trust, expected cooperative behaviours with predictable punishment for 
deviations; and a shared history of successful collective action that raises expectations 
for participation in future cooperative behavior.  
SOCIAL CONDITION OF LIVING 
This is a level of material comfort as measured by the goods, services, and luxuries 
available to an individual, group, or nation. On an individual level, it is a measure of 
the quality of life in such areas as housing, food, education, clothing, transportation, 
and employment opportunities. Various quantitative indicators used as measuring rods 
for assessing standard of living includes life expectancy, access to nutritious food and 
a safe water supply, and availability of medical care. This helps us to measure the 
levels of living, which is the extent to which a person, family or group of people can 
satisfy their material and spiritual wants. 
SOCIAL COST ANALYSIS  
This measures the adverse social impacts of a given socio-economic policy. It is an 
economic analysis in which the actual and potential costs of various economic 
decisions are weighed against actual and potential individual and societal benefits.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Economic development is not a random phenomenon. The policies of national 
government play a decisive influence in determining the pattern of socioeconomic, 
political and human development in any country (Saitoti, 2002: xi). This chapter 
broadly surveys the state and direction of research on the subject-matter under 
investigation. Key issues relating to Nigeria’s adoption and implementation of 
socioeconomic policy; the informal sector in Nigeria and conceptual discourse on 
Human development will be examined. The Theoretical framework focuses on the 
Neo-liberal theory and the Institutional theory of the State. While the Neo-liberal 
theory provides us with the evaluation of the nature and characteristics of its stated 
goals to determine its advantages and deficiencies as a policy adopted by the Nigerian 
government, the Institutional theory of the State investigates the role and character of 
the state regarding its role in policy formulation and implementation, and the 
implications it has on the attainment of human development objectives which 
underscore the essence of development.   
2.1 NIGERIA’S MARCH TO NEO-LIBERAL IDEOLOGY  
It is evident that the implementation of the neo-liberal policy of SAP or economic 
reforms since the 1980s in Nigeria is generally agreed among development scholars 
and experts as the years of missed opportunities for the country (Adedeji, 1990). This 
is because in spite of the numerous efforts of successive governments, more than 70 
percent of the populace still lives below the poverty line. The negative indices of high 
prices of basic consumables, rising unemployment rate which stood at over 50 percent 
in 2005, falling public expenditures on health and education and increasing 
infrastructural decay among others are part of the characteristics of this suffering 
population (McRae, 1989; National Planning Commission, 2005: IX). For instance, the 
nation’s poverty rate increased from 27 percent in 1980 to 66 percent in 1996; by 
1999, it was estimated that over70 percent lived in poverty and 54 percent in 2004; the 
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annual growth rate has oscillated from 6.23 percent in 2005 to 5.63 percent in 2006 
and less in the preceding years following the introduction of the SAP in 1986. Also, 
the growth rate of the non-oil sector has been less than 9 percent (1999-2006) and the 
ratio of income distribution for those in the richest 20 percent of the population to 
those in the poorest 20 percent stood at 12.8 percent in 2004 (see BusinessDay, 2007; 
UNDP, 2004; NBS, 2006).  
From a historical perspective, the country’s economic crises triggered off in the early 
1980s as a result of the fall in the world price for crude oil in the international market. 
This situation exposed fundamentally the structural contradictions that underlie the 
nation’s post-independence economic process which neglected the agricultural sector, 
thus bringing to fore the Dutch-disease syndrome which is associated with making 
crude oil export the mainstay of our economic development. This contradiction was 
also ably manifested in the country’s adoption of the Import Substitution 
Industrialization (ISI) model, which defined the pattern upon which our local industry 
was structured. The economic crunch in the 1980s, however, dealt a heavy blow on the 
ISI strategy in Nigeria as scarcity of raw materials and difficulties associated with the 
sourcing of foreign exchange for the importation of spare parts for industries proved 
unbearable for the manufacturing sector (Onyeonoru, 2005:93; Umoren, 2001:4).     
However, prior to the beginning of the economic crises, the national economy 
appeared to have witnessed a massive expansion on all front, thanks to the oil boom of 
the 1970s and the early 1980s, where the revenue accruing to the state from crude oil 
sales rose from US$ 4 billion in 1975 to 26 billion dollars in 1980 (see Ezekiel, 
2003:8; Omoruyi, 1987:29-33). Such phenomenal growth in revenue earnings 
underpinned the massive growth of the public sector, where government became the 
prime mover of the economy investing large sum in social, infrastructural, and 
economic activities with total government employment accounting for 60 percent of 
the modern sector (see Bangura and Beckman, 1984). Besides, the nation’s production 
and consumption pattern, socio-cultural values, style of economic management, 
policies and programmes implemented were also affected (see Olaniyan, 1996). This 
was not to be unexpected as the state was viewed by the general populace to play a 
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liberating role, which included not only ensuring national independence but also the 
freeing of the citizenry from poverty, disease, hunger and illiteracy.   
However, with the fall in crude oil price in 1981, the revenue accruing to the state fell 
drastically to US$ 17.2 billion in 1981, US$ 12.8 billion in 1982, a situation which 
immediately set off major crisis that spread quickly to other sectors of the economy 
(Omoruyi, op cit.; Olukoshi, 1990:30-1; Fashoyin, 1993:80). The implication of this 
crunch was the collapse of the nation’s industrial sector capacity to produce basic 
consumer goods and import raw-materials and spare parts due to the state’s inability to 
meet industries’ foreign exchange needs given their Import Substitution 
Industrialization strategy (Onyeonoru, op. cit.; UNIDO, 1985). This in turn fuelled the 
inflationary spiral in the economy following increases in the price of consumer goods 
that were in short supply which in turn affected the general living conditions of the 
majority of the people.  
Furthermore, the country’s revenue position began to show considerable strains as 
budget deficit grew. Unable to sustain its expenditure as its pre-crisis levels, 
government began to embark on imprudent foreign borrowing from private and official 
international financial sources to sustain its spending programmes which lay the basis 
for the country’s debt crisis that has served to compound the problems afflicting the 
wider country (Olukoshi, 1990). Also, infrastructural facilities began to show signs of 
decay just as social services sector suffered severe neglect following government 
dwindling revenue fortune which by 1986 amounted to only US$ 5.2 billion. Some 
scholars have argued that this was the most severe economic crisis that the Nigerian 
state has experienced since its creation as an Anglo-colonial project (Bangura, 1982:1). 
To redress this trend of dwindling economic depression and recession, the Shagari 
administration introduced the economic stabilization act in April, 1982, which is a 
package of stringent demand-management austerity measures that entail cut in public 
spending, lending rates regulations, restrictions on borrowing to the private sector. 
Unfortunately, these measures could not correct the economic downturn, which 
continued with the Buhari regime which was later replaced by the Babangida 
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administration in 1985. It was the administration of Ibrahim Babangida that on 27th 
June, 1986 began the implementation of the neo-liberal policy of structural adjustment, 
after having declared a fifteen month economic emergency where deductions were 
ordered from employees’ salaries and corporate profits to strengthen existing demand-
management policies (CBN, 1986:10).  
The neo-liberal policy measures of privatization, deregulation and liberalization were 
mainly predicated on the World Bank/IMF initiated model for curtailing fiscal and 
external imbalances for developing countries which were experiencing high incidence 
of external debt indebtedness owed it and other bi-lateral institutions since the early 
1980s (Mills, 1989:5). Consequently, the key feature of neo-liberal policy was its 
studied reliance on market forces to correct the perceived distortion in the economy, 
particularly the over-valuation of the naira which was adjusted. As a direct 
consequence of devaluation, many industrial firms had to suspend production or scaled 
down capacity utilization in response to the high exchange rates that increased 
manufacturing costs owing to the high import content of that sector’s products.  
As such, the manufacturing sector has been experiencing a decline since the 1990s, 
thus culminating in an average growth of 1.6 percent between 1990 and 1996, an 
annual growth rate of between 3-6 percent (1999-2006) with average capacity 
utilization of less than 50 percent which is a far cry from the 70 percent it attained in 
1980, a drop in the annual GDP per capita manufacturing contribution from 4.32 
percent in 1999 to 3.79 percent in 2005 (NBS, 2006; 2005; MAN, 2006; Vanguard, 
1999). Since its introduction in 1986, the neo-liberal policy has become part and parcel 
of the dynamics of the country’s economic crunch, exacerbating existing pre-
adjustment problems whilst creating new ones specific to its own contradictions. This 
is because the nations that architect of SAP or economic reforms promised to make 
richer got poorer and went from being heavily indebted to being severely indebted and 
economically distressed (Umoren, 2001:5-6). 
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2.2 ECONOMIC POLICY IN NIGERIA 
The first post independent attempt at evolving a set of economic programmes for the 
transformation of the Nigerian economy in Nigeria came with the first development 
plan of 1962-68, which was interrupted by the Nigerian civil war. This was followed 
by the reconstruction plan of 1970-74 which was carried out by the Gowon regime and 
later followed by a series of other development and vision plans by subsequent 
administrations such as the 1975-80 and 1981-85 plans, Rolling plan, Vision 2010 and 
the present Vision 2020 which is aimed at making the nation’s economy as one of the 
world top economies. According to Kazuhara (1993), these development plans were 
designed as a mechanism for identifying appropriate programmes and policies for 
government intervention in the various sectors of the economy in order to take care of 
areas of market failure and to provide appropriate signals for private sector operators. 
However, the policies enshrined in these economic development plans did not achieve 
their set objectives due to poor implementation and lack of local ownership in its 
content formulation, while the choice of projects for development planning and 
programming were determined only by the objective of achieving growth through 
import substitution industrialization (Fakiyesi, 1999:194). This aid-dependent 
development strategy over the years has weakened the ability of the country for 
initiating independent policies, thus leaving the nation at the mercy of donor nations 
(Saitoti, op cit: 7; Umoren, 2001:5). 
To compound the situation, the approach to development planning was top-down, as it 
failed to reckon with the following factors: the executive capacity, the absorptive 
capacity of the economy; and the ability to generate the required funds for the 
identified projects. Besides, the choice of programmes and projects was without the 
normal rudiments of transparency and openness required for selection of projects, and 
in addition, such programmes were neither properly evaluated, nor their cost benefits 
analysis properly analyzed (Ibid, 195). The implication of these development plans 
including the SAP or economic reform measures for the economy was that they were 
short, medium and not long term economic policy.  In fact, it has been stressed that in 
Nigeria, over the past four decades, much emphasis has been placed on the pursuit of 
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short and medium term economic growth policy that are externally driven (Olomola, 
2004:323).  However, most of the development plans, vision goals and the economic 
reforms programme did not achieve their goals due to issues blamed on poor policy 
formulation and implementation, resource constraints, political instability, bad 
governance, corruption and lack of majority participation at all levels. Also, the entire 
economic policies lacked continuity, consistency and they were adopted on ad hoc 
basic given the political expediency of the time (see Adepoju, 1993:81). It was, 
therefore, little wonder that the people for whom economic development policies were 
meant were neither consulted nor taken into confidence in the designing of the 
development strategy.  
The fallout of the consequences associated with the failure of these development plans 
and policy strategy to achieve their set goals brought to fore the issue of economic 
distortion associated with “oil wealth illusion” which has become the nation’s 
albatross. This was exemplified by cases of white elephant projects such as the 
Agricultural Development Projects (ADPs), industrialization projects such as the two 
steel plants at Aladja and Ajaokuta with neither backward nor forward linkages; decay 
of social infrastructure, increasing unemployment and poverty, destruction of domestic 
industry, particularly agriculture (Ojo, 1982). Despite the large flow of revenue from 
oil export in the 1990s, these processes have remained unabated as the neo-liberal 
policy put in place to address the economic crises have not fared well in creating the 
absorptive capacity that would fundamentally restructure the Nigerian economy. This 
is manifested in the nation’s inability to develop its industrial base, advance the 
productive sector particularly the manufacturing, agricultural and informal sectors, and 
ensure the adequate provision social and physical infrastructures necessary to facilitate 
the processes of development.  
2.2.1 THE ECONOMIC REFORM ERA 
The SAP or economic reforms period which started in 1986, was another opportunity 
at engaging in the process of economic reconstruction. This was in response to finding 
solutions to the mal-functioning of the economy arising from resource 
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mismanagement, corruption and lack of endogenous direction occasioned by the “oil 
wealth illusion”, ill-externally conceived programmes and foreign debt obligations to 
international financial creditors like the IMF/World Bank. The goal of SAP was to 
create a new environment for the transformation of major sectors of the economy 
through the policies of privatization, market reforms and liberalization, deregulations 
and exchange rates devaluation. The ultimate objective was to achieve non-inflationary 
growth and to stimulate domestic production of tradeable goods (Adeyemi, 1996).  
It was believed that this process of restructuring and diversifying the productive base 
of the economy by allowing the private sector to drive the economy with the state 
playing a minimalist role, will generate economic growth that will be used to reduce 
the observable inequality in the economy. Since the rise of conservative neo-liberal 
macro-economic orthodoxy in the industrialized countries, especially the United States 
and the United Kingdom, many analysts of the neo-liberal school have attributed much 
of Africa’s economic malaise to the magnitude of state intervention in economic 
activity (Balassa, 1984:317-39). The school views state intervention as self serving and 
inefficient, crowding out available productive resources from more efficient private 
sector. As such, proponents of this school advocated the curtailment of the role of the 
state and the expansion of the market mechanism. This was to be carried out by 
measures such as reduction of public expenditures, elimination of subsidies, 
privatization of state owned enterprises (SOEs), decontrolling prices, interest rates, 
exchange rates and imports. Sponsored by the IMF/World Bank and the industrial 
powers led by the United States, the neo-liberal policy has now become the dominant 
ideology underlining much of North-South economic relations (see Mengisteab, 1995).      
While it is recognizable that the state in Third World countries particularly those in 
sub-Saharan Africa are well known for their shortcomings which include corruption, 
mismanagement and patrimonial tendencies, yet, the state is still a necessary 
mechanism for redistributing wealth in economies with market structures, especially as 
the market mechanism is not itself faultless. Not only does the market share some of 
the shortcomings of the state, it has its own problems. Although private enterprise may 
be more efficient and streamlined, it panders directly to the interests of the powerful by 
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subordinating the concerns of the poor (Logan, 2002).  Fundamentally, SAP or 
economic reforms like other economic programme before it did not address the 
people’s problem of deteriorating living conditions and poor welfare. Rather than these 
reform policies revolve around Nigeria’s problems of poverty, inequality and declining 
human development, the measures were overtly concentrated on market reforms to the 
neglect of redistributive reforms (Fakiyesi, 1999:197; Mengisteab and Logan, 1995).  
Unfortunately, the position of the neo-liberal school does not make it clear how 
widespread privatization of education, health, electricity, water supply and other basic 
services will improve the standards of living in the Third World (Logan, op cit : 2) 
However, experience in the developed nations of the world has shown that a single-
minded concentration of the economy on market reforms at the expense of its 
redistributive nature is a less effective approach in promoting socio-economic 
development and reduction of poverty; as the people are denied basic needs, schooling, 
health, political influence and active participation in the immediate environment 
(Fakiyesi, ibid). It is neither clear how the market will provide social services 
(electricity, roads, hospitals, education) out of goodwill nor how the poor will afford 
privatized welfare without state assistance. This has, therefore, raised the question of 
what happens when the state abrogates all its responsibilities to its people in favour of 
establishing an enabling environment for the market? 
While neo-liberal policy dealt with economic sectors by prescribing general solutions 
for all of them, it failed woefully to incorporate in its mechanism measures to cater for 
the poor, the weak and marginalized, many of whom belong to the informal sector in 
most developing countries. The neo-liberal policy also failed to take account of the 
need for integratedness that was required in the implementation of sectoral policies for 
maximum synergies (Fakiyesi, op cit). This is because for any policy framework to be 
effective, it requires enormous public support and sacrifice to succeed. In addition, the 
neo-liberal policy also failed to pay particular attention to how to increase production 
in the non-oil export sector, what the non-oil component should be, and by what means 
the production and distribution could be achieved, or how the output of exportable raw 
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materials should be shared between production for export and non-tradable domestic 
production.  
This was the state in which the economy was running before the coming in of the 
Abacha government in 1993. The Abacha’s regime unlike his predecessor introduced 
the principle of guided liberalization and deregulation of the economy in 1994, as 
interest rate was regulated, centralization of foreign exchange receipts and dual 
exchange rates of the naira remained as its core (Olaniyi, 2004:366; Anyanwu et al 
1997:483). By these policies, the government deviated from the hitherto deregulatory 
stance adopted since the introduction of SAP in 1986 (Hutcheson, 1996). The 
objectives of the 1994 economic policies by the Abacha regime were: 
To restore macroeconomic stability, stimulate growth in the 
productive sectors, and generally improve confidence in the Nigerian 
socio-economic environment. Specific sectoral objectives included 
restoring fiscal discipline and improved financial transparency and 
accountability, achieve exchange stability, reducing the cost of 
borrowing in order to assist producers, increasing capacity utilization 
in the manufacturing sub-sector and generating employment 
opportunities (CBN, 1994). 
However, like the other economic policy measures, this strategy did not achieve much, 
as inflation was very high, averaging 44 percent. Besides, capacity utilization declined, 
further increasing unemployment and the human development index rose marginally to 
0.4 in 1997, in spite of the fact that there was increase in oil exports which led to a 
balance of trade surpluses culminating in accumulated reserves which increased to 
US$ 7.6 billion (CBN, 1998). Following the death of Abacha in 1998, the Abubakar 
regime took over the centre stage in the structuring of economic reform policies for the 
nation. In a more fundamental way, Abubakar returned to the institutionalization of 
economic policies with strong focus on free market enterprise and the deregulation of 
the economy. Among the key economic policies vigorously enunciated by the regime 
were: 
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i. privatization of the energy and oil sector, communication sectors and 
other areas in which private sector involvement can improve the 
performance of the economy;   
ii. removal  of laws and regulations that inhibit competition;  
iii. institutionalization of accountability and transparency into economic 
process; and  
iv. liberalization of the domestic market to allow for foreign direct 
investment and a level playing ground for all participants in the economy 
(Fakiyesi, op cit).   
The main thrust of the government economic policy was to begin the process of 
privatizing major government enterprises and parastatals such as the petroleum 
refinery, power supply, telecommunications and petrochemical company which were 
considered to have considerable impact on the economy. The essence was to improve 
the efficiency of public asset management through the downsizing of public sector 
(CBN, 1998). It was this economic policy platform that set the stage for the coming in 
of the Obasanjo administration in May 29th1999, which set out with the full 
implementation of the provision of the neo-liberal market reforms of privatization, 
deregulation, trade liberalization, and free market enterprise. Since then, the Nigerian 
economy has been groaning precariously under the yoke of increasing retrenchment 
following the privatization of public enterprises and parastatals such as NEPA, NITEL, 
Nigerian Airways, the rolling mills, paper mills. In furtherance of the pursuit of neo-
liberal economic reforms, President Obasanjo in May 2000 announced that the 
petroleum subsidy would be eliminated; therefore a price increase of 50 percent would 
be established (Guardian, 2000). This indeed marked the beginning of incessant price 
increases in the litre of fuel, kerosene and diesel which were changed three times: June 
1, 2000; January 1, 2002 and June 20, 2003 during his first term in office following the 
deregulation of the downstream oil sector in 2000.  
Amazingly, the traditional explanation offered by President Obasanjo for all these 
increases revolved around the following arguments: to remove the ever-present 
government ‘subsidy’ on petroleum products and make them more readily available. 
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Beyond this, the hikes in prices were also meant to curb large-scale smuggling of 
petroleum products to neigbouring countries. In the words of President Olusegun 
Obasanjo, the federal government could not continue to subsidize the petroleum sector 
and still be able to fulfil its social responsibilities. He observed that, ‘subsidizing fuel 
to the tune of N12 per litre is a wasteful way of spending our money, noting that the 
N250 billion subsidy per annum could be saved and used to provide education, health, 
water supply, roads security and food (Abumere, Okafor and Oluwasola, 2002 and 
Oyeranti, 2002). What all this argument meant was that government was shifting the 
costs of its irresponsibility to fix our four refineries to the consumers of petroleum 
products oblivious of the fact that the inflationary implications of hikes in petroleum 
products produce negative consequences on the standard of living of the populace. 
Consequently, to carry on with the neo-liberal economic policy, the government 
developed a new orientation termed National Economic Empowerment and 
Development Strategy (NEEDS) in May, 2004 that focused on ‘homegrown’ strategies 
that would help it better target public policies in support of poverty reduction in line 
with the Millennium Development Goals, whose objectives include: halving the 
number of people living on less than one US dollar per day, reducing maternal and 
child mortality rates and universalizing primary education amongst others.  Also, the 
strategy was aimed at stressing the importance of transparency, reorientation of 
national values and accountability in government so as to reposition the national 
economy toward increased economic growth, employment generation and rapid 
infrastructural development (National Planning Commission, 2004). 
To achieve these goals, the reform policy was designed to address key problems like 
poverty, and inequality, weak and inefficient public service, poor macro-economic 
management. Besides, it also engaged in the financial sector overhaul of commercial 
banks and development of the non-oil sector particularly solid minerals exploration 
(Zenith Economic Quarterly, 2007:72). Along with the reforms in the economy came 
also reforms in most key sectors of the economy to avoid the virtual collapse of the 
entire system. Areas in which reforms have been carried out include the Pension 
reform, Telecommunications, Aviation Industry, the downstream oil sector, Port 
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reform, Electric power sector reform, insurance sector reform and others.  Like all 
other economic policies before it, the reform agenda has focused its primary objectives 
on entrenching macroeconomic stability at the expense of income redistribution that 
would address the problems of poverty and inequality.   
In this context, all sectoral strategic policy thrusts are been targeted at restructuring the 
agricultural, film industry, oil and gas, solid minerals, tourism, banking and financial 
services without any clear-cut policy framework for the informal sector which 
constitute a huge bug of the nation’s total labour force. Similarly, the government in an 
effort to fight against the incidence of poverty which was on the increase established 
the National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP) in January 2001. The objective 
of NAPEP was also to help achieve the United Nations Millennium Development Goal 
(MDGs) of halving the proportion of people living in poverty by the year 2015.  
However, over the years, the effect of the poverty eradication programme on 
alleviating the conditions of the poor has been of mixed feelings. Critics have argued 
that the poverty alleviation or eradication activities have contributed little in the 
peoples’ struggle to survive, as more and more people fall into the poverty region 
instead of escaping (Ezekiel, op cit).  
Examining the Nigerian situation further, evidence abound that the most notable 
features of the development experience during the past many decades is that poverty in 
Nigeria remain widespread (Oyinlade, 2005:2). For instance, the UNDP (2006) human 
poverty table for developing countries puts Nigeria at the 76th position in the human 
poverty index, 52 percent of the population are without access to improved water 
source, 70 percent living on less than one US dollar per day (1999-2004), with 46 
percent of life births not surviving to the age of 40 years (2000-05) and 29 percent of 
the children of five years are underweight (1996-2004). This data buttresses the fact 
that the over concentration of effort on market reforms without providing for the needs 
of the people for whom the reform will invariably benefit is not only less effective in 
promoting economic development and reduction in poverty, but also deny people 
access to basic needs of life, and incapacitating their opportunities to make valued 
choices. This fact was observed by Onimode (1984), who noted that the problems of 
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poverty and rising inequalities constitute the moral core of the crisis of the present 
world system of neo-liberal globalization which explains the country’s perverse 
development or growth without development.  
In all these processes, the key goals of economic reform programmes are meant to 
achieve a “free market” economy - which is the dominant force that shaped European 
civilization since the 19th century and at the very heart of the capitalist ideology which 
underline the current globalization discourse. As such, developing economies have 
been made to believe that their growth depends on the attainment of a free market 
economy subject to global economic rules and practices. As David Korten (1992) puts 
it: 
This faith in the free market rests on the premise that human beings are 
motivated by self-interest and will seek to benefit themselves. 
Therefore this will yield the greatest benefit to individuals and society. 
It follows then that individuals will compete with each other to seek 
their interests. Thus competition among people (as against cooperation) 
is rational (Cited in Zenith Economic Quarterly, 2007:61).     
In all cases, the economic reform measures have always failed to meet its set target and 
further impoverish the people as well as leaving countries worse off than before the 
reform began. For instance, in Peru after the SAP reforms began in 1990, fuel prices 
shot up 31 times and the price of bread increased 12 times. In Mexico, health budget in 
the 1980s fell from 4.7 percent to 2.7 percent, with half of all Mexicans in 1990 living 
in poverty, and 18 million living in conditions of extreme poverty and widespread 
malnutrition (Zenith Economic Quarterly, 2007:64-65). With these experiences, it is 
not surprising that SAP or economic reform policies have been characterized by 
violent public protest and riots wherever and whenever they are proposed from 
Venezuela in 1989 following a 200 percent rise in the price of bread; Tunisia in 1984 
due to rise in food prices, and Nigeria in 1989 where the anti-SAP student riots led to 
the closure of six universities by the military government. These economic reform 
policies of government which are externally imposed have always serve the interest of 
the global market which benefits the metropolitan economy more than the satellite 
economy, thus completely eroding domestic economic productivity.  
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2.3 THE INFORMAL SECTOR IN NIGERIA   
For the most part, African countries are not yet market societies, mainly because of the 
limited development of capitalism which is anchored on industrialization. Also 
associated with this is the fact that over 60 percent of the population of Africa is rural, 
with mostly peasants engaged in subsistence farming (see Ake, 2000:166). Most 
developing economies particularly in sub-Saharan Africa are not necessarily the sphere 
of capitalism as the urban labour market is largely informal (Ogunrinola, 2007:74; 
Abumere et al., 1998). The real economic sector in Africa in terms of the numbers 
involved in urban labour market comes from the informal sector which accounts for 
more than 50 percent of urban jobs and between 20-80 percent of the labour force in 
most African nations (Population Reports, 2002; MacGaffey, 1988; UNDP, 1994:25). 
Nigeria has the largest and arguably the most dynamic informal sector in sub-Saharan 
Africa given its huge population size. Since the imposition of SAP or economic 
reforms, informal activity has expanded from an estimated 50 percent of the urban 
workforce in the late 1970s to over 65 percent by the late 1980s (ILO, 1999; The 
Economist, 1984; Meagher and Yunusa, 1996: 1; Sethuraman, 1981).  
The high degree of informality in the Nigerian economy emanates from the fact that 
the formal economy is too small compared to the magnitude of the labour force 
seeking wage work therein. And since there is no form of employment benefits from 
the government in a developing nation like Nigeria, those who are unable to secure 
formal employment and cannot afford to remain openly unemployed pick up some 
work to do in the informal sector. Such works include all kinds of trading activities, 
street hawking, technical services like motor vehicle repairs, electronics and electrical 
repairs, barbing, welding, plumbing, driving, manufacturing ventures like brick 
making, shoemaking and tailoring; among many others (see Gafar and Umar, 2004; 
Fliutman,1989).     
The informal sector concept was introduced into economic development analysis by 
Hart (1973) in his study of employment opportunities in Ghana. It was brought to 
prominence by the ILO/UNDP examination of employment in Kenya, where the term 
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was used to describe enterprises that are outside government regulations (ILO, 1972). 
Such enterprises also operated outside the incentive system offered by the government 
and other private institutions. Since then, the literature on the informal sector has 
grown phenomenally over the last two decades. The term informal sector has been 
severally defined by scholars as there is no consensus as to its precise description. It 
has been defined by legal status, organization and control of production, size of 
enterprise or production technology (see De Soto, 1989; Feige, 1990).  
Oni (1994) sees the informal sector in terms of its spongy capacity to absorb those who 
are at any time marginalized from gainful employment in the modern sector. Portes 
and Walton (1981:87) and Fluitman (1989) see the informal sector as encompassing 
“all income-producing activities outside formal wages and social security payments”, 
incorporating the diversity and heterogeneity of economic activities. In the same vein, 
Portes, Castells and Benton (1989:12) refer to it as consisting of a very specific social 
group made up of the unemployed, migrants and low income wage earners who engage 
in production and service activities “unregulated by the institutions of society, in a 
legal and social environment in which similar activities are regulated.”  
Perhaps, the most frequently adopted definition comes from the International Labour 
Organization (1972), which sees the informal sector as an unregulated economic and 
financial activities not registered in national accounts. It is characterized by ease of 
entry, reliance on indigenous resources, small scale operation, family ownership of 
enterprise, labour intensive and adaptive technology, skills acquired outside the formal 
school system or training programmes, and unregulated and uncompetitive markets. 
Other classifications of the sector are many and varied. According to Abumere et al 
(1998) the informal sector has been characterized as invisible, irregular, backyard, 
unorganized, subterranean, hidden, unreported, unobserved, residual and parallel.  
In addition, the sector has also been represented as the real sector (McNeill, 1993), the 
economy of the poor (Hemmer et al., 1989), indigenous entrepreneurship and 
microenterprises (Tokman, 1989). Some other features of the informal sector are: 
small scale establishment, rudimentary, make-shift structures, employees with little 
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education and limited knowledge of the formal sector amenities like bank loans and 
bureaucracy (Odekunle, 2000:9). It is, therefore, easy to infer that the most striking 
feature of informal sector studies is the numerous ways in which it is used and these 
characterization best suit the informal sector of Lagos, Nigeria. Bromley (1987) 
reckons that the informal sector is largely ignored, rarely supported, often unregulated 
and sometimes actively discouraged by government. 
While informal economy has a long history, scholars began to pay attention to it in the 
second half of the twentieth century, first in the developing countries and later in the 
developed nations. By the mid-1990s, the informal economy had emerged as an integral 
component of national economies in the developing and developed societies.         
Implicit in the development of the informal sector is the conception of dualism as it 
relates to the urban economies of the Third World, which is based upon one or more of 
the following factors: mode of production, mode of organization and scale of activities; 
organized and unorganized sectors or simply large and small-scale activities (see Boeke, 
1953; Hirschman, 1958; Paauw et al., 1973). Other factors that have helped to sharpen 
the dualism between the two sub-systems of the formal and informal sector and brought 
its significance as employment generation avenue derived from our colonial heritage, 
patterns of trade, patterns of allocation of resources with an urban bias, presence of 
multi-national corporations and international transfer of technologies, (see ILO, 1973; 
Weeks, 1975; Sethuraman, 1976). However, the two sectors may be distinguished in 
terms of the mode of production, organization and scale of activities: formal sector 
consisting of activities using modern modes of production and organization comparable 
to the developed world and hence are larger in scale of operation as compared to those 
of the informal sector (Geertz, 1963:63). 
Accordingly, the informal sector is one where free entries to new enterprises exist; 
enterprises in this sector rely on indigenous resources; they are family-owned and small 
scale; they use labour intensive and adapted technology; their workers rely on non-
formal source of education and skills and finally they operate in unregulated and 
competitive markets. Correspondingly, the formal sector enterprises possess 
characteristics adverse to the above-entry for new enterprises is difficult, the firms rely 
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frequently on overseas resources; they are generally subject to corporate ownership and 
large scale operation; they use capital intensive and often imported technology; their 
workers possess education and skills acquired through formal sources and they operate 
in protected markets. The formal and informal dichotomy is probably the latest of the 
dualistic models to come into the development literature, having been used by Hart 
(1973), but popularized in a series of papers in the 1970s by the International Labour 
Organization (see Merrick, 1976; Tokman, 1978).  
The framework presented above suggests that the informal sector consists of small-scale 
units engaged in the production and distribution of goods and services with the primary 
objective of generating employment and incomes to their participants notwithstanding 
the constraints on capital, both physical and human, and know-how. The informal sector 
enterprises can be interpreted as belonging to the lower end of the urban continuum of 
enterprises. The informal sector units can therefore be expected, in principle, to 
overcome the capital and skill constraints over time and thus assimilate themselves with 
enterprises; the extent to which they succeed in breaking such barriers in practice is 
however an empirical question and depends on a number of a factors. Viewed in this 
framework, the term “small enterprise” as commonly used can be interpreted as 
belonging to the middle of the continuum; it uses a mode of production and organization 
similar to the  formal sector enterprise but on a relatively small scale. It is therefore 
sometimes labeled as the intermediate sector. Perhaps the distinguishing feature 
between the informal sector unit and the small enterprise is their orientation: whereas 
the former is motivated primarily by employment creation, the latter is concerned 
primarily with profit maximization (see Abumere et al., 1998:5; 1978).   
 The concept elaborated above suggests that the informal production units are motivated 
by employment generation and that they have little capital (and skills) at their disposal. 
They are relatively labour-intensive unit using simple technologies of production due to 
capital constraints, access to limited technical know-how and have low-value added per 
worker as compared to the formal sector firms.  To put it more plainly, the formal sector 
can be described in terms of a high labour productivity while the informal sector is 
characterized by low labour productivity. Thus the bulk of the people engaged in the 
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informal sector are self-employed and not working for wages.  Finally, the sector can 
also be characterized in terms of certain basic traits of its participants and/or 
opportunities and constraints available to them. Then, it should also be noted that the 
traits of individual participants (rural/urban origin), age, sex, ethnic background, level 
of education, skills and the like, would seem to explain the differential values, attitudes, 
behaviours and motivations observed in the two sub-systems. 
However, the dualist conception of urban economies in most Third World countries 
have been criticized for assuming that the informal and formal sector are separate and 
independent, whereas, in fact, they interact. Some scholars have argued that there is lack 
of clarity by this dichotomy model on sectors which exist outside the formal/informal 
sectors such as the state sector and the executive/professional sectors (see Bromley, 
1978). According to Brombey (1978), the dichotomy is even less applicable to 
households since some members work in the formal and others in the informal sector. 
Besides, many of the characteristics used to distinguish the sectors are not unique to 
either of them. For instance, elements such as labour-intensive technology, reliance on 
indigenous institutions and practices, and family ownership of enterprises exit in 
varying degrees in both the informal and formal sectors. Despite these criticisms, the 
application of the dichotomy model in this study is very much appropriate as the use of 
the term informal sector and features are concerned. This is significantly so as there is 
little doubt that the term more accurately describes the breadth and heterogeneity of all 
the activities usually classified under the two sectors. Furthermore, the use of this 
pattern also enables us to retain the conceptual link with existing studies, a link which is 
vital in the comparison of findings and in policy analysis 
In the literature, researchers have studied the informal sector for different purposes. 
Some writers such as Kelly (1994) have studied the informal sector because of its 
implications for the macro economy. Some have studied it because of its employment 
potential (Hart, 1973, Roberts, 1991) or income implications (Amin, 1987). Others 
have focused on the links between it and the formal sector (Hemmer et al., 1989) or its 
relevance for the new institutional economic approach to development studies (Feige, 
1990). However, this study focuses on the social cost implications of Nigeria’s neo-
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liberal policy on human development in the informal sector of Lagos State, Nigeria. 
This is critically so as the informal sector has come to represent the people’s 
spontaneous and creative response to the state’s incapacity to satisfy the basic needs of 
the impoverished masses (see De Soto, 1989: xiv-xv). 
Measuring the size, employment structure and other characteristics in the informal 
sector in Nigeria is not an easy task. However, estimates suggest that the sector 
accounts for between 45 percent and 60 percent of the urban labour force, up from 25 
percent in the mid 1960s (Nwaka, 1992; Okunola, 2001). Also, the CBN/FOS/NISER 
(2001) nation-wide study of urban informal sector reported that a whooping 12.14 
million jobs were generated by 8.6 million of enterprises in urban informal sector in 
Nigeria. Besides, Loayza (1996) finds the size of the informal sector to positively 
correlate with tax burdens, labour market restriction and inefficient government 
institutions; but negatively correlated with real per capital GDP. Similarly, Friedman et 
al. (2000) found the size of the informal sector is positively correlated with costs of 
bureaucracy and the level of corruption within the country studied. The development 
of the informal sector in Nigeria follows closely the general pattern of economic/urban 
development in the country. Each phase in the development of the cities and the 
economy has its own dynamics in informal sector development. British colonial rule 
neither anticipated nor approved of the growth of large urban populations. Although 
many port cities, river ports, rail-side towns and administrative centres owe their 
growth to the activities generated by the European presence, the colonial officials 
remained oblivious to the idea of rapid urban growth and tended to see the cities as an 
unfortunate by-product of colonial activities which had to be firmly contained in order 
to avoid political subversion and social disorganization. 
The towns were not conceived as or promoted as centres for industrial production, for 
job creation and self-sustained growth, but rather as small enclaves for the 
administrative, colonial trade and transportation. The policies and the institutions for 
urban development, where they existed, were very restrictive and myopic, especially in 
the critical areas of land use control, planning, and the provision of infrastructure and 
services. Planning and housing policy were used as an instrument of segregation to 
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ensure that the small community of Europeans was protected in segregated high 
quality residential reservations (Omuta, 1986; Stock, 1988). Sadly, the laws, codes, 
regulations and institutions designed for the small populations envisaged in colonial 
cities have been inherited with little rethinking by post-colonial administrations; and 
have naturally been quickly overtaken by and overwhelmed by the process of rapid 
urban growth and post-colonial administration.  
The expansion of the private sector and the pursuit of import-substitution 
industrialization in the years after independence gave a boost to urban employment and 
urban growth in the informal and formal sectors. In post-colonial Nigeria and other 
African countries, many analysts have observed a new process of urbanization 
unleashed by the masses of relatively low income migrants, who have flocked into the 
cities to solve their problems of accommodation and employment informally, and on 
their own terms. The urban poor are now dominant and in most cases are transforming 
the city to meet their needs, often in conflict with official laws and plans (Mabogunje, 
1992; Fapohunda, 1985).  
Arising from this background, it becomes evident that the development of the Nigerian 
informal sector since attaining independence took place in an environment where the 
formal sector was regarded as the real engine of economic growth. Activities in the 
informal sector were classified variously as traditional crafts and petty trade in the 
subsistence sector, or as small scale enterprise within the formal sector, and treated as 
such (Dike, 1997). No effort was, however, made to protect informal sector operations 
and products from competition with imported mass produced goods, hence the 
informal sector operators tended to gravitate towards trading, service provision and 
transportation.  
Despite this lack of effective state support, the informal sector continued to grow, 
fueled by the advent of oil boom in the 1970s, the neglect of the agricultural sector and 
the more attractive climate created by rising urban wages associated with increased 
opportunities in administration, construction, commerce and services, thus resulting in 
high rates of rural-urban migration. Nonetheless, the major impetus for the rapid 
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expansion of informal economy in Nigeria results from the deterioration of conditions 
in the public and organized private sectors, the economic recession/crisis of the late 
1970s and early 1980s, and the imposition of neo-liberal policy measures which 
formally began in 1986. Besides the rapid growth of the informal sector, conditions in 
the sector have been exacerbated by the nation’s lack of economic diversification, 
insufficient investment capital, low level of technology, inadequate infrastructural base 
which have limited its capital output ratio (that is the ratio of the level of equipment or 
capital relative to output) to development (see Mabogunje, 1994; Meagher, 1991b).  
However, the informal sector over the years has provided the “safety net” that 
accommodates the unemployed, the poor, the unskilled, by utilizing family labour and 
resources to make a living. It has also provided space for myriads of workers who have 
left their previous formal sector jobs for reasons of retrenchment and retirement. As 
Morgan (1989) puts it, ‘though detailed statistics on the enterprises are hard to come 
by owing to lack of extensive databases, it is clear that in many countries their role is 
extremely important as contributors to the nation’s wealth, labour force and 
entrepreneurship. Available evidence from economies such as Indonesia, South Korea, 
Bangladesh, India and Ghana which have exhibited success in developing the informal 
sector shows that micro-enterprises are major engines in industrial and commercial 
development when there positive comparative attributes are harnessed and developed 
alongside the formal economy (see Evans et al., 2006). The businesses from the 
informal sector also contribute important connecting points between the various 
sectors of the economy where flexibility of products and services supplied play a 
crucial role in the commercial network of the country. It has also created avenues for 
the middle and upper income persons and rich entrepreneurs to moonlight in a variety 
of activities in this sector as a means of survival strategy in order to weather the 
adverse consequences of the liberalization and deregulation policy (Tripp, 1990:49; 
Dike, 1992).  
In spite of the employment problems in the urban sector (open unemployment, 
disguised unemployment, job and skill mismatch), the rate of growth in the informal 
sector in Lagos State has remained high due to rural-urban migration brought about by 
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the high concentration of development efforts in the city having been the former 
capital as well as the commercial and industrial hub of Nigeria (see Okowa, 1987). 
Since migration is age and gender dependent, the city of Lagos has experienced a very 
high concentration of labour force growth that far exceeds the rate of growth of formal 
sector jobs. As such, the informal sector has provided the anchor for housing many of 
these migrants. For instance, Fapohunda et al. (1975) found that 50 percent of the 
labour force in Lagos was involved in the informal activities. The informal sector of 
Lagos can be said to be mainly engaged in the production and distribution of goods 
with about 70 percent of persons engaged in rendering service activities. The 
production of other different types of services, including fabrication constitutes about 
21 percent of economic activities undertaken in the informal sector (Fapohunda, 
1985:30). Informal sector enterprises in Lagos are predominantly one man businesses 
with most of them being single proprietorships (Abumere, Arimah and Jerome, 
1998:23).  
However, over the last two decades, the sector has grown in leaps and bounds due to 
the emerging trends of urbanization, rising unemployment, population growth and the 
socioeconomic policies of government in the country. In spite of this expansion in 
generating employment opportunities which was clearly acknowledged in Nigeria’s 
Third Development Plan (1975-1980), the government has not thought it expedient to 
provide specific public policy framework for the sector as a viable and significant 
engine of development (see Meagher et. al, op cit:3). This is in contrast to the 
Economic Commission for Africa (1992) Study on African economies, which 
indicated that the informal sector’s contribution in the Africa countries is estimated at 
about 20 percent while its contribution to the GDP of the non-agricultural sector stood 
at 34 percent and that of Nigeria stands at 25 percent. 
Consequently, the informal sector in Lagos is presently characterized by varied 
challenges arising from Nigeria’s implementation of economic reform measures which 
have completely altered its nature and composition, the social and structural conditions 
in which it operates as well as the linkage between it and other sectors. For instance, 
following Nigeria’s economic recession which began in 1981 as a result of the sharp 
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fall in oil prices, infrastructural and social services expansion in Lagos State has been 
on the decline over the years. Energy and water access, sewage, transportation and 
housing have all being adversely affected, and these challenges had severely affected 
the well-being of the generality of the populace, particularly the self employed 
persons, majority of who belong to the informal sector.  
Similarly, the age and educational distribution of the informally employed persons 
have become similar to that in the formal sector as more educated adults (within 21- 49 
years) have found themselves in the sector (see Ogunrinola, 2007:83-8; Folawewo, 
2006; Roberts, 1991). Besides, operators in the sector still continue to experience 
problems of low productivity, low real incomes, poor working conditions and few 
opportunities for advancement (Mabogunje, 1994). Although some of the more 
structured groups of the sector, such as street traders and artisans, tend to have an 
entrepreneurial character to generate incomes. Nonetheless, the activities of the sector 
is still marginalized, vulnerable and characterized by limited markets, inadequate 
economic returns arising from the economic policies of deregulation, trade 
liberalization, currency devaluation, subsidy removal and privatization which have 
resulted in high exchange rates, high prices for petroleum products, high production 
costs, and skyrocketing inflation.   
These conditions contrast the earlier held perspective that most of those in this sector 
are there by default i.e., who for the absence of jobs in both the public and organized 
private sectors had nowhere else to go; but to settle in the sector to earn their 
livelihood as a survival strategy (see Latouche, 1993:49). However, further studies 
have shown that this is not entirely true, as the informal economy has emerged in most 
Third World nations as a direct byproduct of the advent of a deregulated open world 
economy which acts as a substitute to a weak formal economy (Amin et al., 2002). As 
such, there has been strong clamour on the need to develop policy intervention that 
should assist and protect those in the sector who are seen as extensive in marginalized 
populations (see ILO, 2007:1). Consequently, several motives have been adduced for 
the participation of persons in this sector which varies along these lines:  
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i. Labour market flexibility: Many, particularly women, prefer this sector 
because it offers flexibility in participation e.g., combining household 
responsibilities with income earning opportunities by choosing their 
own hours and place of work as well as the activities (see Mabogunje, 
1994).  
ii. Existence of profitable opportunities: Some enter this sector voluntarily 
because there are profitable opportunities. Being small these units are in 
an advantageous position to exploit the market niches waiting to be 
exploited, by offering tailored services (which large enterprises may not 
find attractive or capable of offering) and thus enjoy natural protection 
(e.g., many wage workers leave formal sector to establish own 
enterprises in the informal).  
iii. Non-compliance with regulations: Many units often choose to be small 
and remain unregistered or unlicensed or invisible and thus get 
mislabeled into the informal sector so that they can avoid compliance 
with some or all regulations, since compliance with them generally adds 
to costs burden. One should, however, make a distinction between those 
who can afford to comply with regulations (i.e., their business revenue 
is high enough to bear the cost of regulations) and those who cannot 
because their incomes are too low. In other words many non-poor may 
also form part of the informal sector. This is in addition to wage earners 
who also moonlight in the informal sector partly due to poor wages and 
job insecurity (see Sethuraman, 1997; Bender, 2004). 
Though the motives for participation in the informal sector vary for operators, they do 
have a single common characteristic which is that each unit is independent and free to 
make its own decision about the business to take part in. The policy implications of 
this is that the incomes and productivity of these units can be influenced through direct 
assistance programmes aimed at strengthening their productive capacity as well as by 
changing the business environment in which they operate (ECOSOC, 2006). It is clear 
from the above that the urban informal sector is not one homogenous category; there 
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are different kinds of activities, different sizes of business, with different motives for 
participation. It is also evident that both poor and non-poor participate in the informal 
sector. As such, any strategy to raise incomes of workers in this sector should 
recognize these differences. Some of these salient features are: 
i. two thirds or more of these units are owned and operated by individuals 
as own account business or as family enterprises;  
ii. only a third (or less) engage paid workers; wage employment therefore 
constitutes only a fraction of total employment in this sector;  
iii. many of the owner-operators being poor, these units possess little 
capital by way of investment; and.  
iv. few operators have adequate premises, if they possess one at all; and 
many lack minimum infrastructure (see Sethuraman, 1997; Mabogunje, 
1994:27).  
The informal sector in Lagos, Nigeria through its expansion over the years has brought 
a lot of benefits to the citizenry in spite of operating in a hostile policy environment 
and without subsidy from the government. Many poor people have benefitted by 
gaining access to incomes through employment in the sector since capital investment 
required to create a job is only a small fraction of what is needed in the formal sector.  
Other units in the sector are engaged in recycling of materials through collection and 
disposal of garbage in cities and thus contribute to a better environment. Also, the bulk 
of the medium and low-income housing in developing countries is produced by the 
informal sector operators who function as masons, bricklayers and labourers. These 
arguments, therefore, emphasize the need to promote the employment and incomes of 
operators in the urban informal sector.   
Furthermore, units in the informal sector provide vital connecting points between the 
various sectors of the economy where flexibility of products and services supplied play 
a crucial role in the commercial network of the country. They also have in addition the 
highly desirable quality of being in virtually all cases home grown enterprises and as 
such do not carry with them the same risk encountered by foreign firms seeking to 
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introduce operating methods that are inapplicable to local conditions (Morgan, 1989). 
On the other hand, the sector suffers from a variety of constraints, including lack of 
access to resources and markets as well as land and infrastructure which hampers its 
capacity to participate in development as effectively as the formal sector. Furthermore, 
the physical and human endowments of the microenterprises in the sector are also very 
limited, coupled with operating in a hostile political, social, cultural and institutional 
environment (see Jerome, 1996; Amin, 1981).  
2.4THE LINKAGES BETWEEN THE INFORMAL AND FORMAL SECTOR 
The contribution of the informal sector to economic development can also be viewed 
from the interaction among the various operating units in the sector and between the 
informal sector operators and those in the formal sector. Both sectors should be seen as 
intertwined with each other, albeit in a mutually iterative relationship rather than one 
arising as a consequence of the other. According to Lanjouw (1998) the relationship 
among the operators in the informal sector and the relationship between the informal 
sector operators and the formal sector operators have contributed to the growth of the 
informal sector, and to its contribution to economic development and poverty 
reduction. For instance, the linkages among informal sector operators (in terms of the 
supply of labour, technical services, finance, raw materials and equipment) has helped 
improve the quality of goods and services produced by the operators. For instance, it 
was reported that ‘most (of the) enterprises that employed fewer workers derive a 
greater proportion of their raw materials and other inputs locally and largely from the 
informal sector. In concrete terms, the extent of informal-informal linkages ranges 
from 75 percent for locally fabricated machineries to 81 percent for marketing of 
output (CBN/FOS/NISER, 2001). This contrasts with the formal sector enterprises, 
which relies mostly on imported inputs leading to low value added. 
Furthermore, their relationship with the formal sector has made them powerful 
distributors for the goods and services produced by the formal sector enterprises. The 
formal sector enterprises are also known to provide input and services to informal 
sector enterprises through sub-contracting. Also, many large scale, formal sector 
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enterprises from manufacturing enterprises, departmental to fast food outfits have also 
engaged the informal sector operators and enterprises to produce spare parts, 
components and various goods and services for them (see Johnson, 1992).  For 
instance, Abumere (1980) emphasize that not only do many farmers in the traditional 
sector produce for the modern sector and even export, but that the links between the 
formal and informal sector are even more striking. Studies have established that there 
is more demand for informal goods from outside the sector than from within it. 
According to Abumere et al (1998), most of the items now sold by most large scale 
organizations such as UTC and Leventis supermarkets since importation became 
unprofitable due to excessive devaluation of the naira comes from the informal sector. 
These include garments, bed sheets, shoes, crafts goods, furniture and so on.    
Indeed, the World Bank (1989, 1987) is of the view that the key strategy for the 
promotion of the informal sector should be the strengthening of its link with the formal 
sector through increased patronage. This line of thinking is based on the assumption 
that the orders from the formal sector will break the cycle of low productivity currently 
endemic in the informal sector by expanding the scope of its market and enabling the 
transfer of modern technology and managerial expertise. Thus, any public policy that 
is aimed at enhancing internal production with the goal of achieving self reliance must 
start from encouraging links between the formal and informal sector, since these tend 
to reduce production costs. The vast policy implications arising from these links thus 
warrant that considerable research effort be devoted to it.   
2.5 THE CONCEPT OF “HUMAN DEVELOPMENT” 
“The Challenge of development is to find possible approaches to move it in a positive 
direction”                                                                (Wilber and Jameson, 1991). 
The study of development has remained one of the most interesting and exciting 
subjects of international political-economic discourse. Two centuries after the 
Industrial revolution, poverty, hunger, starvation, wars, misery and its attendant ills are 
still pervasive in most parts of the Third World particularly sub-Saharan Africa, which 
calls for salient investigation and understanding of the subject-matter at this crucial 
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period. However, the field of development studies in the Third World emerged shortly 
after the Second World War and rapidly became focused on a series of macroeconomic 
problems particularly those concerning global inequalities between the rich and poor 
countries (Preston, 1985). While economists played a leading role in the elaboration of 
postwar development theories and practices, the field of development has over time 
become notably interdisciplinary with contributions from variety of orientations, 
including Sociology, Political Science, Management, International Relations. 
The central theme which runs through various attempts to define development is 
change. At its core, development concerns itself with basic differences in the well- 
being enjoyed by human beings. From a human perspective, the concept of 
development can simply be defined as quantitative and qualitative improvement in the 
lives of the people (Soyombo, 2005:209). According to Guolet (1973:10), 
development deals with the improvement of human beings through the expansion and 
adequate provision of educational, health, housing and employment opportunities that 
would raise the quality of life of persons in order to create an egalitarian, just and 
peaceful society. Todaro and Smith (2003:15-24) sees development as a complex set 
of interrelated change processes, abrupt and gradual, by which a population and all its 
components move away from patterns of life perceived in some significant way as 
“less human” toward alternative patterns perceived as “more human”. From these 
foregoing definitions, it is comprehensible that development is a multidimensional 
process that involves major changes in social structures, popular attitudes and national 
institutions as well as accelerations of economic growth, reduction of inequality and 
eradication of poverty (Todaro, 2000). It entails the movement away from a condition 
of life widely perceived as unsatisfactory, toward a condition of life regarded as 
materially and spiritually better. Besides, it transcends as well as encompasses growth 
and embraces such aspects of the quintessence of living and social justice, equality of 
opportunities for all citizens, equitable distribution of income and the democratization 
of the development process.  
In the 1950s and 1960s, development was used in strict economic sense and became 
closely associated with economic growth which was seen as a panacea for poverty 
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alleviation (see Ojo and Lawson, 2003:340). Economic development was seen as an 
economic phenomenon with emphasis placed on accumulated savings and investment 
rates which result in rapid per capita GDP as the catalyst for measuring socioeconomic 
indicators and other features. At the early stage of economic growth approach, 
increasing inequality was seen as a by-product, with the expectation that over time, the 
“trickle down” effect would alleviate poverty and unemployment (Obikaonu, 
2003:104). Between the 1950s and 1960s, however, many developing countries 
recorded substantial rates of growth while, simultaneously, the bulk of the citizenry 
remained poor, with manifestations of deteriorating standards of living as the “trickle 
down” effect of “economic growth” development model failed to materialize. 
Consequently, there was a clamour by economists, development scholars and policy 
makers for the “dethronement of GDP” given that widespread poverty, rising 
unemployment and inequitable income distribution accompanied economic growth. 
“Redistribution from growth”, therefore, became a popular slogan and also central to 
the measurement of development (Todaro, 2000:15). This led to the adoption of the 
adoption of the basic needs development approach which was vigorously championed 
by the ILO at the World Employment Conference held in 1976 (see Ojo and Lawson 
op cit : 341). The “basic needs” approach identifies the satisfaction of basic human 
needs as nutrition, clothing, health, education, water and employment as the dominant 
features of overall development strategy and a way of combating the problems of 
poverty, unemployment and inequality. However, the basic needs approach was 
subsequently criticized for overemphasizing top-down service delivery by the state, 
instead of dealing with the issues of human choices.  
With many developing countries experiencing several economic problems such as 
slow down of economic growth, the debt crises, fall in world crude oil price and 
worsening terms of trade, in the early 1980s, the structural adjustment paradigm took 
the central stage. The World Bank/IMF inspired SAP measures adopted by many 
countries such as Nigeria and Ghana was aimed at ensuring prudent economic 
management and favorable macroeconomic environment for sustained growth. The 
process of liberalization, deregulation, privatization pushed people centred 
49 
 
development (e.g. education, health, housing, transportation) to the background. This 
economic management approach was highly criticized for exacerbating the state of 
poverty, inequality, deterioration of public services, infrastructure, among other things. 
As a result, some international organizations such as the ILO and UNICEF, trade 
unions and NGOs observed that SAP or economic reforms lacked human face as it 
fails to maintain the provision of basic minimum services particularly for the poor and 
the most vulnerable who shared the most burden of the adjustment programmes 
(UNDP 1996:49). These concerns raised eventually led to the development of the 
concept of human development.       
However, the focus of human development is more on people’s welfare and the social 
changes in economies that impact positively on human well-being as opposed to 
focusing on the economic side of the ledger. The concept of human development has 
overtime attracted interdisciplinary contributions and orientations. Reference to and 
emphases on “human good”, “flourishing lives”, and human beings as “real end” of all 
activities were made and found in the writings of various philosophers from Aristotle 
to Emmanuel Kant, and among other leading political economists such as Adam 
Smith, David Ricardo, Marx and John Stuart Mill. For instance, Aristotle argued that, 
“Wealth is evidently not the good we are seeking; for it is merely useful and for the 
sake of something else”. That something else is the opportunity of people to realize 
their potentials as human beings (UNDP, HDR 2006:263). In all other branches of 
knowledge such as the field of managerial and industrial Psychology, scholars like 
Maslow (1970) in his theory of “hierarchy of needs” brought to the fore the very 
essence of contemporary human development thinking when he asserted that human 
needs are hierarchical by nature and when man is assured of all those needs he can be 
able to reach and use his full potentials.  
The concept of human development is an alternative paradigm from the other 
economic development models such as modernization and dependency theories, neo-
liberalism. It was pioneered by Amartya Sen, and further extended by the works of 
Martha Nussbaum and Mahbub ul-Haq, founder of the UNDP’s Human Development 
Report. The UNDP (2000:17) defined human development as the process of expanding 
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people’s choices, by expanding human functioning and capabilities. Human 
development has three essential capabilities or elements: to lead along and health life, 
to be knowledgeable, and to have access to the resources needed for a decent standard 
of living. Other areas of choice highly valued by people include participation, security, 
sustainability, and guaranteed human rights.  
From this perspective, human development is seen as pointing the way forward for 
government and its institutions to focus their economic development policy 
fundamentally on peoples’ welfare rather than on things or institutions as the broad 
objective of development (UNDP, 1994:14). Thus it opined that the expansion of 
output and wealth are only a means to attaining this end and not the end in itself. In 
this context, therefore, Mahbud ul-Haq (1995) conceived of human development as 
“the development of the people, for the people and by the people”.  It underlines “the 
importance of putting people-their needs, their aspirations and their choice at the 
centre of the development process” (UNDP, 1996:49). The approach in seeing people 
as the real wealth of a nation emphasizes the need for the provision of essential social 
services by the various levels of government. This position places responsibility on 
them to promote efficient public policy that will create an enabling environment which 
allows the people access to affordable healthcare, nutrition, housing and education as 
well as the capacity to develop their potentials and creativity (UNDP, 1990:9).  
Furthermore, the human development components of choices, capabilities and 
contributions known as the 3Cs (UNDP, 1990) apart from been multidimensional is 
also internally consistent as well. While the first two components of capabilities and 
choices are largely centred on the individual, the third component of contributions is 
the bond between individual and society. In other words, the three components are 
dependent on and enforce each other, i.e., mutually inclusive. Sacrifice of one 
component for the sake of one or both of the other components serves no good 
purpose. This conceptualization also draws on and captures the necessary balance 
between rights and obligations, means and ends; consumption and investment; current 
and future, the individual as a consumer and as a creator of wealth, which in turn 
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accommodate for the inter-generational links and needs; and each of the three has both 
intrinsic and instrumental values.      
The term capabilities comprise all aspects of human, physical, intellectual and social 
endowments. It includes a variety of needs, the proper satisfaction of which is 
necessary to enhance a person’s competence and abilities such as good health, 
nutritious food, functional education, convenient housing, clean environment, safe 
neigbourhood (see Anand and Ravallion, 1993). Choices are centred around the 
concept of “free to and free from: the freedom to take and make a decision - let it be 
economic, habitual nature, and freedom from fear, hunger, unemployment, exclusion, 
discrimination, persecution etc. And finally, the term contributions incorporate the 
necessary participatory harmonious relations between the individual and the 
community in pursuit of the collective goals of development whether at the local, 
national, or the world at large (Jiyad, 2000). 
The basic characteristics of human development can be gleaned from Sen’s seminal 
Development as Freedom, in which he argued that development should be seen as a 
process of expanding the freedoms people enjoy positively rather than the narrow 
focus of other views which identify development with economic growth or social 
modernization. As Sen (1999:3) argued: “Development can be seen…as a process of 
expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy.” For him, these other factors such as 
GDP and personal incomes are crucial means to expanding freedoms but not the only 
ones. Factors such as education, health, political and civil rights give form to the 
substance of human freedom. He affirmed that, “If freedom is what development 
advances, then there is a particular argument for concentrating on that overarching 
objective, rather than on some particular means, or some specially chosen lists of 
instruments (Ibid). Sen further advanced two separate reasons as to why freedom is the 
central component of the development process: 
i. The evaluative reason: assessment has to be done primarily in terms of 
whether the freedoms that people have are enhanced; and  
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ii. The effectiveness reason: achievement of development is thoroughly 
dependent on the free agency of people (Ibid: 4).   
Thus, the success of a society’s development is to be measured and evaluated by the 
substantive freedoms that its members enjoy, not by the calculations of utility, income, 
or other singular perspectives. For him, development is achieved through human 
agency of which freedom is critical. Freedom is both an end unto itself, and as a means 
to other ends. Freedom itself becomes a means to more freedoms, such as political 
liberty, economic opportunities, or security. Sen’s conception of human agency is a 
clear demarcation between the capabilities approach and other development theories 
such as neo-liberalism. 
For Mahbud ul-Haq (1995), human development reports since 1990 has been to 
provide an integral point for analyzing multiple issues that existed under the 
development umbrella. Human development approach sees the development enterprise 
as being chiefly concerned with the objective of expanding human liberty and 
removing impediments to its flourishing. It is creating the enabling environment for 
human beings to pursue that which they have reason to value doing or being. Here, the 
teleology of conventional development theory is reversed: human beings and not 
economic growth is the centre of development. Consequently, focus has shifted from 
economic development to human centred development and more recently, sustainable 
human development. Besides, it has been recognized that investment in human capital 
is likely to yield more contribution to national development than sole concentration on 
economic factors (Soyombo, op cit: 210). It is this vision that has underlined the global 
UNDP Human Development Reports since the 1990s as powerful advocacy tool for 
development which has engaged global discussion that cut across various themes such 
as: financial development, gender equity, economic growth, political participation, 
human development, poverty, human security, globalization, human rights, 
technology, aid, trade, democracy, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), water 
and making globalization work for all in 2006 and 2007 respectively.  
53 
 
Since the 1990s the annual UNDP Human Development Report has been published to 
compare the levels of promoting human development among countries of the world. 
The report has been used to point out the inadequacy of measuring economic 
development by income and output measures, shifting emphasis to other measures of 
development such as health, education, gender quality, income distribution. These 
variables are all captured by indices of development such as the Human Development 
Index (HDI), Human Poverty Index (HPI), Gender Development Index (GDI) and 
Gender Empowerment Index (GEI).  
The HDI combines a measure of purchasing power with measures of physical health 
and educational attainment to indicate progress or retrogression in human life. This 
approach gives a more comprehensive and reliable information regarding development 
just as the critical components of indicators of poverty is taken into consideration. The 
CBN (1999:11) captures the HDI thus: “the building blocks of the HDI are data on 
longevity, knowledge and income. Longevity is measured solely by life expectancy at 
birth, while knowledge is measured by the adult literacy rate and mean years of 
schooling weighted at 2:1 respectively. For income, purchasing power parity (PPP) 
(based on real GDP) per capita adjusted for the local cost of living) is used.” It further 
stated that “these three measures are combined in a 3-step process to arrive at an 
average index.” There is a minimum and maximum rate for each component of 
measures in HDI.  It expresses the ranking of nations in values that range between 0 
and 1. 
As for a large number of countries, the ranking on a “human development index” scale 
is lower than that on per capita GDP (measured in dollars of purchasing power parity), 
suggesting that these countries have failed to translate economic growth or prosperity 
into corresponding better living standards for their people, as it is the case with 
Nigeria. It also indicates that there is no automatic link between income and human 
development; as such link has to be consciously created and reinforced through 
pragmatic human centred policy measures. For instance, while the GDP per capita 
income increased faster in the 1990s in Nigeria from US$ 699.59 in 1990 to 1,011.73 
in 2006 (CBN, 2007), this was not accompanied by corresponding improvements in 
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health, education and other social indicators. A cursory observation of the living 
conditions and quality of life in contemporary Nigeria indicates the poor state of social 
welfare and services. Currently, in spite of its huge petroleum resources and massive 
oil revenue accumulation, Nigeria is ranked low in terms of human development index 
(from 152nd in 2002 to 157th position in 2005) , a drop in life expectancy from 54 years 
in 1990 to 43.4 years in 2006, a human poverty index value of 40.6 percent, 70.8 
percent of the population living below the poverty line (1996-2004), while only 54 
percent of the population had access to improved sanitation (UNDP, 2005; 
2003:200,257).  
Consequently, relating human development to the broad conceptualization of 
development, Guolet (op cit) argued that development has ethical connotation as it 
deals with the improvement of human beings through the expansion and adequate 
provision of educational, health, housing and employment opportunities that would 
raise the quality of life of persons. It therefore becomes very important that for any 
country to attain sustainable socio-economic development and improve the welfare of 
its citizenry, it must invest in people in order to bring about significant improvement in 
the stock of human capital, which is a key element required for poverty reduction that 
has become a serious development challenge in the African continent. The 
development of human capital is, therefore, of importance as it affects productivity of 
labour through investments in population, education and health, which is a basic 
ingredient in the process of attaining sustainable development. It is this reality that 
underscores the concept of human capital which arose in the 1960s emphasizing the 
qualitative aspects of human inputs, namely skills and education, knowledge in wealth 
generation and capital accumulation, as a replacement for the development economics 
of the 1950s which predominantly concerned itself with growth in average income- 
GDP per capita income.  
In the 1970s, a shift toward issues of income distribution emerged in response to the 
failure of the development growth strategies adopted then to have significant impacts 
on reducing poverty, unemployment and inequality. These issues later switched to 
distributional aspects of growth that facilitated the emergence of Basic Needs 
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strategies, a fundamental element that transformed into the concept of human 
development and its relationship with income growth. It was this framework that led 
the Club of Rome to call for the creation of a quality of life index to measure 
development and economic welfare in and between nations.  It is sad to note that 
human capital investment in the African continent has consistently been at its lowest 
ebb, as it has adversely been affected over the past three decades by a number of 
factors such as wars, civil and ethnic conflicts, and dismal economic performance 
resulting from the impact of economic reform policies that have led to a number of 
public spending cuts in a number of nations like Nigeria, Code d’Ivoire, Ghana, 
Zimbabwe and others (see Bangura, 1986; Herbst, 1990).  
According to United Nations Economic Commission for Africa -UNECA (1999), only 
few countries in Africa have been able to attain or surpass the 7 percent growth rate 
that is necessary to reduce poverty by half over the next 15 years going by the United 
Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) initiative for the continent. Relating 
this development approach to the informal sector operations in Nigeria, it becomes 
pertinent to state that following the period of economic recession in Nigeria in the 
1980s which led to her adoption of the IMF/World Bank inspired SAP or economic 
reforms; the profile of urban informal sector in Nigeria has changed significantly. This 
is fundamentally so as the dynamics of urban labour force is a critical subject in 
economic development.    
Since the formal sector in most developing countries is relatively small, coupled with 
the contraction in the public and organized private sector following Nigeria’s 
implementation of the economic reform measures of privatization, liberalization and 
deregulation, most job seekers have had to settle for informal employment either as 
apprentices, own-account workers or employee, journeymen or casual workers. This 
has brought about the rapid expansion of the informal sector which do not only 
accommodate those not qualified by education and skill level required for urban formal 
jobs, but also provide space for myriads of workers who have left their previous jobs 
for various reasons: retirement and downsizing (see Schaeffer, 2002).  
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The profile of the urban informal entrepreneurs has completely altered over time as 
well as their social conditions of living. As entrepreneurs who are risk takers, 
investors, managers and leaders who initiate, innovate and combine resources in the 
right proportions to generate output, their role as prime movers in the advancement of 
economic development is very critical (see Ogunrinola, 2007:83). To begin with, there 
has been a shift in the age structure of urban informal sector workers over time. In 
Callaway’s study in the 1960s, three quarters of the entrepreneurs were between the 
age group of 30-49 years, while those less than 30 years and those over 50 years were 
just 16 percent and 9 percent respectively (Callaway, 1973; 1965). In the 1990s, the 
two studies reviewed for the period showed that the proportion of those less than 30 
years has grown from 25 percent in the 1960s to 35 percent in 1991 and 38 percent in 
1995. This shows the increasing youthfulness of entrepreneurs in the informal sector, 
as compared to the 1960s. In contrast however, entrepreneurs in the age group 30-49 
have declined from 75 percent in the 1960s to 55 in 1995. It would be inferred from 
this study that the age cohort of those less than 30 have more than doubled from 16 
percent in 1960 to 38 percent in 1995. These findings were further corroborated by 
Folawewo’s study in 2003 where a mean age of 29 was reported (Ogunrinola, op cit). 
As there was a noticeable shift in the age structure, so also has there been a shift in the 
educational attainment of informal sector entrepreneurs. In the 1960s, almost half of 
the entrepreneurs had no formal education. They were enterprise owners by virtue of 
the informal apprenticeship training and entrepreneurial drive that led them to establish 
and run their own enterprises. The remaining half had varying degree of education 
ranging from primary (30 percent) to secondary (16 percent) while ‘other’ categories 
(i.e. Quranic education) made up 5 percent. By the mid 1970s, only a quarter of the 
entrepreneurs were in the ‘no-schooling’ category while more than half (55 percent) 
had primary education and almost a fifth had secondary education. By the 1990s, those 
without formal education have dropped from 10 percent in 1990 to 6 percent in 1995, 
while those with primary and secondary education increased from 46 percent in 1960 
to 66 percent in 1995. A new trend that is noticeable in the informal sector currently is 
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the increasing number of higher education graduates (18 percent in 1995) that are 
participating in the informal economy (Ogunrinola, op cit., 84-85).    
What can be gleaned from the foregoing profile of the informal sector operations is 
that in the attempt by the Nigerian state to make a transition from a mixed economy to 
a market economy, the nation has been thrown into several economic problems which 
include low income, poor purchasing power, inflation, massive corruption in public 
and private sector, lack of transparency in public life and increasing unemployment. 
To survive the economic recession, many laid off workers who could not find fresh job 
in the rapidly declining formal economy or afford to remain openly unemployed since 
there were no formal support system (in form of social security system or even 
informal family support) had to rely primarily on informal sector employment for their 
standard of living (see Gibson, 2002). Given the huge influx of persons to this sector, 
its supply of labour in the economy has constantly outstrips the demand, thereby 
leading to low level of real wage in response to market forces of demand and supply as 
most enterprises are sole proprietorship type. 
 Also, the apprenticeship system in the informal sector which has made significant 
contributions to the development of future entrepreneurs over time had also been 
altered. Such employment opportunity which was once sustained through the linkages 
of the informal sector enterprises to the entire economy had decline over time due to 
increasing costs of inputs and equipment occasioned by changes in the macro economy 
as a result of the nation’s implementation of economic reform policies. It is however 
worrisome, that this sector which is reported to be responsible for about 40 percent of 
the GDP (CBN/FOS/NISER, 2001) and over 50 percent of employment have not 
enjoyed the requisite support and funding to strengthen the capacity of informal sector 
enterprises given its changing structure and profile of operators in the sector. This is 
because, a younger and more educated entrepreneur has an increased capacity to 
accumulate and use business building information, and hence able to plan and 
implement business strategy in a better way than the older and less educated 
counterpart when given the required management and technical training. It is our view 
therefore that the observed changes in age and educational attainment of entrepreneurs 
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if properly harnessed can facilitate better enterprise organization, and hence an 
increasing ability of the informal enterprises to generate higher, stable, and decent 
employment over time provided the labour intensive technology is continually 
adopted.  
Given the state of the Nigerian economy characterized by high level of unemployment, 
slow growth of real GDP, high rate of growth of the labour force, low and dwindling 
labour absorptive capacity of the formal sector, high and increasing level of poverty; 
among others; Nigeria must come to grip with the fact the informal sector will 
continue to be a major absorber of labour. For instance, Umo (2005:4) observed that: 
‘Unemployment rate ranges from 10-17 percent; graduate 
unemployment is estimated at 25 percent; youth unemployment 
is put at 60 percent; while only 10 percent of about 5.4 million 
new entrants into the labour market are often absorbed by the 
economically annually …’ 
This position, therefore, emphasizes the need for government to give the sector 
unalloyed attention in order to effectively tab into its potentials. This commitment 
from government will help seek ways to provide decent jobs for those forced into the 
sector, promote the protection and incorporation of workers and economic units in the 
informal economy into the mainstream economy. It is within these contexts that the 
human development perspective has been chosen in this study to evaluate the living 
standards of informal sector workers in the light of government continued 
implementation of the neo-liberal policy of deregulation and liberalization, and its 
implications for the level of human welfare and empowerment of the people in the 
nation. This is essentially so as advancement among informal sector workers in 
Nigeria as well as other vulnerable groups and sectors of the economy particularly 
agriculture places a demand on the provision and availability of basic social needs 
which involve not only physical and financial resources, but also human and social 
resources. In addition to suitable trading premises, tools and working capital, these 
workers require knowledge and entrepreneurial skills as well as a healthy body to run 
their on-going enterprises properly and profitably. It is within this framework therefore 
that human development can be contrasted with the neo-liberal economic paradigm 
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under three broad outlines which include objectives, policy and statistical indicators 
(Jolly, 2003:106).   
As such, a cursory evaluation of the Obasanjo government in the last seven years 
(1999-2007) revealed that while the belief in the philosophy of human development 
may have prompted the government to declare it as a guiding principle of its economic 
policy when it asserted that: 
The economy exists for and belongs to the people, and at all times the 
general well-being of all the people shall be the overriding objectives of 
the government and the proper measure of performance…the strategy to 
be employed shall be to empower Nigerians in both the rural and urban 
areas to become more economically productive, with a view to 
improving their quality of life. To avoid the mistakes of the past, 
projects and measures to be implemented will be people oriented. The 
people concerned, as stakes holders, will be fully involved in 
determining the projects and will take ownership … significant 
improvement in water, … basic educational facilities (both under the 
Universal Basic Education (UBE) Scheme and Mass Adult Literacy 
Programme) and basic health facilities…will be embarked upon 
immediately on a nationwide basis (FGN, 1999).  
However, evidences in form of statistics seem not to corroborate this belief in human 
development by the government in the light of its implementation of the neo-liberal 
policy. For instance, in 1996, 1997 and 1998, budgetary allocations as percentage of 
annual budgets were 10.8 percent, 11.5 percent and 9.6 percent, respectively. When 
this is compared with the allocations made under the Obasanjo administration in 1999, 
2000 and 2001, the allocations were 11.1 percent, 8.7 percent and 7.0 percent. From 
these data, it is clear that the sector has not received the desired level of budgetary 
allocation that would make a difference. The situation is even worse in the health 
sector where the percentage budgetary allocation for 2000 and 2001 was 2.7 percent 
and 3.9 percent compared to 5.0 percent and 4.6 percent for 1997 and 1998 (CBN, 
1999-2001). Besides, a look at other economic indicators such as the interest rate, 
exchange rates and prices of basic foodstuff and other consumables showed that 
nothing has positively changed. For instance, the exchange rate of the naira to the 
dollar in 1998 was N87, and by 2001 it has moved to N132; interest rates moved from 
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18.3 percent in 1998 to 26 percent in 2001 while inflation rate has increased from 10 
percent in 1998 to 18.9 percent in 2001 (CBN, 2001). 
Consequently, when all these actions are translated in terms of their impact on the 
well-being of the people, the government neo-liberal economic policy may not have in 
any meaningful way helped to alleviate poverty among the poor in the society which 
its economic programme had targeted. Hence, unemployment has been on the rise 
while the incidence of poverty has increased with high margins (see Obikaonu, 
2003:120-121). What these conditions point to is the fact that government economic 
policy has fallen short of human development strategy, which is to empower people, 
provide them better opportunities to develop their capabilities in all economic, social, 
cultural activities for a wealthier, healthier, more knowledgeable and meaningful life. 
Furthermore, the government has also fallen short of the declaration to avoid the 
mistakes of the past by making its programme people-oriented. It has failed to allow 
the people to participate in the process of formulating and implementing their 
development policies. To close this gap remains a major challenge to the policy 
makers in their efforts to alleviate poverty through human development.        
These happenings goes to reaffirm Sen’s critical contribution that development at its 
very core should concern itself basically with the differences in the well-being enjoyed 
between human beings. As such, inequality in one shape or another, be it that of 
income, justice, or capabilities, forms a significant aspect of all worthwhile and lasting 
ethical theories and development policy analysis (Sen, 1992). Thus, issues of 
inequality, life expectancy at birth and access to opportunities to pursue our 
capabilities are arguably the drivers of development analysis that should shape, 
empirically, the analytical perspectives in forming economic policy and provide hope 
for the formation of new avenues in development thinking and practice. As such the 
issues of inequality, poverty and unemployment then serve as a useful pivot to 
conclude the examination of divergence between human development and neo-
liberalism.  
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Since the 1990s, the human development perspective has pointed out, albeit with great 
fervor the shifts occurring in neoclassical economics. It also provides the critique and 
vigilance on the limitations of orthodox economics in analyzing the expansion of 
human capabilities across the globe. No wonder that in the decades of the 1990s, the 
concept of human development became the central theme of major international 
conferences on such themes as: environment and development in Rio 1992, Human 
rights at Vienna in 1993, on population and development at Cairo in 1994, social 
development in Copenhagen 1995, women in Beijing 1995 and human 
settlement/habitat at Istanbul 1996.  
In addition to the conceptual formulations of human development, vast empirical 
investigations, mostly supported by the experience and performance of the East Asian 
‘miracle’, had arrived at the conclusions in support of human development and its 
contribution to national progress. Thus, the World Bank (1995) study on 192 countries 
had re-echoed the importance of human development when it concluded that physical 
capital contributed 16 percent, natural capital 20 percent and human capital by an 
outstanding 64 percent to national wealth. Also, a cross-country econometrics exercise 
by the UNDP (1996:113-4) showed strong links between human development 
indicators ( life expectancy, child mortality rate, equitable distribution of income, share 
of GDP invested in health and education and social expenditure) and economic growth 
indicators (higher levels and growth rates of per capita income). 
2.6 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
The importance of this section lies in the role of theory in research as it relates to at 
least two tasks: a negative or critical one of arguing against its predecessors, and a 
positive or constructive one of providing an alternative account of the issues in dispute 
and of raising new questions. To understand a theory, then, requires placing it in the 
narrative of the debates in which it arose and developed. The study draws its 
theoretical base from the theory of Neo-liberalism and the Institutional Theory of the 
State for understanding the subject under investigation. The Neo-liberal theory 
provides us with the understanding of the nature and characteristics of the nation’s 
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economic reform policy, while the institutional theory of the state examines the role 
and character of the state regarding its responsibilities in the formulation and 
implementation of policy framework and the implications it has on attaining the 
objectives of human development which remain the centerpiece of any meaningful 
development.   
2.6.1 THE THEORY OF NEO-LIBERALISM 
The emerging neoliberal policy…seems to be one of shrinking 
government responsibility in providing economic and social 
protection to the African people… Governments are passing . . . 
the buck to the informal sector (Grey Johnson 1992:79-80). 
The theory of Neo-liberalism is the most influential perspective in the political 
economic analysis of world capitalism. Most importantly, the economic policies of 
most nations and international organizations like the IMF/World Bank, World Trade 
Organization (WTO), and Multinational Corporations (MNCs) are influenced by the 
neo-liberal economic principles. It refers to a historically specific reemergence of 
economic liberalism’s influence among economic scholars and policy makers during 
the 1970s, through the 1990s and possibly into the present millennium. The neo-liberal 
tradition dates back to at least the seventeenth century with the writings of classical 
economists such as Adam Smith, David Ricardo, John Keynes and others who are 
considered to be the key central figures associated with the propagation of orthodox 
liberal approach.  
By definition, Neo-liberalism is an economic model that supports a free market 
mechanism with the state voluntarily reducing its role in the economy (Handelman, 
2006:292). The whole idea about neo-liberalism is that market mechanism should be 
allowed to direct the fate of human beings. The economy should dictate its rule to 
society, and not the other way round (George, 1999:1). The central doctrine of neo-
liberalism is the notion of competition-competition between nations, regions, firms and 
of course between individuals. The idea of competition is crucial to the practice of 
market mechanism as it separate the sheep from the goats, the men from the boys and 
the fit from the unfit. It is also aimed at creating efficiency through appropriate 
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allocation of resources, whether physical, natural, human or financial (see Friedman 
and Friedman, 1980: 54-55).   
According to Mark and Richard (1995), there are three variants of liberalism which 
include: orthodox, interventionist and institutional liberalism. Although these 
variations among liberal scholars occur in terms of the intensity of their beliefs in 
various neo-liberal assumptions or principles, they nevertheless have numerous 
common predispositions. Orthodox liberals are concerned with promoting the freedom 
of the private sector and the market to function with minimal interference from the 
state. Interventionist liberals emphasize the need to promote government involvement 
in a free market economy in order to ensure equity, fairness and justice given the 
uncertainty of the private sector and the market to combat problems of unemployment 
and inequality as well as produce widespread welfare benefits for all. Institutional 
liberals on their part believe that outside involvement is necessary to supplement the 
functioning of the free market enterprise and, therefore, favour the role of international 
institutions such as the IMF/World Bank, and WTO which plays active monitoring 
responsibility in most Third World economies.    
Theoretically, the assumptions of neo-liberalism are in line with the principles of 
classical economics such as the work of Adam Smith, who propounded the “invisible 
hand” theory which refers to the forces of supply and demand working to attain 
equilibrium in a perfectly or nearly competitive economy. To differentiate the 
liberalism of Adam Smith from the new liberal orthodoxy that gained ascendancy in 
the 1980s, some scholars have used the term “neo-liberalism” (Cohn, 2004:100). The 
theory support the notion that the good of society is advanced most effectively when 
individual actors (business people, workers) seek to maximize their economic 
advantage (Handelmen, op cit: 291). In such an environment, the individualistic 
desires of consumers for goods and services, combined with the self interested drive to 
maximize profits by the producers of these goods and services, will tend toward 
determinant levels of production and prices. As Smith (1910:398) asserts: 
64 
 
Every individual is continually exerting himself to find out the 
most advantageous employment for whatever capital he can 
command. It is to his advantage, indeed, and not that of the 
society, which he has in view. But the study of his own 
advantage naturally, or rather necessarily, leads him to prefer 
that employment which is most advantageous to the society. 
For Smith, an effective competitive environment is important in restraining the actions 
of producers and owners/capitalists who constantly are tempted to form cartels or 
monopolies or take other action in an effort to increase their individual profits at the 
expense of both the consumers and workers. He also developed the Laissez-Faire 
economic theory which supports minimal state intervention in the economy with free 
market operation based on division of labour and specialization aimed at maximizing 
efficiency and prosperity that is beneficial to all (Handelman, op cit ; Bauer, 1984:30-
31). He emphasized that the primary responsibility of the state is to provide the legal 
framework and enabling environment that would allow for the functioning of the 
market (preventing restraints on competition and free trade) through the provision of 
public goods such as defense, education, security and infrastructure that would allow 
individuals and private firms to freely express their economic preferences (Walton and 
Seddon, 1994:170; Sargent, 1990:97-99).  
In general, the current neo-liberal position is that dissolution of the state-market 
wedlock is an unproblematic requirement for the political and economic survival of the 
Third World (see Bryant and Farrell, 1996). Its strong belief is based on the promotion 
of the general good by following the principles of free market and open competition, 
limited welfare, individualistic self interest, utility maximization and comparative 
advantage in free trade (James and Dietz, 2004:113; Toye, 1991:321). Consequently, 
in conceptualizing economic development, neo-liberal model advocate market forces 
and commercial and competitive activity propelled by the private sector as the most 
efficient methods for producing goods and services. At the same time they shun the 
role of the state and discourage government intervention in economic, financial and 
even social affairs (Schmidt, 1995). According to neo-liberals, the purpose of 
international economic activity is to achieve the optimum or most efficient use of the 
world’s scarce resources and maximize economic growth and efficiency. Liberal 
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advocates are therefore primarily concerned with aggregate measures of economic 
performance such as the growth of GDP, trade, foreign investment, and per capita 
income.  
Thus, the process of contemporary economic globalization is driven by this ideology; 
removing borders and barriers between nations in terms of trade and movement of 
persons and goods/services, free circulation of capital and freedom of investment, so 
that market forces can drive the global economy as well as create global prosperity 
(see Obadan and Obioma, 1999; Ohmae, 1990). This global capitalist drive is all about 
increasing interconnectedness and interdependence among institutions, communities, 
families and individuals. It conjures the picture of a borderless world through the use 
of the information technology to create partnerships and foster greater financial and 
economic integrations (Khor, 2003). As such, many liberals believed that Less 
Developed Countries (LDCs) today are facing the same challenges that countries in 
Europe and North America did during the nineteenth century. Unlike in the earlier 
period, however, Less Developed Countries today can benefit from a diffusion of 
advanced technology and modern forms of organization from advanced industrial 
states. Furthermore, they believed that all states, including LDCs would benefit from 
the growth of interdependence and interconnectedness if they follow open, liberal 
policies which spur investment.   
In other words, greater integration with the centres of modern economic and political 
activity spurs modernization and rapid economic growth in LDCs, whereas relative 
isolation from the centre of modern activity would result in LDCs backwardness 
(Cohn, 2004:95). However, scholars have criticized economic globalization anchored 
on neo-liberal model as they challenged the view that all countries should follow 
similar path to development. They point out that the challenges facing LDCs today are 
different from those that confronted early developers. The forces of globalization, the 
need to compete with advanced industrial states, and the proliferation of multinational 
corporations all indicate that development today cannot simply be a repetition of 
earlier western model (Portes, 1976:60).  
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Furthermore, advocates of economic globalization have not been able to make it clear 
how the current neo-liberal model of free market will improve standards of living in 
the Third World. And despite reservations from some United Nations agencies like 
UNECA, UNESCO, UNICEF about the possibility of neo-liberal approach providing 
global prosperity particularly for the Third World, the neo-liberal policy approach 
were foist on most sub-Saharan African countries by the World Bank/IMF as the only 
means of reducing poverty and inequality in the poorest regions of the world as well as 
achieving economic recovery and growth (Ake, 2001). For the proponents of the return 
to orthodox liberalism, such as Friedman, Hayek and Ludwig, they reject the notion 
that free market policies contribute to inequality and unemployment. For them, private 
initiative and free enterprise are more likely to result in full employment, rising wages 
and a higher standard of living with the highest priority placed on competitive markets 
and the efficient allocation of resources (Friedman, 1962:171-172, Hayek, 1978:209; 
Ludwig, 1974:17).   
Consequently, neo-liberal advocates argue that international economic interactions 
among nations can be mutually beneficial (positive-sum in nature) if their economies 
are permitted to operate freely with others, even if they do not gain equally (Cohn, 
2004:95). They maintained that if existing international relationships based on free 
market system do not bring about growth and efficient allocation of resources, the 
problem is not with the international economic system of capitalism or their 
positioning in the global economy, but the result of irrational and ineffective domestic 
policies and the unwillingness of governments to pursue rational liberal economic 
policies. The neo-liberals further argue that the countries of Western Europe that 
promoted private property rights experienced early success in industrialization and 
development, and that Third World governments that do not enforce these rights 
hinder foreign investment and adoption of new technologies (Wade, 1990:11-14). 
Thus, the essence of the neo-liberal approach to development for them is summed up 
as follows: “Nations are not poor because they are poor, that is…because of vicious 
cycles; rather they are poor because of too much government interference” resulting 
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from protective tariffs and import quotas, control of interest rates and prices and state 
subsidies (Cohn op cit).  
In the case of developing countries such as Nigeria, the neo-liberal ideology 
propagated by the IMF/World Bank requires the replacement of the interventionist 
state by a private sector in the running of the economy and encourages the expansion 
of market forces by undertaking various market friendly policies. This trend in 
economic reforms was made virtually universal for all Third World countries 
particularly those nations in sub-Saharan Africa which were hit by economic recession 
in the 1980s. The International Financial Institutions (IFI) such as the IMF/World 
Bank made the implementation of structural adjustment policies which is merely 
another name for neo-liberalism a condition for debtor nation’s access to new loans 
and renegotiation of existing private loans (Brian and Kelly, 1999). As such, by 1989, 
at least 27 African countries had structural adjustment programmes in place, while 
about 50 countries had stabilization programmes (Lipumba, 1994; World Bank, 1994). 
This neo-liberal policy was most ardently supported by the United States (US) and 
Western Europe in the 1980s during the Reagan-Thatcher-Kohl era. These leaders 
believed that expanding the free-market and private ownership would create economic 
efficiency and social well-being. Related to this anti-state position of neo-liberalism is 
the advocacy of market policies such as deregulation, trade liberalization and 
privatization, increased foreign direct investment in which almost all nations of the 
Third World that have implemented it had engaged in selling State Owned Enterprises 
(SOEs), opening up their economies to the world, and contracting our government 
services to private companies (Haque, 1996b).  
Although Nigeria has been implementing neo-liberal policy for more than two 
decades, yet the neo-liberal package has attracted considerable academic debate as to 
its relevance or otherwise to the Nigerian economic situation and the social welfare of 
the people. Arguments regarding the benefits of adopting neo-liberal approach to 
development according to its advocates which include: the efficient allocation of 
resources through the market as state controlled economies proved unresponsive to 
economic shocks, ensure fiscal policy discipline, spur investment, promote 
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technological transfer, innovation and responsiveness to consumer demand have been 
contested. In response to the claims of the neo-liberal approach in establishing 
efficiency in the use of scarce resources, Graham- Brown (1993) observed that: 
The SAP introduced into African societies concepts such 
as cost recovery and efficiency, acted as a red herring to 
shift the emphasis away from discussion of broader issues 
of development, of world trade imbalances, protectionism, 
and the promotion of equity and well-being to simply 
economic growth. It vigorously advocates export oriented 
free market economy, especially in agriculture, to ensure 
Africa’s role in the economic order as the producer of raw 
materials for western industries and socioeconomic 
growth.  
Similarly, proponents of neo-liberalism have also argued that SAP or economic 
reforms would return developing economies to growth, check inflation and correct 
balance of payment deficits. For them, the adjustment package of currency 
devaluation, trade liberalization, removal of subsidy and rationalization in the size of 
the public service was meant to effectively alter and restructure the consumption and 
production patterns of the Nigerian economy, as well as eliminate price distortions and 
heavy dependence on the export of crude oil and import of consumer and producers 
goods (Yesufu, 1996:91; Anyanwu, 1993:243). By freeing exchange rates through 
devaluation, the level of non-oil exports would be enhanced; discourage imports thus 
reducing the nominal value of imports while increasing the value of exports. Financial 
and trade liberalization and deregulation would spur private investment (both foreign 
and domestic) by removing artificial barriers to trade through government regulations 
such as exchange controls, arbitrary taxation and control of international trade. With 
growing exports and declining imports, growth would return, enhancing government 
revenues at the same time while the state cut-back spending on the social sectors and 
privatized its enterprises (Prasad, 2006).  
However, according to Obadan et al (1993), empirical evidence from several countries 
of the world on devaluation does not confirm its value as an instrument for correcting a 
fundamental disequilibrium in balance of payments”. For them, exchange rate 
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adjustment is generally not a suitable method for evolving structural changes, and has 
major consequence for generating inflation. Also, Soludo (1993) opined that the 
probability of devaluation reducing imports is even more doubtful in view of the low 
price elasticity of imports in Nigeria. The situation is worsened by the absence of 
capital goods industry and high dependence on imports for the needs of industries.  
Besides, the expectation that devaluation will encourage the inflow and discourage the 
outflow of foreign capital is unrealistic as many other important factors (such as the 
size and growth of a country’s market, tariff and trade policies, political stability and 
often general ideological orientation of the government) determine the flow of capital 
in a country (Ibid).   
With regard to the issue of privatization, doubts have been raised with regard to its 
conceived strategy of improving resource allocation for government that would be 
used to finance essential services such as infrastructure, health and education. 
However, relating this position to the Nigerian state which began the privatization 
policy in 1988, it is sad to state that nothing fundamental has changed in terms of the 
provision of infrastructures and basic social services as statistical evidence from the 
UNDP human development report for Nigeria had shown a decline in the quality of 
life for the people over the decade. According to Odedeji (1996), the privatization of 
SOEs has led to the escalation in the cost of utilities (including electricity, 
transportation, housing, telephone) without the attendant efficiency. This fact was 
evident during the Obasanjo Administration (1999-2007) following the massive 
privatization of SOEs such as NITEL, Aladja, Ajaokuta and Delta Steel plants, Benue 
Cement Company and many others.  
Furthermore, while the IMF/World Bank proposed trade liberalization for developing 
countries, the industrialized countries (which control the two bodies) are actually 
intensifying trade protectionism in their own countries. However, as Soludo (1993) 
opined, “there is not a single industrial country that did not employ vigorous protection 
at some stages in its history” and still continues to. For instance, the experience of 
Japan reveals that properly managed protection, so far from being an obstacle to 
growth is an indispensable instrument for promoting growth.   More than that however, 
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given the current structure and direction of international trade, trade liberalization has 
only exacerbated rather than improve the trade balance of underdeveloped countries as 
there are increasing demand for the products of the advanced countries (see Anyanmu 
et al, 1997:480).  
Consequently, opponents of the neo-liberal package have argued that the economic 
reforms policy of the IMF/World Bank was merely perpetuating a system of 
international debt peonage, insisting that the burden of adjustment or economic 
reforms would be borne disproportionately by the poorest people in most developing 
societies as the original conception by the ‘Washington Consensus’ deliberately 
excluded poverty reduction programmes (Williamson, 1997). The removal of price 
supports, declining exchange rates, diminishing government spending on the social 
sector, infrastructure and loss of public employment all impacted the poor inordinately. 
This was in contrast to earlier government price controls mechanism and purchasing 
subsidies that focused on energy and foodstuffs which were relatively the large part of 
the peoples’ budgets. For instance, declining exchange rates and the resultant drop in 
purchasing power would unduly affect the poor and their consumption habit; and that a 
cut in government job provision through contraction in the public sector and 
privatization policy would cause more and more families to fall below the poverty line 
(Cornia, Jolly and Stewart, 1987). Writing further about the effect of privatizing SOEs 
in Africa as advocated by the neo-liberal model, Herbst (1989:81) observed that: 
…There is no defined constituency that is demanding 
(privatization) because improved public sector management 
would probably mean trimming the workforce in an attempt 
to make parastatals more efficient, and reducing the largesse 
that is distributed quite widely. The privatization of state 
owned corporations might benefit a few individuals, but it is 
unlikely to bring significant benefit to many.  
From the above positions, it is instructive to note that the neo-liberal policy of  
structural adjustment or economic reforms is in the interest of international firms 
(multinational corporations) from the West to own the lion’s share of the productive 
assets in Africa, control African economies, and have the levers of political power in 
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Africa (Osabu-kle, 2000:523). This process was rightly instituted from the colonial era 
following the effective transformation of African economies in the interests of 
capitalist expansion occurring in Europe. As such, agricultural land, airwaves, water 
sources, energy sources, healthcare, banking, indigenous knowledge, plants, seeds and 
even ideas are now increasingly controlled and supplied by corporations for profit. As 
Girvan (1976) notes, a large and growing share of world production are under the 
control of a few hundred MNCs who own about 2/3 of the fixed assets of the entire 
globe. Accordingly, George (1999:3) observed the principle of competition which is 
the central value of neo-liberalism scarcely applies to these MNCs which are the 
largest actors in the neo-liberal world. Rather, they prefer to practice what is called 
Alliance Capitalism. It is therefore, no accident that, over the years, two-thirds to 
three-quarters of all the money labeled “Foreign Exchange Investment” is not devoted 
to new, job creating investment but to Mergers and Acquisitions which almost 
invariably result in job losses.   
Similarly, the privatization policy has also failed to provide the stimulus for a more 
vibrant private sector by providing insufficient investment opportunities. Also, the 
weakness of the indigenous entrepreneurial groups to (due to limited savings for 
investment) galvanize the required capital has posed difficulties for local citizens 
acquiring state enterprise assets. In the same vein, little state financing, as well as other 
measures have not provided the level plain field to enable domestic private groups to 
purchase and run government concerns, especially in areas such as commerce, 
distribution and transport in which indigenous entrepreneurs already have some 
presence. In addition, the actual implementation of privatization in Africa has been 
affected by diverse political and personal considerations, particularly patronage 
politics where many divestiture transactions were subject to the political and personal 
interests of those in power. For instance, in Nigeria, the issues of the sale of most 
government enterprises and estates like the former Nicon Noga Hilton Hotel in Abuja, 
the 1004/Eko court housing estates, Benue Cement Company, NITEL, the steel 
complexes in Aladja, Ajaokuta and others are still shrouded in controversies as regards 
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the actual value for which these enterprises/estates were given away by the Bureau of 
Public Enterprises to private hands.  
As such, the events in Nigeria over the last decade has brought to the fore the critical 
fact that the whole point of privatization is neither economic efficiency nor improved 
services to the consumer, but simply a ploy to transfer wealth from the public purse 
which can redistribute it to even out social inequalities to private hands. In Nigeria and 
elsewhere, the overwhelming majority of privatized company shares are now in the 
hands of financial institutions and large investors. Consequently, it is instructive at this 
point that we stop talking about privatization as the cure to government inefficiency 
regarding its participating in business enterprises and use the words that tell the truth: 
we are talking about alienation and surrender of the products of decades of work by 
millions of Nigerian people to a tiny minority of large investors. This is one of the 
greatest hold-ups of ours or any generation (see George, 1999:8). 
 As for the policies of deregulation, liberalization and the removal of border 
restrictions, they have provided fertile ground for Multinational corporations to grow 
rapidly in size and influence making them the most productive economic units in the 
world, more so than most countries. As a result, the key government structures of the 
global economy have been primed to serve the interest of this group. Also, free trade in 
its current form is the foremost demand of neo-liberal globalization which simply 
translates to providing greater access to emerging markets for corporations and their 
host nations (Richard, 2000). Trade liberalization has been largely seen as having 
affected international private sector expansion, while thwarting the growth of the local 
private sector. With the removal of, or reductions in, trade restrictions and protection, 
African markets have been exposed to a flood of foreign exports. Competition from 
foreign manufacturers has undermined the fortunes of many domestic businesses. 
Many local manufacturing firms have had to close down due to unfavourable trade 
tariffs particularly high interest rates which worked against local manufacturing 
production. This provision instituted by the neo-liberal ideology has turned many 
African nations into ‘industrial cemetery’ as these countries are being saturated with 
‘cheap industrial imports’ lacking in quality (see Olukoshi, 1995:176).   
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Furthermore, the policy of liberalization creates dependency upon commodities which 
have artificially low prices as they are heavily subsidized by economically dominant 
nations. Financial liberalization removes barriers to currency speculation from abroad. 
The resulting rapid inflow and outflow of currencies is often responsible for acute 
financial and economic crisis in most developing countries (Toye, 1995). With regard 
to deregulation process, the emphasis is on removal of regulations that restrict profits 
and to seek out favourable regulatory conditions that reduce costs and increase 
productive capacity. Removing these restrictions allows corporations to have greater 
access to and use of resources and labour, and to move freely across borders.  
These conditions, however, are contrary to the original assumptions of free trade as 
affluent countries in the developed world have adopted and maintain protectionist 
measures, particularly in the agricultural sector through the provision of subsidies 
which are detrimental to the economy of most African nations who are primary 
product exporters. For instance, protectionism allows the nations in the west to 
strengthen their industries by levying taxes and quotas on imports, thus increasing their 
own industrial capacity, output and revenue. As such, agricultural  and commodity 
subsidies in the U.S and Western Europe allow corporations to keep their prices low, 
effectively pushing smaller producers in developing countries out of the market and 
impeding their development (Connor, 1994).  
Thus, the logical conclusion of liberalization and deregulation is a race to the bottom, 
where the lowest possible standards are sought after and legislated for globally, with 
little regard for workers’ welfare, employment conditions, the community or the 
environment. Deregulation, therefore, encourages monopolization as it form virtual 
monopolies through acquisitions and mergers which allow them to manage 
competition through strategic alliances that enable corporations to arbitrarily increase 
the prices of goods and services far beyond the reach of the poor. It is this practice that 
has brought about increase in the prices of capital inputs, consumer goods and services 
especially petroleum products such as petrol and kerosene that are of essential 
necessities to low-income families in Nigeria. In the same vein, the policy of trade 
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liberalization has also contributed to increased international economic inequality 
between advanced capitalist nations and developing countries (Morley, 1995a; 1995b).  
Consequently, the neo-liberal policy strongly opposes issues that focus on economic 
development with particular emphasis on income redistribution and poverty alleviation 
through state intervention, which seem to portray an endorsement of inequality as a 
perquisite for growth (George, 1999:5; Colclough, 1991:6) The preference for 
emphasizing economic GDP growth rate, free trade that allow for foreign direct 
investment and per capita income clearly underscore its policy measures of subsidy 
removals, cut-back expenditures, currency devaluation which ultimately have 
undermined the basic economic and welfare rights of citizens to education, 
employment opportunities, healthcare and infrastructure. This perspective which was 
perceptively used by the IMF/World Bank in the 1980s and 1990s as a prime 
instrument for pressurizing Less Developed Countries (LDCs) to adopt the neo-liberal 
precepts of liberalizing their economies is seriously misplaced.  
To begin with, there is a huge discrepancy between the measurable result of neoliberal 
ideology and its proposed benefits. The over emphasis on economic growth based on 
pro-market policies underestimate the importance of economic equality, environmental 
concerns and sustainability. It also expresses negative role for government in the 
economy. The question that therefore arises in terms of development objectives in the 
African continent concerns how these efforts have impacted on the countries’ 
competitive position, economic growth and the well-being of the people. Therefore, 
the claims by neoliberals that business enterprises run by the organized private sector 
are more efficient than those run by the state, and that market competition and 
corporate efficiency would drive prices of goods and services down for consumers, 
create employment opportunities and improve the standards of living of people has not 
been realized.  
As a result, UNDP (1996:57-60) identified different categories of market based 
economic growth - for instance, “jobless growth” which indicates a growth path that 
has failed to expand opportunities for employment in many developing countries (e.g. 
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India, Nigeria, Ghana, Egypt) and “ruthless growth” which has resulted in increased 
poverty where the fruits of growth rates accrue only to the rich (Umo, 2003:3). The 
neo-liberal model is less concerned with the distributional issues between the North 
and the South and the differences between the rich and the poor nations as well as the 
effects of liberalization on the poor and vulnerable groups in society. It is this situation 
that led Polanyi (1965:73) to warn of the danger of nation’s commitment to the “self 
regulating market” with little concern about its effects on society. For him, the failure 
of society to move in protecting itself from unregulated market activities would breed 
disasters. In his words: “to allow the market mechanism to be the sole director of the 
fate of human beings and their natural environment…would result in the demolition of 
society.”   
Furthermore, the neo-liberal policy advocacy of government divestiture from playing a 
crucial role in Third World nation’s economies has been criticized as incorrect. This is 
because the state played an active role in the industrialization process of nations such 
as the United States, Germany, Japan, China and others (James and Dietz, 2004). 
Accordingly, Stiglitz (2001:17-56) rejected the neo-liberal preference for a minimalist 
state, stressing that state minimalism “is at odds with the evidence of the world’s 
development success stories.” In the same vein, scholars have argued that the neo-
liberal assumptions of establishing a strict dichotomy between the state and the market, 
and taking the position that the market is more efficient than the state in the efficient 
allocation of resources and enhancing welfare cannot be justified or validated in all the 
nations that have adopted the neo-liberal policy (Peter, 1996). For instance, the 
Russian government adoption of the neo-liberal policy during the Gorbachev 
administration in the 1990s did little to change the economic fortunes of the country. 
This is in contrast with the story of China’s homegrown economic reforms and its 
attendant successes which has today made her the fourth largest economy in the world 
after the US, Japan and Germany (Zenith Economic Quarterly, 2007:70). As such, the 
cumulative impact of economic reforms (stabilization and structural adjustment) over 
the past two decades have been greater inequalities in developing countries with rising 
unemployment, poverty and reduced social protection for the masses of these societies.  
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Some other scholars have argued that the role of government’s involvement in the 
economy in the first instance is the result of the degree of market failure in many 
societies; that is by the extent to which unregulated market outcomes are inefficient as 
a result of the activities of monopolistic or oligopoly forces. Besides, this situation can 
also occur when the market does not perform the desired function of delivering results 
that are economically efficient or socially acceptable by all (Toye, op cit: 325). 
Coupled with this argument is the fact that the market may fail to achieve equitable 
distribution of income leading to a situation where the large proportion of the 
population would be unable to access the goods and services produced by the private 
sector (Saitoti, 2002: 277).  
Similarly, unlike many states in the developed world, the post independence African 
state, in most cases, emerged as a result of popular struggle for self determination. 
Hence, given the challenge of development in Africa which is to improve the quality 
of life of the citizens, it was thus the expectation of the general population for the state 
to play a liberating role of freeing them from poverty, disease, hunger and illiteracy. 
This is fundamentally so when we consider the role of providing public services and 
infrastructure which are statutory responsibilities of government to help meet the basic 
welfare needs of the people as a matter of human right. Thus, state intervention in 
economic activity particularly public services is significant for Africa where the newly 
independent states considered active participation in economic activity as an 
imperative. This is because most public services (which economists call natural 
monopolies) require large investment outlays for capital activities such as roads, rail 
tracks or power grids which most private company cannot meet. To now privatize 
these “natural monopoly” would result in higher prices been paid for them than they 
ought to be and the services provided to the consumer are not necessarily good. 
Therefore, from the foregoing discourse, it is imperative to state that it is the needs and 
conditions of each nation that should determine whether or not state involvement in 
economic activity is necessitated as the implications of the policies of SAP or 
economic reforms are far more reaching, affecting the social, cultural, and political 
aspects of a nation and not just economic and fiscal policies (Sigrun, 1993).  
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Thus, following the resurgence of orthodox liberal scholarship in industrialized 
countries since the late 1970s and beyond, many advocates of the neo-liberal school 
have defined anything public as ipso facto “inefficient”. As such, they have adopted 
this position in attributing much of Africa’s economic malaise to the magnitude of 
state interventionist role in the economy.  As such, proponents of neo-liberal model 
view state intervention in the economy as self-serving and inefficient, crowding out 
available productive resources from the more efficient private sector, and therefore, 
advocated for the curtailment of the role of the state and expansion of the market 
mechanism (Cowan, 1990). Although the African experience over the years provide 
ample evidence that state intervention has, by and large, been both self-serving and 
inefficient (Mengisteab, 1995:164), there are, however, serious flaws in the diagnosis 
of the neo-liberal school and its prescription that replacing the role of the state by the 
market will cure Africa’s economic woes and restore improved standards of living.  
First, while state intervention has in most cases aggravated the situation of economic 
deterioration in Africa through massive corruption and ineffective leadership, it is not 
the underlying cause of our national economic ills, although it is more likely than the 
market mechanism to lead to economic malperformance when the state is self-serving. 
Second, the neo-liberal school fails to distinguish the differences in the nature of the 
state and thus in the types of interventions (whether predatory, developmental or 
intermediate state), as it simply lumps them all together as harmful to economic 
development (Mengisteab, op cit). According to some school of thought, such factors 
such as colonialism, transnational firms and the World Bank activities never 
mentioned by the neo-liberals, had much to do in shaping the development strategies 
which were spearheaded by the state (Cheng, 1990:141). Besides, in calling for the 
reform of the public sector in Africa, little consideration has been given to insulating 
public institutions from the partisan and patronage politics in which much of Africa’s 
economy have sustained corruption and favouritism in public bureaucracies (Tangri, 
1999: i; Hyden, 1983). This situation has been clearly manifested in Nigeria as 
exposed by the activities of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission 
(Nigeria’s anti-graft agency) which has unearthed varying cases of massive corruption 
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by public officials that has been the nation’s albatross since it came into operation in 
2003.  Also, historical evidence in Africa contradicted the liberalization position on the 
role of the state in the economy, in that between the early 1960s and the mid 1970s, 
African economies benefited from relatively high commodity prices, grew modestly at 
an annual rate of 7.5 percent, with notable progress made in the development of 
infrastructure such as roads, schools and hospitals (Mkandawire, 1988).  
Furthermore, it has also been argued that African countries are not yet market 
societies, mainly because of the limited development of capitalism. Over 60 percent of 
the population of Africa is rural, mostly peasants engaged in subsistence farming. Even 
urban Africa is not necessarily the sphere of capitalism. This is because of the total 
number of persons that constitute the labour force, the informal sector accounts for 
more than 50 percent of urban jobs in Africa (MacGaffey, 1988). As Ake (2000:166) 
argued, there is a long way to go before we can say, taking Africa as a whole, that 
property has become capital and labour, wage labour, so that for the bulk of the 
population, the means of subsistence is produced as a commodity. This is particularly 
so because market society is based on a principle of solidarity which is entirely 
different from those of pre-capitalist societies, as the basis of its integration is the 
nexus of exchange relations. The complementarities and the reciprocities of exchange 
relations produce and sustain an organic solidarity which Marx called “the 
interdependence of exchange relations” (Ibid: 165). Because of the limited 
development of commodity relations in Africa, social atomization is limited as is 
individualism; consciousness is still considerably communal and interests are not 
generally perceived as being private and in potential conflict with other interests, 
which is the raison d’être of a liberal state, liberal law and the juridicalization of 
persons (Ibid).   
For the most, it has also been clearly articulated that the liberalization of the Nigerian 
economy without any fundamental socio-structural changes in the existing socio-
economic relations is unlikely to lead to a workable market system, much less to the 
nation’s socioeconomic development given the high level of social inequality 
(Adedeji, 1995: 234). In the same vein, Soludo (1993) has observed from the Nigerian 
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experience with the neo-liberal approach that ‘reliance on market resources in an 
environment of inefficient government bureaucracy, relatively narrow and weak 
private entrepreneurship, high dependence on foreign factors and a general anti-
development environment may not produce the desired or optimum solutions sought.  
For instance, the development of the private sector and the diversification of the 
economy are still weak. The local private sector has been heavily dependent on the 
patronage of the state for survival. The peasant and informal sectors which are 
generally deprived of resources by the urban based development bias is still 
predominant. Its links with the modern sector also remain weak. Consequently, the 
modern sector has remained essentially an enclave relying heavily on the international 
market instead of expanding the domestic market (Hyden, 1980: 218).  
In the same vein, the development of an African bourgeoisie was impaired as they 
were deprived of access to resources such as credits. As Efange (1987) pointed out, the 
capitalist class was only at the embryonic stage and where African entrepreneurs 
existed they were suppressed when regarded as a threat to the commercial interests of 
the metropolitan enterprises. The fragile merchant and artisan classes were also 
destroyed by competition from large firms from the metropolitan states (Wallerstein, 
1986; Ake, 1981). Thus, at the advent of political independence in the 1960s, most 
African economies were generally less diversified than those of other regions of the 
developing world and the situation has not changed considerably as of today. 
Manufacturing, for example, accounted for less than 7 percent of gross domestic 
product for sub-Saharan Africa (see Mkandawire, 1988). It is also noteworthy to state 
that sub-Saharan Africa is the only region in the world where public investment 
exceeds private investment (given its low level of less than 10 percent of GDP), which 
poses as the most daunting challenge for African economies (Husain and Farugee, 
1994; World Bank, 1995).   
Consequently, the capitalist class which normally would have champion the ideology 
of the market is also by no means a dominant class that can impose its ideology over 
the rest of society in Africa. As such, state intervention thus remains significant as no 
hegemonic class capable of imposing its order has emerged in Africa. The 
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development of the African bourgeoisie as a class has also been constrained by its 
inability to expand its productive capital and to develop a domestic market where it 
could ascertain its independence. It is for these reasons that Rodney (1971:10) 
contended that capitalism has proved incapable of transcending the fundamental 
weaknesses in sub-Saharan Africa such as underutilization of productive capacity, the 
persistence of a permanent sector of unemployed and periodic economic crisis related 
to the concept of the market - which concerned people’s ability to pay for goods and 
services and the irrationality of incredible poverty in the midst of wealth such as it 
exists in most Third World countries, including Nigeria. Above all, capitalism has 
intensified its own political contradiction in trying to subjugate nations and continents 
outside of Europe. This became evident following the advent of the neo-liberal 
package into Africa in the 1980s. Since then, SAP or economic reforms has acted as 
catalyst by far and more importantly exacerbating situations of conflicts, ethnic 
tensions, inter-groups struggles and sharpened the divide between the “haves” and the 
“have nots” due to the conditions of reduced socioeconomic resources and 
opportunities created by its measures. In almost every nation that the SAP measures 
have been implemented such as Mexico, Venezuela, Nigeria, Morocco and others, it 
has failed to achieve its objectives of reducing inflation, creating employment and 
better standards of living for the people.   
For instance, when SAP was introduced in Nigeria in 1986, the London Times 
recounted that during the period of Babangida regime, the nation went through some of 
the worst political, social, civil, military and intra-military crises. These include the 
Orka counter military coup, Vatsa coup plot, workers strikes, the bloody religious riots 
in Kafanchan in 1987, intermittent revolts in the rural areas, nationwide university 
students’ unrests in 1989, protests and agitations by various associations of 
professional bodies, including doctors, lawyers and academics over the deteriorating 
standards of living of the populace. Thus, the same situation of strikes, demonstrations 
and riots that greeted Nigeria were also replicated in other countries such as Cote d’ 
Ivoire, Zambia, Zimbabwe where it was also implemented (Bangura 1986; Herbst, 
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1990, Ake, 2001:95). These conditions have not changed substantially in most of these 
nations today, with Nigeria painting a vivid picture.  
In all, from the foregoing discourse, it appears that the main aim of the neo-liberal 
measures from the onset was not to develop the economies of African nations but to 
ensure their continued ability to pay their debt to the borrowing institutions (Soludo, 
1993). Apart from the above, Yesufu (1996) have argued that there was really nothing 
new that adjustment or economic reforms had to offer the country in terms of 
objectives which were not already continued in the various development plans of the 
Nigerian government. In his words, SAP or economic reforms merely catalogue but in 
more details the very same economic problems that have in varying degree been 
harped upon by all successive government since independence, and which the various 
development plans would have addressed. Hence the economy has buckled under SAP 
or economic reforms for the same reasons the development plans failed to record 
success as manifested by the growing deterioration in the social welfare of the 
populace, increasing poverty, unemployment and inequalities over the years.  
Accordingly, UNECA (1989) reiterated that: there is mounting evidence that the neo-
liberal package of adjustment or economic reforms are rending the fabric of the 
African society. Worst still, their severe impact is on the vulnerable groups in the 
society, which include children, women and the aged who constitute 2/3 of the 
population. One area where there has been obvious deterioration is in the social service 
sectors which have resulted in several unfortunate social welfare maladjustments, 
including cuts in government health and education expenditures, reductions in real 
food subsidies and increase in food prices. Since the economic recession hit the nation 
in the 1980s, it was the ‘soft’ social sectors such as education, health, basic foodstuff, 
petroleum products and infrastructure that often saw their budgetary allocations cut 
most drastically (see Onimode, 1989; ECA, 1989).  
 As such, the Nigerian people are poorer today than they were at the beginning of the 
1980s.The proportion of the poor has doubled over the last two decades, during which 
time the country received over US$300 billion dollars in oil and gas revenue (Ezekiel, 
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2003:8). For instance, the UNDP (2004) Human Development Report showed that 
while Nigeria’s per capita income in 2004 stood at US$ 860, the percentage of the 
country’s income earned by the poorest 20 percent was 4.4 percent, while the income 
share going to the wealthiest 20 percent was 55.7 percent. Also, the life expectancy of 
the people has dropped from 54 years in 1990 to 43 years in 2007, her ranking in the 
HDI has deteriorated from 152nd  position in 2002 to 159th in 2005 (UNDP, 
2003;2005). These occurrences have impacted negatively on the human development 
of the people which remains the centerpiece of any meaning economic development. 
The neo-liberal package has failed to bring about poverty reduction through 
empowering the people as well as bridge the widening gap between the rich and the 
poor. In spite of Nigeria being ranked the 6th largest petroleum exporting nation in the 
world, it is ranked the 25th poorest nation in the world and 194th in GNP per capita 
(UNDP, 2001; Ezekiel, 2003:9). Paradoxically, Nigeria’s level of revenue and 
endowment in natural resources are in opposite direction with her poverty level.  
In the area of employment generation which would have availed the people the 
material requisites for the procurement of goods and services which are required for 
the satisfaction of the their needs, the neo-liberal policy package adopted by Nigeria 
since the 1980s has worsen the situation rather than bring about its reduction. 
Following the privatization of SOEs, contraction in the public and private sectors, the 
level of unemployment has been on the increase over the years. For instance, the 
unemployment rate percent has risen from 6 percent in 1985 to 12.4 percent in 2007 
(IMF, 2007). The statistics further indicate that the young people (aged 15-44 years) 
are more affected by unemployment, accounting for more 69.6 percent of the 
unemployed population which goes to indicate that the economy is operating below its 
potential. In the absence of social welfare support such as unemployment benefits, 
most of these unemployed persons are left to fend for themselves with many of them 
drifting to the informal sector.  
This happening therefore raises concern about the presumption by neo-liberal 
advocates that free market enterprise would result in full employment and a higher 
standard of living for the average person. With the massive expansion of the informal 
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sector which results from the deterioration of conditions in the public and organized 
private sector, the activities of persons operating within this sector are still 
characterized by varying challenges of low real incomes, high cost of living, 
insufficient investment capital, low level of technology, inadequate infrastructural base 
and limited markets which have limited its capital output ratio (Mabogunje, 1994). 
These constraints which are attributed to the nation’s macroeconomic policies of cut-
back spending in the social sectors, subsidy removals, exchange rate management and 
deregulation of the economy have hindered the informal sector’s contribution to the 
GDP which stood at 7 percent in 1998 in spite of constituting over 70 percent of the 
total labour force (CBN/FOS/NISER, 2001).       
What this fact has brought to the fore is that while the government was focusing its 
efforts on implementing fiscal and monetary policies based on the neo-liberal model, it 
failed to recognize that the effect of this policy on the standard of living of the people 
was most critical in determining the success or otherwise of the neo-liberal package in 
achieving economic development (see Osabu-kle, 2000:517-518). This is 
fundamentally so as economic development goes beyond just growth in GDP to 
include other relevant social and institutional changes which include reduction in 
absolute poverty, increase in employment opportunities, improved productivity of 
labour and other factors of production, a better quality of life and development of 
physical and commercial infrastructure and many others.  
Thus, following the Khartoun declaration in 1988 at the International Conference on 
the “Human Dimension of Africa’s Economic Recovery and Development”, the neo-
liberal policy was attacked for aggravating human condition in Africa, because it was 
“incomplete, mechanical and too short a time perspective. It was incomplete because 
the neo-liberal package was often implemented as if fiscal, trade and price balances are 
ends in themselves and are virtually complete sets of means to production increases. 
Human condition imbalances as related to employment, incomes, nutrition, health and 
education do not receive equal priority in attention to macro-economic imbalances 
(UNECA, 1988:21). Besides, the neo-liberal package was mechanical in being 
inadequately grounded in, or sensitive to, specific national economic, human and 
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cultural realities. This was aggravated by an incomplete articulation which allows the 
gaps between macro-models and contextual realities to remain largely unobserved, 
waiting for the attainment of external equilibrium and fiscal balances before seeking to 
improve the human condition of the people (Ibid). It was these concerns that led to 
UNECA (1989) claims that there are three factors that must be changed to make SAP 
or economic reforms viable for African societies:  
Firstly, SAP must be country specific; secondly, the people 
involved in development assistance and SAP must be 
accountable to the people who are supposed to benefit from 
the efforts and thirdly, the people themselves must 
participate in identifying problem areas, suggesting 
solutions and in planning and implementing projects, 
programmes and policies (African Recovery Newsletter 
1989). 
In the broader context, the neo-liberal policy have produced serious implications and 
outcomes for human centred development- including increases in poverty and 
inequality and decline in state capacity to meet the welfare needs of the people in 
many developing countries especially sub-Saharan Africa. From the early 1980s when 
the SAP policy gained dominance in LDCs, the number of people in poverty in Africa 
rose from 270 million in 1986 to 335 million in 1990 (McQuaig,1999:7; Sharma, 
1994:202). The overall standards of living of people have dropped in most African 
countries due to reduction in social services, increases in food prices, decline in real 
wages and reduced access to education and health facilities.  
As such, to many scholars have opined that the neo-liberal approach is synonymous 
with the harsh conditions of exploitation, disintegration of human dignity and welfare, 
corruption and the corrosion of moral values leaving the continent in the shards of 
trouble and turmoil, as there is a serious ‘dichotomy’ between Africa’s development 
goals and the objectives of the neo-liberal approach (ECA, 1989; Mosley et al, 1991). 
This is essentially so as the implementation of adjustment or economic reforms 
measures in sub-Saharan Africa, especially in Nigeria has not been matched with 
transformation with regard to improving the level and distribution of income, 
satisfying basic human needs (Ake, 2001). This position was corroborated by the 
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Brandt Commission (1980:103-104) which affirmed that: “economic forces when left 
entirely to themselves tend to produce growing “inequality” especially when income 
distribution is highly distorted as in the case between North and South, rich and poor 
societies.  
Thus, according to Momoh and Hundeyin (1999), the current deregulation of the 
Nigerian economy and the attendant consequences it has generated could be said to 
have its root in the contest of the classical political economy. For them, the 
implementation of the neo-liberal policy in recent times have further contributed to the 
underdevelopment of the third world countries such as Nigeria and have made them to 
be more dependent on and subservient to the west who sponsored the agenda. 
Furthermore, Onimode (1988) argued that this new world economic system, which is 
essentially capitalist, promotes an international division of labour in which the 
industrialized capitalist countries produced the manufactured goods while the Third 
World countries were forcefully made to produce raw materials needs of the former. 
Corroborating this position, Amin (1976:104) argued that “the structures of the 
peripheral nations are shaped so as to meet the needs of accumulation at the centre, 
provided that the development of the centre engenders and maintains the 
underdevelopment of the periphery.” This unjust and unbalanced international division 
of labour began through the process and logic of colonialism driven by imperialism 
and currently propelled through the political and economic legislation of the Bretton 
Woods Institutions (see Copeland, 1989:13-14).  
 Also, since the Nigerian state began the implementation of the SAP or economic 
reform measures like other Third World nations, the government has always been 
engaged in open conflict with the people from all walks of life over the adverse 
consequences of the neo-liberal policy on their overall well-being. This position 
further emphasizes the fact that for a transition or economic reform process to succeed, 
it is imperative that sufficient attention be paid to the social impact of reform, and to 
finding ways of lessening the negative impact on the most vulnerable individuals in 
society. In the same context, the neo-liberal position is also faulted for making 
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erroneous assumption that Less Developed Countries in sub-Saharan Africa have 
efficient competitive markets which cannot be justified.  
According to scholars, the reliance on market resources in an environment 
characterized by inefficient government bureaucracy, narrow and weak private 
entrepreneurship, high dependence on foreign factors may not produce the desired 
success required in a nation making efforts to recover from economic recession 
(Ajakaiye, 1987:220-223 cited in Soludo, 1993). Thus, given the structural rigidity 
prevalent in a developing country like Nigeria, the various market are not characterized 
by efficient elastic demand and supply curves, and such wholesale liberalization of 
prices may not lead to the realistic or optimal price structure required to ensure 
efficiency in resource allocation. This is because market forces are assumed to be 
efficient in resource allocation when prices are sufficiently flexible (both ways), price 
elasticities are significantly larger than zero and the structure of output is such that all 
imports are competitive. When prices are sticky (downwards) however, factor 
proportions tend to be rigid and the production and consumption structures are 
significantly dependent on non-competitive imports, and adjustment programmes 
based on generalized market deregulation and restrictive monetary, fiscal and credit 
policies along with trade liberalization are unlikely to succeed (see Soludo, 1993). 
Worse still, the conditions required for the efficient functioning of a free market 
(perfect competition; availability of correct information about present and future prices 
and non price variables, given and independent consumer tastes, capital divisibility, 
and the absence of increasing returns to scale) do not exist in most developing country 
including Nigeria (Obadan and Ekuarhare, 1993).   
Furthermore, Stiglitz (2002) argued that there is an insufficient link between 
liberalization policies and economic growth to warrant the special role it plays in 
donor agency policies. For instance, in the immediate aftermath of the Asian crisis in 
the 1990s, it is evident that the IMF instituted policies deepened unemployment and 
worsened economic recovery conditions of nations that implemented them. By 
contrast, China, who did not maintain any relations with IMF and thus did not follow 
their recommendations, experienced no significant downturn from the crisis. Besides, 
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the idea by neo-liberals in the Western nations to use aid/loans from World Bank/IMF 
and bi-lateral institutions to induce shift toward neo-liberal policy for the economies of 
most developing countries is not ethically justifiable.  
It is this tendency that led Holland (1998:5) to perceptively assert that: “the World 
Bank is to economic development theology what the papacy is to Catholicism, 
complete with yearly encyclicals.” It has been pointed out that as long as the 
development of the dependent countries of the Third World are not controlled by them 
but rather dominated from outside, it amounts to a violation of national sovereignty 
and autonomy which should be reversed (Frank, 1969:3-6). For Frank, the dependence 
of the developing countries on the developed nations for their development project is 
an asymmetrical relationship, with the development of the developed nations being for 
the most part independent, that is, determined by factors largely internal to the 
metropolitan economy and society, while it also determines that of the periphery. It is 
for this reason that UNECA (1990) presented an alternative ideological framework to 
the Bretton Woods Institutions agenda on structural adjustment or economic reforms 
that go beyond policies and strategies. According to Adedeji (1990) the alternative 
framework to Africa’s development differed from the approach of the Bretton Woods 
Institutions in four major ways:  
i. It is human centred: it distances itself from the orthodox mechanistic 
models such as balance of payment equilibrium and reduce government 
budget deficits without regard to the implication of the social sectors 
and the overall welfare of the people; 
ii. It is a holistic approach to socio-economic change: The alternative 
approach does not focus on a few selected economic variables but  
rather situate change in the broader context of social, political, cultural 
and economic values and institutions; 
iii.  Its policies derive their validity and legitimacy from the structural 
nature of the African political economy. That means that its policies are 
based on a full grasp of the fact that the basic manifestations of the 
Africa structural distortions include elements like the predominance of 
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subsistence and mere trading activities, narrow, urban bias of public 
policies, neglected informal sector, fragmented market etc and 
iv. It is sensitive to specificity: It “refrains from proposing a programme to 
be applied in all countries at all times as has been the discernable 
tendency with the orthodox ‘ready-made’ programme of adjustment or 
reforms that have been proposed to Africa, Asian and Latin American 
countries alike.   
Consequently, the consensus has emerged among development scholars of a healthy 
skepticism regarding the efficiency of markets in many less developed nations. This 
skepticism, however, arises not from the dogmatic rejection of markets or lack of 
knowledge about what the markets can accomplish when they function well, but due to 
the understanding that the market does not always yield efficient outcomes or socially 
acceptable redistribution of wealth (Stiglitz, 1998). In the same vein, the market cannot 
function properly in a society that is in transition from a pre-capitalist, dualistic social 
formation to a fully articulated capitalist society as is the case Nigeria where it panders 
directly to the interests of the powerful by subordinating the concerns of the poor. For 
instance, it is clear to all that the issue of Nigeria’s development is that we as a people 
have not been able to develop a national development project. But instead, we 
continually opt for dependent development allowing the metropolitan patrons through 
the Bretton Woods Institutions determine the agenda and find the resources to 
implement it.  
Thus, policy making process was largely divorced from the political responsibility, and 
development strategy dissociated from both the social needs and from the cultural and 
historical realities of the developing society (Ake, 2001:40). This dissociation led to 
development policies that have been more disruptive than developmental. Therefore, 
the need for government to supplement the market process in many areas has been 
advocated by many development scholars, who though recognize that markets are an 
essential component of any well-functioning economy if it works well, stressed that 
every society needs some degree of state intervention to have a well-functioning social 
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system, of which the economy is only a part, albeit an important part (Adelman, 2001; 
Chang, 2002).  
In all of this evaluation, one issue that has been found to characterize the neo-liberal 
model to development is its consistent lop-sidedness. For instance, there is a powerful 
predisposition from the Bretton Woods Institutions when government interventions in 
the economy are working badly to reject such activism (rather than reforming it) and to 
substitute market mechanisms. On the other hand, when the latter produces poor 
results, there is equally strong tendency to urge that marketization should be reformed 
(i.e. carried out better) rather than rejecting it for some form of government 
involvement (Schatz, 1994:692). This policy contradiction from the international 
financial institutions such as the IMF/World Bank speaks volume of their perceived 
inconsistencies to the developmental needs of the Third world. It is therefore, the 
position of scholars that striking a balance between the complementary roles to be 
played by the government and those to be undertaken by the private sector in making 
the market work better and correcting market failure that is therefore an important part 
of sound economic management and balanced pragmatism (Wade,1990:260).  
Thus, Shapiro and Taylor (1990) also opined that “getting price right” which is the 
neo-liberal recommendation for the ills of Less Developed nations is not enough. They 
stressed that attempts at price reform can only work if they are coupled with large 
scale state interventions such as aggregate demand manipulation, export subsidies, 
public investment and barter trade deals for these countries to improve their economic 
performance. According to them:  
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During the industrialization push in all now rich nations, 
public interventions were rife . . . The US courts restricted 
individuals control over property, decisions came to favour 
community over absolute domain . . . . US state legislatures 
controlled exports and granted monopoly power to public 
corporations. The government targeted railroads and farmers 
with land give-aways and was highly protectionist until after 
World War II. During the Meiji restoration, the Japanese 
state sets itself up as an entrepreneur, financial and manager 
in several manufacturing lines. Its activist role continued 
throughout the militarist period and after World War II in 
the famous industrial programming of MITI (Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry) (p. 866).      
In the same vein, the World Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER) 
1990 study also showed that public investment tend to stimulate private capital 
formation. This is in direct contrast to the presumed relationships postulated by the 
neo-liberal school which argue that public investment crowds-out private investment. 
This position adduced by the neo-liberal school is simply not true. The WIDER 
research suggests that on average every dollar of public investment induces one dollar 
or more of private investment. Ironically, Mexico which has received the strongest 
inducement to adopt neo-liberal policy measures and has carried out the largest wave 
of privatization in the less developed world has been plagued by modest growth, 
declining or stagnant living standards, massive migration of its skilled work force to 
the west and the near elimination of much of the small business sector (Cypher, 2001). 
This picture is a true replica of the happenings in the Nigerian society today.  
A strong case for state regulation of the financial market in developing countries 
emerged from examination of the rapid growth of East Asia economies. A positive role 
for the state supplementing activities in the financial markets belies the neo-liberal 
case for pure liberalization of financial markets in developing economies without state 
intervention, asserting that regulation would likely prove distortionary (World Bank, 
2005). Furthermore, the East Asian economic miracle experience suggests that 
regulation features such as improving success chances and reducing opportunities for 
abuse are fundamental to development. Also, the willingness to drop without 
questioning unsuccessful interventions as well as adapting them to changing economic 
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conditions, all prove to be key aspects of a flexible role for state regulation in 
benefiting the financial market of developing economies. Thus, the issues should not 
be whether the state gets involved in the economy but how it gets involved. This is 
critically so in many sub-Saharan African countries where the majority of the poor live 
at or below the poverty line. 
 
2.6.2 INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF THE STATE 
From the beginning, the discourse on ‘development’ in Africa has been one on how the 
continent compares with the rest of the world in terms of basic, conventional indicators 
like levels of education, infrastructure, social services, industrialization and 
urbanization. In this regard, the Institutional Theory of the State situates the broad 
understanding of development within the context of the historic role that states have to 
play in harnessing development efforts through the pursuit of a holistic development 
strategy aimed at advancing the socioeconomic well-being of the citizenry. This 
position statement contrast the perception of the nature of the African states by 
International Financial Institutions such as the World Bank/IMF that see it as the 
principal obstacle to the continent’s development (World Bank, 1981; Deyo, 1987).  
The institutional theory of the state was developed by Evans (1995) as a “comparative 
institutional approach” that argues that states count and do play highly positive roles in 
national economic development. The theory is a departure from the various approaches 
to development, whether of the ‘modernization’ variety (Rostow, 1960) or the 
‘Washington Consensus’ neo-liberal model (Williamson, 1990) and others. As Evans 
(1995:3) contends: “the state lies at the centre of solutions to the problem of social and 
economic order. Without the state, markets, the other master institution of modern 
society cannot function.” For him, states are the result of complex historical forces and 
relationships, acting as actors or agents capable of shaping and influencing the ongoing 
process of historical evolution. This statement suggests that any discourse on 
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development such as the neo-liberal model, which attempts to draw a contrast between 
‘the state’ and ‘the market’, is actually a presentation of false choices. 
The broad thrust of the theory is anchored on the concept of embedded autonomy 
which stresses that the success or failure of any development strategy and/or economic 
performance for any nation is based on the nature and character of the state as well as 
the nature of the relationship between the state and other key economic factors such as 
business, labour, agriculture, industry (Ibid). Looking at the institutional approach to 
development, Evans elaborated the idea of the state under three typologies that range 
from the developmental state, predatory state to the intermediate state. However, for 
the purpose of this study, our focus will be limited to the analysis of the developmental 
and predatory state and their implications for promoting socio-economic development.  
According to Evans (1998), the developmental state has as its internal character, an 
autonomous make-up that makes it to stand alone, above the fray and beyond the 
controlling reach of vested interests in formulating its own economic policy. It also 
incorporates the Weberian ideals of meritocracy, discipline and is immune to 
corruption. Such a state must be able to develop the capacity and power to implement 
its own vision of economic transformation (through indigenous economic and social 
policies) without collecting handouts from any external body or institutions. Also, the 
state’s vision has to be driven by a highly competent group of state managers who 
have achieved their power and authority via proven performance and professional 
competence. In addition, the state bureaucracy must be characterized by the values of 
embeddedness wherein it must forge collaborative links with certain key actors in the 
civil society by stimulating their entrepreneurial energies through active involvement 
in tax policy, control over credit and influencing the prices of raw materials so as to 
sway economic activity for the benefits of all.  
The developmental state's first goal must be the equal redistribution of the country's 
wealth among the people through sustained commitment to pro-poor policies aimed at 
reducing poverty. To achieve this objective, the state must implement programmes that 
include the provision of improved services in agricultural areas, the absorption of poor 
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households into modern agriculture and other sectors through accelerated creation of 
employment opportunities and the provision of social services and amenities. This kind 
of developmental state model has been reported as responsible for stimulating 
fundamental economic growth and development in South East Asian economies of 
Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaysia (Wade, 1990; 
Chalmers, 1987). In all of these countries, the state played an important role; guiding 
the private sector toward targeted economic activities and stimulating growth in areas 
that the government wishes to expand. Sometimes, government planners have even 
pressured particular industries or companies to specialize in certain products and 
abandon others. This aspect of the state was able to allow it to engage international 
capital much more effectively and actually give the state a ‘comparative advantage’ in 
negotiating deals. 
Some scholars have argued that East Asia’s Confucian culture-featuring nationalism, 
close cooperation between different sector of the economy, and a strong work ethic 
have been a critical ingredient in the region’s economic growth (Kahn, 1984).  In the 
same vein, similar cultural explanations have been put forth by Max Weber who 
attributed the development of Western capitalism to the adoption of the Protestant 
work ethic. Such developmental state fails to confirm the neo-liberal portrayal of 
utterly unproductive role of state intervention in the economy. However, some critics 
have pointed out that the new industrializing countries (NICs) in the South East Asia 
(for example South Korea and Singapore) in the 1970s and 1980s were authoritarian 
and less democratic in their posture. Be that as it may, the fact remains that these states 
were legitimate in their operations as they instituted pro poor policies on mass 
education, infrastructure development and industrialization that have clear and tangible 
benefits for the population. Besides, the state was also capable of insulating itself from 
inter- and intra-class competition within the country, and thus was able to institute 
policies that were egalitarian. 
In the same vein, it has also been established that with respect to the exercise of 
political power, the states in Africa have not been different from those in East Asia. 
Rather, it is the uses to which power and authority have been predominantly exercised 
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that establish the differences between forms of government (Ikpeze, 1994:73). In sub-
Saharan Africa, both authoritarian and democratic regimes have been found to be anti-
developmental, and state power has been used to secure and enrich those in 
government and partly to the advantage of favoured groups and interests (see Nelson, 
1992:290). Political and personal goals have informed the actions and decisions of 
state leaders, and African administrations have been marked by ubiquitous political 
intrusion, arbitrariness, massive corruption and political favouritism (Kenneth, 1994). 
In contrast, for a variety of historical and geopolitical reasons, East Asian political 
elites have been deeply committed to rapid economic growth and development which 
they have taken as the sacred mission of the state and are driven by it (Onis, 1991; 
Leftwich, 1995).   
In furtherance of his conceptualization of the state, Evans conceived of the predatory 
state as one wherein the appropriation of unearned income via rent-seeking has 
become endemic. In such a state, political offices are held not for the reason of 
providing service to a nation, but for the purpose of individual gain in a society which 
may offer few alternatives to wealth accumulation. Corroborating his position, 
Bardhan (1990:3-7) asserts that government in a predatory state is all too often 
hijacked by a predatory oligarchy who siphon the national treasury and transform 
government bureaucracy into bribe-collection agencies which impede legitimate 
business, socio-economic and societal development.   
In this kind of state, everything is for sale from the courts, the legislatures, the taxing 
authority, to the military among others. Economic mismanagement, social distrust and 
political instability are the hallmark of this state. Its primary characteristic is to 
distribute income to selected elements of society by the creation of monopolies in 
major sectors of the economy through the collusion between the state and its allies in 
the private sector to milk the nation’s resources through the execution of white 
elephant projects with little or no benefit (Kohli, 1999:99). This situation create room 
wherein rent seeking become endemic and structural as selected persons, favoured 
private firms, government officials and its agencies engage in “Directly Unproductive 
Profit Seeking” activities such as smuggling, bribery and corruption, import licensing, 
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fuel importation which generate profits but produce no goods or services directly 
(Evans op cit :12, 248).  
Furthermore, in a predatory state we also find a vitriolic mixture of traditionalism and 
arbitrariness characteristic of pre-capitalist societies. In such a state, there is a scarcity 
of trained bureaucrats, and an absence of both meritocracy and rule-governed 
behaviour throughout the state apparatus. The state operates under the whims of a 
‘leader’ who functions in the “patrimonial tradition” of an absolutist ruler clustered by 
presidential clique who control and use state apparatus for their own ends (Kohli, op 
cit). for instance, the kleptocratic government and state institutions run by Mobutu 
Sese Seko in Zaire, Babangida and Abacha in Nigeria are classic examples of 
predatory states in Africa. 
As for the intermediate states, it has the character of inconsistencies as its bane. It 
exhibits the loathsome features of the predatory state as well as “pockets of efficiency” 
characteristic of Weberian attributes of functioning bureaucracy (anchored on merit-
based recruitment, coherent institutional structure) where state managers demonstrate 
both professionalism and competence. Such a coherent institutional structure can form 
a constructive counterpart to private-sector institutions in designing, promoting and 
completing imaginative and important projects, either jointly or on their own through 
state owned enterprises (Asmden, 2001:141-145). Such nations as Brazil, India, or 
Mexico are appropriate examples of the intermediate state (Herring, 1999:306-334). 
Furthermore, intermediate states also fall victim to “bureaucratic fragmentation” in 
which professionalism dominate in some sectors and agencies while personal ties 
and/or corruption form the basis for decision–making and authority in other parts of 
the state apparatus. Such a state fails to confirm the neo-liberal portrayal of utterly 
futile and unproductive state intervention. Yet, intermediate state lack the means to 
consistently transform society, even as they are able to engineer successful sectoral 
transformations (Evans, op cit).  
 Evans elaborated further the ideas of the predatory states, aptly exemplified by most 
states in Africa like Congo, Zaire, Nigeria and others, to the developmental states 
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represented by the tightly knit and efficient state bureaucracy in the United States, 
Britain, Germany, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. These typologies demonstrate how 
differences in domestic institutional structure account for variations in national 
developmental outcomes. In establishing an empirical comparative setting of the 
nature of states, the latter countries can be seen as an exemplar of the developmental 
state and the former as predatory states. For him, states can vary, depending on the 
historical evolution of specific societies.  States are the result of complex historical 
forces and relationships, but they are also actors or agents potentially capable of 
shaping and influencing the ongoing process of historical evolution. For Evans 
(1995:19):  
States are the historical products of their societies, but that 
does not make them pawns in the social games of other 
actors. They must be dealt with as institutions and social 
actors in their own right, influencing the course of economic 
and social change even as they are shaped by it.  
In all of these typologies of state types drawn by Evans, one key factor that runs 
through them has to do with the nature of governance and the functions it set out to 
perform. What this fact brings to fore is that governance (whether good or bad) is an 
important determinant of economic development. According to Brautigam (1991) 
governance has to do with the exercise of power and authority in both economic and 
political spheres. This means that development is influenced by both economic and 
non economic factors. Although each of these factors is important, the central thesis of 
the ‘governance-led development theory’ is that good governance provides the lead. 
Good and intelligent governance is seen as an ‘entrepreneur’ which harnesses all 
material and human resources and alters the socio-cultural settings of people for the 
achievement of rapid development (see Uwatt, 2004; 370). Despite this view, there is 
little consensus on what constitute good governance as its definition are characterized 
by non-neutral and neutral connotation. 
In looking at the non-neutral definition of governance, Boeninger (1992) sees 
governance as the ‘good government of a society which guides the country along a 
course leading to the desired goal’. The desired goal in this case is development, 
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broadly defined to include the concepts of equity, freedom of expression, institutional 
pluralism, transparency, accountability, social justice and the effective exercise of 
basic human rights. Since equity, social justice, human rights and the like are 
important characteristics of democracy, it implies that good governance is equated 
with democracy. This definition has been criticized on the ground that most 
democratic government have been found to anti-development and characterized by bad 
governance. However, a good example of a neutral definition of governance is that 
presented by the World Bank (1992). Here, governance is presented as ‘the exercise of 
political power to manage a nation’s affairs’. The focus here is on the manner in which 
power is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources 
for development.  Whereas the basic elements of good government were earlier hinted 
upon, Obadan (1998) outlined five fundamentals of good governance to include: 
i. accountability of government officials (public leaders and bureaucrats) 
for public funds and resources; 
ii. transparency in government procedures, processes, investment 
decisions, contracts and appointments; 
iii. predictability in government behavior; 
iv. openness in government transactions and reliable flows of the 
information necessary for economic activity; and  
v. adherence to and observance of the rule of law of governments and 
citizens.    
Thus governance from the above implies efficient and public administration, good 
policies and sound management of national resources. It also entails ruling on the basis 
on equity and social justice and ending corruption, nepotism, prebendalism and 
political manipulations of public institutions. Thus the positive influence of good 
governance on national development is a derivative of the checks and safeguards it 
provides against anti-development forces especially corruption. As such, Obadan 
(1998:35) summits that “the links between good governance and economic growth are 
quite obvious. Elements of good government…are clearly significant impetus for 
economic growth”. Similarly, Nelson (1991) avers that the links between elements of 
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good government and economic growth are plain; Clear-laws, predictably enforced, 
reliable information, reasonably efficient expansion, maintenance of infrastructure and 
basic services and no more than moderate corruption are clearly growth-promoting; 
their opposites clearly hampers growth. Therefore, the anti-thesis of good governance 
is bad governance, and this is characterized by pervasive corruption, lack of public 
accountability and the capture of public services by privileged individuals. The World 
Bank (1992) identifies the main features of bad governance as: 
i. failure to distinguish between what is public and what is private, 
leading to private appropriation of otherwise public resources; 
ii. inability to establish a predictable government behavior in a manner 
conducive to development or arbitrariness in the application of laws and 
rules; 
iii. excessive rules, regulations, licensing requirements, and so forth, which 
impede the functioning of the markets and encourage rent seeking; 
iv. priorities that are inconsistent with development, thereby resulting in 
misallocation of national resources; and  
v. exceedingly narrow base for or non transparent decision making. 
In the context of the foregoing discourse, Applying the institutional theory of the state 
in analyzing the role and functions of the states in sub-Saharan Africa vis-à-vis the 
neoliberal position on the minimalist role of the state in the running of African 
economy, questions are raised as to what is specifically the problem of states in Africa 
and why is it unable to provide socioeconomic development? To provide answer to 
these questions, it is critical to explore the historical and structural forces concerning 
the nature and character of the state with regard to the formulation and implementation 
of development strategy. This is particularly crucial given the pivotal place that the 
state occupies in Third World countries development since independence.  
Accordingly, Ake (2000:160) argued that development in Africa has to be about the 
transformation of the state, before it can bring about the introduction of new 
socioeconomic and political processes that will positively impact on the living 
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standards of the generality of the citizenry. This is so because the state is the 
framework from which public policies emerge and are propelled (through articulation 
and aggregation) by members of the political class (see Oyovbaire, 1987). As such, the 
actions and inactions of political elites who occupy positions of state control clearly 
underscore issues of socio-economic and political transformation of nations. This fact 
aligns with Weber’s conceptualization of the principle of rationalization aimed at 
establishing the differences between various societies with regard to the dominant 
beliefs, practices and social relationships in the area of economic, political, intellectual 
and religious life, as well as differences in the bearing of these realms on each other 
(Freund, 1969). For Max Weber, rationalization is defined as: 
The organization of life through a division and coordination of 
activities on the basis of an exact study of men’s relations with 
each other, with their tools and their environment, for the 
purpose of achieving greater efficiency and productivity. 
Hence it is a purely practical development brought about by 
man’s technological genius (cited in Freund, ibid: 18).   
Consequently, in evaluating development strategy or economic reforms implemented 
by the states in Africa, it must be seen essentially as much a political as an economic 
issue. This is so as any strategy adopted by the state changes the distribution of 
benefits in society, benefiting some social groups and hurting others (Killick, 1995; 
Herbst, 1990). Thus the significant part of a successful development strategy would 
depend on a good policy which to large extent is determined by country specific 
factors such as history, including previous leadership styles, geography, level of 
development, and the impact of political change taking place at that time. In this 
context, two distinct periods stand out in appraising Africa’s development strategy. 
The first period spanning 1960s and 1970s was characterized by policies aimed at 
strengthening economic autonomy.  It is during this period that diversification oriented 
policies were aggressively pursued in most countries. The second shift in economic 
policies in Africa was occasioned by the economic crises of the early 1980s. During 
this period, most of the post independence economic policy geared toward long term 
development were replaced by macroeconomic stabilization and adjustment with focus 
on short term goals, and this orientation of economic policy failed to yield the 
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expected results in achieving socioeconomic development, especially the 
diversification of the economy that was begun in the 1970s and early 1980s (ECA, 
2007).  
Historically, since the 1950s, the newly independent African states have been brought 
into the centre of Eurocentric ideological struggle involving neocolonial forces in the 
area of economic development. However, the inherited chain of economic dependence 
forged during the colonial era ensured that economic, political, and educational models 
central to capitalist expansion have continue to play a hegemonic role in determining 
post independence African development strategies (Abrokwaa, 1999). As such, 
Generally speaking, Africa’s socioeconomic problems have been attributed both to 
internal and external causes. For instance, since the era of the Atlantic slave trade and 
in particular during the colonial period, one message from the West has remained 
clear: Africa must always depend on the West for its image and destiny. This has 
implied that Africa is incapable of defining and solving her own problems of 
development. Unfortunately so, this position has consistently been manifested in the 
manner that African states and governments have accepted the development strategies 
dictated by the industrialized nations using their perspective, thus making Western 
development model the foundation of policy decisions in postcolonial Africa.  
Firstly, it started with the modernization model which was premised on the thesis of 
social and economic dualism, being the clashing of an imported social system with an 
indigenous social system of another style. As defined by Eisenstradt (1966:1) 
“modernization is the process of change toward those types of socio-economic and 
political systems that have developed in Western Europe and North America…and 
then have spread to other European countries and to South American, Asian and 
African countries.”  This view of modernization perceived the traditional as a rurally-
based, closed, marginal, and stagnated population which co-existed with an urban-
centred, secular, and industrial society. In this context, the traditional sector was 
considered an obstacle to development because of its incapacity to fully incorporate 
into the model of development functioning in the modern sector. This mode of analysis 
implied the acceptance of a mechanistic, teleological theory of convergence in which 
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homogenization is both desirable and inevitable. The underdeveloped societies, 
through a diffusionist and evolutionary process, were expected to move inexorably 
from the traditional to the transitional and eventually were to reach a stage represented 
by the model developed society (Hoogevelt, 1976:18).  
The most elaborate and preeminent of the modernization strategy was the stage 
economic model presented by Rostow (1960: 4) in his historical analysis of economic 
development. Examining the gap between development and underdevelopment, 
Rostow envisioned a unique sequence of five distinct stages through which all states 
must pass: traditional society, precondition for takeoff, takeoff, the drive to maturity, 
and the age of mass consumption. His focus was on identifying and overcoming 
existing endogenously generated deficiencies, whether they be inappropriate values, a 
lack of entrepreneurship, or a low level equilibrium trap caused by a scarcity of 
investment capital. It is clear that Rostow’s approach was derived from a Eurocentric 
analysis of the industrial revolution in Britain and was mechanically applied to a 
completely alien historical, physical, and cultural context of Africa continent and 
elsewhere. Besides, common to the modernization model of development was that the 
progress of all nations-states could and should be evaluated using measures such as 
GDP, per capita income, political integration, and acceptance of modern values. 
It was from this model the Import Substitution Industrialization was designed to 
accelerate the process of industrialization in the African continent, with the expectation 
that the benefits of the strategy would spread downward (trickle down) within the local 
economy, and leading to complementary productions in mining, agriculture and 
manufacturing (Irrizary, 1980). However, by the early 1960s, the accelerated 
industrialization and the trickle–down theories had failed to produce economic gains in 
Africa and other developing nations. Although there was some success in raising the 
per capita income in a number of developing nations, including India, Sri-Lanka, 
Nigeria, large sections of the population in these countries faced further 
impoverishment because of unequal distribution of wealth both within and between 
states.  
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From the 1980s, the World Bank/IMF had imposed stabilization and structural 
adjustment on several African countries, which were aimed at reducing demand and 
expenditure within the economy of the debtor country. However, it became 
increasingly obvious that the stabilization and adjustment cures for the African 
economies based on the measures of currency devaluation, reduction of public 
spending, removal of state subsidies, restraint on wages and public sector employment 
and limits on credit expansion were not resolving the economic problems of these 
nations as intended, but rather they plunged them further into debt and political 
instability. In a nutshell, as it was earlier hinted, the main aim of these so-called 
economic adjustment programs was not to develop the economies of these African 
nations but to ensure their continued ability to pay their debts to the rich nations.  
The neo-liberal policy measures acted as a red herring to shift the emphasis away from 
the discussion of broader issues of development, of world trade imbalances, 
protectionism, and the promotion of equity and social well-being to simply economic 
growth. It vigorously advocates export-oriented free market economy, especially in 
agriculture, to ensure Africa’s role in the world economic order as producer of raw 
materials for Western industries and socioeconomic growth (Graham-Brown, 1993). In 
addition, adjustment takes little account of the specific sociopolitical conditions in a 
country where it was to be adopted, often endorsing dictators who were ready to carry 
out the will and wishes of the donor countries. This fact exposes the great defect of 
SAP or economic reforms in that it is blind to its own politics, not only about its 
impact on politics but also the impact of politics on its own feasibility (Ake, 2001:95). 
But, this kind of development strategy prescribed for Africa by the West has offered 
little or no solution to African poverty, its poor majority, or its underdevelopment. It 
was not designed to strengthen Africa’s independent socioeconomic and political 
growth, but instead used its adopted strategies of promising an imminent better future, 
to enrich themselves and their economies off the sweat and toil of the African masses 
(Abrokwaa op cit: 660). Since the 1950s, therefore, economic development has been 
employed as an instrument of control by the industrialized nations in an effort to 
change the socioeconomic and political structures of African societies for their own 
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economic exploits. As rightly observed by Cheru (1989) today one can safely conclude 
that a century after the infamous Berlin Conference of 1884-1885, which led to the 
partitioning of Africa and the scramble for African labour, resources, and land, it 
appears that the continent is being recolonized by the same Western powers through 
the neo-liberal economic model which had no foundation in Africa. 
For instance, colonialism as a political weapon destroyed Africa’s traditional 
organizational and economic structures and usurped the peoples’ power, initiative, and 
capacity to control their own development and destiny. In most cases, this tool was 
used to transform and control the colonies in the interests of the capitalist expansion 
occurring in Europe whose growth was made possible through the principal activities 
of multinational corporations (MNCs). These corporations established subsidiaries in 
many third world nations in order to exploit their cheap labour and raw materials. They 
also used their worldwide business structure to control production from the raw 
materials, through the processing to the final stages. The MNCs represent, therefore, 
the increasing concentration of capital and the integration of production on a 
worldwide scale (Webster, 1990:80). 
The poverty and economic dependence of Africa arising from the colonial experience 
not only continued but escalated, becoming integral parts of the present world 
economic order, with African governments borrowing largely to solve debt obligations 
rather than to finance sustainable economic development. The roots of the debt crisis 
lie in an international system resembling global apartheid whereby the North, in 
collaboration with autocratic African governments and their minority elite class, 
continue to subvert the economic future of Africa (Ibid).  Thus most governments and 
states in Africa have adopted and supported development strategies from the West 
taking little account of the specific socio-political conditions in their country and the 
consequence that these strategies may have on rising unemployment, rural-urban 
inequalities, infrastructural decay and different social groups, particularly the poor 
majority in the society. Across Africa today, economic reforms are initiated by African 
leaders only when international financial institutions convince the ruling elite that their 
political longevity depends on pursuing reforms (Richard, 2000:17). From this 
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perspective, it is not the disinterested concern of the ruling elite for improving the life 
of the masses that lead them to implementing development strategies or socioeconomic 
reforms, but the cold-hearted concern for their political and economic survival that 
prompt action.     
This was aptly corroborated by Nkrumah (1965) when he argued that the new world 
economic order of capitalism subsumed under modernization through the process of 
import substitution industrialization and other forms of economic policies such as SAP 
that came later were nothing but a new process of neo-colonialism, which simply 
means a form of socioeconomic domination from outside that does not rely on direct 
political control. As such the institutional, political and economic changes in most of 
sub-Saharan African nations reflect these processes. He asserts that: 
The essence of neo-colonialism is that the state which is 
subject to it is, in theory, independent and has all the 
trappings of international sovereignty. In reality, its 
economic system and its internal policy is directed from 
outside (p ix).   
Thus the socioeconomic and political pictures of present day African societies indicate 
that these societies and their leaders lack control of their economic destinies because 
they are not given the free hands by the West to implement African oriented 
endogenous development strategy. The developed countries have continued to use 
their economic power to create an international division of labour between nations. 
This is significantly evidenced by the World Bank/IMF rejection of the Lagos Plan of 
Action adopted by African Heads of States in 1980 as a design for the restructuring of 
African economies on the principles of self–reliance and self sustaining participative 
development (Ake, 2001:22-24). However, after nearly half a century of Africa’s states 
implementation of exogenous development strategies championed by international 
financial institutions (IFIs) like the World Bank/IMF, it is painfully evident that 
Africa’s underdevelopment and poverty incidence has increased rather than decreased. 
This elusive quest for development was aptly confirmed by African leaders at the then 
Organization of African Unity (OAU) (now AU) summit in Lagos held in 1980, where 
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they hinged Africa’s poor development record on the inadequacy of exogenous 
development strategies (OAU, 1982:1). The Lagos Plan of Action argued: 
Africa is susceptible to the disastrous effects of natural and 
endemic diseases of the cruelest type and is a victim of 
settler exploitation arising from colonialism, racism and 
apartheid. Indeed, Africa was directly exploited during the 
colonial period and for the past two decades; this 
exploitation has been carried out through neo-colonialist 
external forces which seek to influence the economic 
policies and directions of African States (OAU, ibid:3).  
Instead of development, African nations, particularly those in sub-Saharan Africa, 
have been plunged into insurmountable debts and increased poverty. The African state, 
therefore, has increasingly become irrelevant to the people due to its inability to 
provide them with their basic social needs. Hence, the people seem to have taken 
charge of their own development needs without the government, and they have 
designed applicable strategies to survive in the current harsh economic conditions and 
pressures dictated by the exogenous policy agenda sponsored by the West. It is evident 
that the African economy, societies, and its peoples are worse off now than at the time 
of gaining independence in the 1950s and 1960s as shown by the varying human 
development and economic indicators for the continent over the last three decades. 
Africa is now heavily indebted to the rich countries of the world, and its people 
continue to live in destitution-the result of total reliance on, belief in, and adoption of 
foreign development models and strategies.  
As such, looking at the Nigerian state from the period of its evolution, it is seen as a 
clone of its colonial progenitor which still retains most of its features having been 
established in the course of the expansion of Western capitalism in order to facilitate 
the British colonialists’ goal of exploiting the natives, their labour and natural 
resources. This structure of the state as inherited by our nationalist leaders at 
independence still retained all the major features of colonialism including its 
embryonic administrative state networks which are arbitrary, alien and hostile creation 
that does not concern itself with advancing the welfare needs of the people, thus 
making it reflect the features of a predatory state. This is particularly evident in the 
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manner with which the inheritors of state power in most sub-Saharan African nation 
such as Nigeria has been much more interested in cornering the privileges of state 
office for the primitive accumulation of national resources rather than engaging in any 
transformative agenda that will advance the welfare of the masses in general and the 
society in particular (Mkandawire and Soludo, 1999; Mkandawire and Olukoshi, 
1995). 
Thus, the character of politics which provides the competitive platform for the political 
elites to seek for power to control the commanding heights of the state where decisions 
about public policies are made and enforced clearly reflects the nature of the state 
which they are trying to capture. The character of the state in turn depends largely on 
the economic system which invariably is capitalist in form and character. The state 
therefore lacks autonomy in the sense that it is externally controlled, a fact reflecting 
Nigeria’s dependent economy, which necessarily makes it a dependent entity. In this 
context, therefore, the interest of benign Africa elite are at odds with those of the 
masses, and conditioned by their class interests which are more linked to the interests 
of the metropolitan bourgeoisie (Mkandawire et al, 1999). This explains why they 
cannot launch a development project but rather opted for dependent development.   
Besides, the state is not detached from the dominant class, but it is used by it directly 
as a tool for the pursuit of parochial interests. For instance, from the post independence 
period, the principal competitors for state power in Nigeria have always been the same 
social class, the Nigerian petit bourgeoisie who overtime have transformed to become 
a comprador bourgeoisie. It is the character of this class that determines to a large 
extent the character of our politics, socioeconomic policy formulation and the nature of 
our development aspirations (Ake, 1996:23). One salient reality about the political 
elite class within the Nigerian state context is that their capacity for the pursuit of 
enlightened self interest is quite limited. The class is too divided, its discipline is poor 
and its consciousness retarded. Besides, the class is too divided to express and pursue 
its enlightened self interest as a class. In the same vein, the government in which it 
expresses its institutional political power is too weak to lead or compel it to pursue its 
enlightened self interest. Regrettably, the increasing misery and alienation arising from 
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their corrupt and incompetent rule today is what is undermining the well-being and 
livelihoods of the greatest majority of the Nigerian people and the corporate existence 
of the nation. 
Furthermore, the Nigerian bourgeoisie was, and remains, a loose coalition of the elite 
of different ethnic groups and economic interests. It remains fragmentary, reflecting 
Nigeria’s incoherent economy and multiethnic nationality (Ibid). Its intent right from 
colonial days to the post colonial era is not to change the colonial state structure, but to 
inherit the exploitative system which underlies its own oppressive style in relating with 
the citizens. This is aptly reflected in the present economic reform measures of 
government started in 1986, which have proven incapable of addressing itself to the 
needs and challenges of the poor. In the same light, the state elite in African countries 
have also been responsible for the poor development of the private sector, as it was 
‘clearly not prepared to tolerate such attempts to develop the emergence of an African 
business class, with power autonomous of the state.’ This result from the fear that such 
a class would be less reliant on the politics of patronage and therefore less easy to 
control (see Brian, 1996:3-4).     
Consequently, the political elite who assume state power are economically weak partly 
because of the dependent structure of the inherited economy which makes it a producer 
of primary products such as crude oil and cash crops which are exported to the 
developed world and dependent on them for manufactured consumer and capital goods 
that they ultimately require (Frank, 1969:3-6). The political class simply sees state 
power as a means for the accumulation of wealth to enhance its weak economic base 
which will further consolidate his relevance politically. As such, the Nigerian political 
elites are considered as nothing but a group of persons who seek political power as a 
tool to better their living conditions. So, politics is seen as a struggle among 
themselves for successive exploitation of the people and the nation’s resources. As 
such, the state today is no longer a public property but a tool to serve those who 
control it (Amin, 1976:104). There is increasing differentiation and opposition of 
interests of the masses to those of the few elite who control state power and the means 
of production to the point where the masses have become mere tool used by them in 
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their quest for primitive accumulation. They use state power without restraint to 
oppress and impoverish the people, pauperize their living conditions through ill-
conceived economic policies that fail to address the enhancement of the peoples’ 
quality of life, put their political opponent out of business, expropriate them, even to 
deprive them of their liberty. 
The obvious manifestation of this class division is evident in the failure of the political 
class to mobilize the masses for any serious national purpose or aspirations given the 
cynicism, apathy and hostilities of the masses who are disappointed about the inability 
of the political class to bring them better life (see Adedeji, 1998:25). This failed 
relationship has further deepened the alienation of the leadership from the rest of the 
people where they now use the force instrumentality of the state to repress in order to 
curb the peoples’ expression of their disappointment. This is evident in the concoction 
and inevitable failure of development strategies biased in favour of the parasitical 
political elite group which controls state power and dissociated from the interests of 
Nigeria’s real productive forces - the self employed, peasants and the working class as 
it is the case with the present economic reform policy of government since 1999.   
The Nigerian state today is one that is not able to maintain an impartial public 
institution, it is unable to mediate the competition of political contestants and social 
classes, provide social services and address the welfare needs of the people for which 
it was created. As such, politics has become essentially a competition without rules or 
referees. Even when there are rules they are subverted in the interest of the few in 
order to maintain the status-quo and continue their political and economic hegemony. 
This political incoherence is the bane of the Nigerian nation. The state is no longer 
seen in the sense of a truly public sphere or a commonwealth; rather it has been 
reduced to a contested space where strangers converge to appropriate for their interest 
groups whatever is on offer, including the power of the state (Ake, 2001:94).  
In this context, therefore, every interest group is out for itself; each wanting to 
appropriate and privatize state power to its own benefit. As such, the issues of national 
interest, public interest, or even public policy scarcely arise (Ekeh, 1975). Even when 
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they do exist, they are lost in the contradiction between the manifest and latent 
functions of policy implementation. The same state of political incoherence is also 
brought to bear on the formulation of public policy such as characterized the 
adjustment or economic reform measures.  For instance, from the onset the 
introduction of SAP or the present economic reforms of government was authoritarian 
in nature as well as an imposition which hinges on the renunciation of politics. It was 
devoid of the process of aggregating interests, articulating them and negotiating 
consensus on the general thrusts of public policy and on the managers of public policy. 
The imposition of SAP calls for considerable coercion because the government doing 
the imposing has no legitimacy (Ake, Ibid). This fact explains the main crux of 
structural adjustment or economic reforms given its association with de-
democratization and political incoherence. These tendencies stand in the way on a 
development project and a development strategy. This situation obviously is a negation 
of the primary goal of government which is to implement economic (fiscal and 
macroeconomic) policies that will increase aggregate demand by financing public 
projects such as the provision of basic infrastructure and evolving policy programmes 
that can lower the incidence of poverty, inequality and unemployment (Davidson, 
1992).  
These events, therefore, provide the base for explaining the paradox of development 
failure in most developing societies such as Nigeria where in spite of her enormous 
resource endowment; the citizens are ravaged with poverty which has been blamed on 
bad governance and corruption (FRN, 2001; Conable, 1991). Confronted with this 
peculiar Nigerian paradox, the World Bank (1996) gave an apt description of Nigeria, 
calling it ‘poverty in the midst of plenty’. Thus many scholars have ascribed the 
increasing poverty in Nigeria to the mismanagement of public resources by our 
political leaders that have appropriated our collective commonwealth for their self 
interests at the expense of the general well-being of the people. This is predicated on 
the view that wealth of the non-poor is significant only because the poor exist and the 
preservation of the status-quo help to accentuate the condition (Edu, 2003). 
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Despite over four decades of self governance in Nigeria, the number of Nigerians 
living below the poverty line has worsened, especially since the 1980s as majority of 
the people lack command over basic consumption needs (Dike, 1995). For instance, a 
look at the social indicators of development for Nigeria showed that the country has 
not done well in terms of promoting an improvement in the quality of life of the 
people. The life expectancy at birth has dropped from 54 years in 1990 to 43 years in 
2006; the incidence of poverty has risen from 28.1 percent in 1980 to 46.3 percent in 
1985, but dropped slightly to 42.7 percent in 1992; from there it rose to 65.6 percent in 
1996 and to over 70 percent in 2006 (IMF, 2007; Uwatt, 2004:379). Besides, with the 
country’s human poverty index at 41.6, Nigeria has become one of the 25 poorest 
countries in the world (UNDP, 1998:17; Aliyu, 2001).  
Also empirical evidence in terms of economic indicators also show mixed results. The 
inflation rate has increased from 6 percent in 1960 to almost 37 percent in 1975. From 
1987 onwards, the inflation rate rose steadily to 57.2 percent in 1993 and 72 .8 percent 
in 1995, declining thereafter to between 10-15 percent from 1998 to 2007. The 
increase in the rate of inflation has been fuelled by the neo-liberal policy of exchange 
rate adjustment and interest rates charged by financial institutions following 
government’s expansionary monetary policy. The economy has also been operating 
below 50 percent of its installed industrial capacity in 2006 compared to over 70 
percent in 1960 and 1980 (CBN, 2007; Uwatt, 2004, 378). This has resulted in the 
increasing rate of unemployment which has risen from 2.4 percent in 1960 to 12.4 in 
2007 (IMF, 2007).  
These conditions have brought to fore the central thesis of this study which is to 
emphasize that the state of poverty in the nation has resulted in deficiency in human 
development of the populace, and that bad governance and corruption looms large in 
precipitating this manifestations. Though the nature and causes of poverty varies just 
as the features and problems of the poor, they cover economic, social, cultural, 
political and other factors. But according to NCEMA (1995), the most significant is 
economic, which hinges on unemployment and underemployment. At it were, with 
unemployment rate hitting the double digit of over 12 percent (due to government 
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privatization policy as well as contraction in both public and organized private sector), 
the activities in the informal sector has experienced proliferation over the years in 
order to provide a source of livelihood for most of the unemployed, majority of whom 
are poor. Among the characteristics of this group of persons who constitute over 70 
percent of the nation’s total workforce is that apart from many of them being 
underemployed, they also lack access to regular source of incomes and income earning 
opportunities which hampers their self development drive. They lack education, access 
to quality healthcare and limited skills. Their low education and limited skills mean 
that they cannot have access to opportunities for meaningful employment and income 
generation. They also suffer poor/ ill health and are generally unable to attend to this 
condition because of their low incomes. These social conditions of the people have 
been further worsened by government’s continuous implementation of the neo-liberal 
policy measures which canvassed for a lesser role for government in the economy, 
including her cut-back spending in the social sectors where capital expenditure has 
been declining over time. This goes to substantiate the fact that there exists a close 
interrelationship between policy and poverty, which may be called the policy-poverty 
nexus (see Onimode, 1995).   
Thus the role of the political factor in exacerbating the incidence of poverty in the 
nation which has resulted in the deficiency of human development is obviously 
manifested through corruption which the Political Bureau in 1987 and the Vision 2010 
reports described as the bedrock of the country’s development failure. Here the 
attainment of political power has become channels of enriching the operators of the 
state through misappropriation and mismanagement of public funds which in turn 
leads to the dearth of public resources for funding development projects (see Adeyemi. 
1991; Ake, 1976). For instance, in a State where public office holders have near 
absolute political power and discretion-essentially autocratic in nature; where social 
control is lacking; and compliance to societal law suffer gross deficiency, political 
actors tend to become unaccountable to the people they rule and administer. All these 
factors historically have been created in Nigeria in the last thirty years. Today, there is 
a consensus by majority of Nigerians that corruption has pervaded every fabric of the 
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Nigerian economic and social institutions. This became an obvious reality when 
Transparency International in 2005 rated Nigeria as the third most corrupt nation in the 
world trailing behind India and Bangladesh.  
Also bad governance and corruption has become the bane of programme-
implementation in Nigeria. Funds that should be channeled into the actual operation of 
institutions, agencies and also to provide needed resources for programmes often 
disappear into private accounts. This goes to explain the lack of success in the various 
poverty alleviation programmes instituted by government where the perpetuation of 
vested political interests runs counter to the requirements of poverty alleviation target. 
This is where the Nigerian paradox become manifest and it was confirmed by the 
federal government of Nigeria in the blueprint for the National Poverty Eradication 
Programme (NAPEP) (FRN, 2001). Aliyu (2001:1) quotes the NAPEP blueprint as 
saying: 
Poverty is one of the most serious problems in Nigeria today despite 
various efforts by governments from independence to date. Poverty 
among Nigerians has been on the increase. Statistical data available 
indicate that by 1960 the poverty level in Nigeria covers (covered?) 
about 15 percent of the population and by 1980 grew to 28 percent. I 
1985, the poverty level was 46 percent and dropped to 43 percent in 
1992. By 1996 the Federal Office of Statistics estimated that the 
poverty level in Nigeria at about 66 percent and there are a number 
of real indicators to show that the current poverty level has gone 
higher.  
 A particular disturbing fact is that the increasing incidence of poverty has been 
occurring at the same time that higher resource inflows have been coming into Nigeria. 
For instance, within the last three decades of the 20th century, the country has earned 
over US$ 300 billion dollars from the exportation of petroleum alone (Edu, 2003, 278). 
The fact that higher resource inflows have been occurring simultaneously with 
declining living conditions is paradoxical and anti-thetical to normal expectations. 
Much of this paradox is attributable to the problem of bad governance where those 
leaders holding political power have failed to keep faith with the major goal in 
governance which is to improve the standard of living of the masses, raise the level of 
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happiness and dignity of the citizens and provide social and economic infrastructures 
for the nation.     
This is where the need to address the challenges of the informal sector becomes critical 
given its huge role and contributions it plays in weathering the economic constraints 
which the government implementation of the neo-liberal economic reforms have 
brought to fore. This position clearly underscores the submission of the Brandt 
Commission (1980) which stressed that when economic forces are left entirely to 
themselves, they tend to produce growing inequality especially when income 
distribution is highly distorted between the rich and the poor in societies. It, therefore, 
becomes evident to reject the positions of neo-liberal advocates that competitive 
markets will function properly in a society like Nigeria, when the original 
“Washington Consensus” neo-liberal model deliberately excluded poverty-reduction 
programmes from its proposition at the beginning, only for it to evolve later as an 
afterthought (Edwards, 1995).  
These happenings, therefore, raises the question of the feasibility of the liberal state in 
the African context. This is because the modern liberal state is a historical product of 
industrial capitalism. The state in Africa is not a ‘res publica’, a public force or a 
commonwealth, because its members do not have common business and mutual 
interests in the way public activities are conducted. This public is opposed to the 
modern public of market society in which the liberal state is embedded. The 
uniqueness of the African state is that it has a very rudimentary modern public 
displaced and retarded by the multiplicity of primordial publics: ethnic, national, 
communal and sub-national. These circumstances have produced a structural dualism 
in contemporary Africa which is the problematic for the development of the liberal 
state (Ekeh, op cit). Regionalism and religious differences become politicized by the 
elites in order to find a base of power at a time of political anxiety and economic crisis.  
The state in post independence Africa has, so far, largely failed to alleviate the 
dissociation of available resources from social need. Instead, it has in most cases 
created its own privileged elite, which has resulted in the loss of its commitment to 
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economic liberation of the masses. In most of Africa, the leadership has betrayed the 
goals of liberation and mostly substituted itself for colonial administrators. In the same 
vein, they have continued with the colonial structure of authoritarian political system, 
coupled with the deprivation of the peoples’ access to resources, as well as the 
exacerbating inequalities among ethnic groups and regions which have remained 
unresolved, causing chronic conflicts that heighten the dissociation of resource use 
from social needs (Mengisteab, op cit: 169).   
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the state in Africa is still at the rudimentary 
public level lacking legitimacy, honesty and responsibility. Rights remain largely 
coextensive with power, and accountability and political participation are lacking. It is 
peopled by individuals and social groups who are essentially strangers to each other. 
Their relation rest mainly on an amoral calculus of strength and is characterized by 
unrelenting struggle for power. They invest nothing in the state and owe no 
responsibility to it (Ake, 2000:165). In most of Africa, the state is a contested terrain 
where different nationalities, sub-nationalities, ‘ethnic groups’ and communities go to 
fight for the appropriation of resources including power which has engendered strong 
centrifugal tendencies.  
2.6.3 SYNTHESIS 
From the discourse of the theoretical framework that underlined this study, it is clear 
that an examination of the social welfare conditions of the people in a given society is 
fundamental to understanding the nature of development strategy conceived by 
government and the character of the state institutions put in place to implement this 
strategy within a social milieu. This has enabled us to provide an in-depth analysis on 
issues of human development and the role which the state has played toward the 
promotion and improvement of the citizen’s standard of living, for which the whole 
essence of development is the beginning and the end. 
Given the nature of most African states which are predatory in their framework, it is 
not surprising that the development strategy or strategies implemented by several 
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governments in Africa have always been to the detriment of the general well-being of 
the people. This is so given the interests that underscore these strategies and their 
implications for promoting socio-economic development. It is an established fact that 
African nations’ vision for socioeconomic transformation has always been externally 
driven and mostly propelled by International Financial Institutions such as the World 
Bank/IMF. This ranges from its modernization model anchored on Import Substitution 
Industrialization (ISI) from the 1950s and 1960s, to the present neo-liberal strategy 
based on the supremacy of the market, thereby making the Western developmental 
strategies the foundations of policy decisions as is the case with post colonial Nigeria. 
These economic programmes or strategies in all sincerity have little concern for the 
realities of Africa’s historical, social and cultural conditions. They are mere passing 
enthusiasms and not development strategy, and this explains why the Nigerian state is 
stuck in the discourse and practice of SAP or economic reforms with no sign of 
anything else in the menu. In this light, the kind of development strategies prescribed 
for her by the West has offered almost no solution to its state of poverty, increasing 
unemployment, inequality or its underdevelopment. These strategies are not designed 
to strengthen the country’s independence socially, culturally, economically and 
politically. As such, since the 1950s, the drive for development has been employed as 
an instrument of control by the industrialized nations in an effort to change the 
socioeconomic and political structures of African societies for their own economic 
interests. This is clearly manifested in the nature and character of the African state, 
including Nigeria, where the interests of the state leadership are consistently at odds 
with those of the masses, and conditioned by their class interests that are more linked 
to the interests of the metropolitan bourgeoisie.  
Consequently, most of the development strategies adopted by African nations have 
failed to bring about the redistribution of the continent’s massive wealth among the 
populace through sustained commitment to pro-poor policies aimed at reducing 
poverty. Similarly, African governments have consistently been unable to develop 
policies for the protection of consumer goods, prices of raw materials, promote full 
employment opportunities, ensure manufactured export competitiveness as is been 
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done in the Western and East Asian developmental states. Furthermore, the managers 
of most African states lack the enlightened national self interest that is the required 
catalyst for the economic transformation of their societies unlike their foreign 
counterparts which largely underline the emergence of the developmental states.  
Neither do there exist domestic leaderships for whom development is an overriding 
priority, nor strong economic bureaucracies, nor favourable international and political 
environment are present to provide the catalyst for economic transformation of Africa 
(Gyimah-Boadi and Van de Walle, 1996).    
In this context, the operators of the African states see it as the platform for promoting 
rent seeking activities wherein economic development policies are pursued for the 
purpose of individual gains other than the collective interests of their respective 
nations (Diamond, 1991:78). As such, the state is used directly for the pursuit of 
parochial interests, wherein the leadership consciously supports development projects 
from the West for their own benefits at the expense of the poor, ignoring the decaying 
social infrastructures, rising unemployment and general economic stagnation which 
they have created (Pauly, 1997). Besides, they are also insensitive to the realization 
that these development strategies are completely alien to the nation’s historical, social 
and cultural context. In the same vein, the indicators for measuring the progress of 
these development strategies have consistently been the use of GDP, per capita income 
rather than the well-being of the people. 
Little wonder, therefore, that the states in Africa such as Nigeria has always faltered in 
the provision of social services and amenities, creation of employment opportunities 
by guiding the private sector, agricultural sector, informal sector and other viable 
sectors toward autonomous targeted economic policy that would stimulate their 
economic growth and development. Unlike governments in East Asia countries which 
did much to nurture and support private sector enterprises in diverse ways (credit, 
subsidies, information), African regimes have done little to provide various forms of 
assistance - institutional, technical, infrastructure, microeconomics - which are vital for 
fostering the conditions for a vigorous and resourceful entrepreneurial activity (Wade 
op cit). These conditions have created social distrust between the government and the 
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governed due to the inability of the government to meet the basic needs of the people. 
Today, the Nigerian state is no longer a public property of the people but a tool to 
serve those who control it. It has been reduced to an alien and hostile structure that 
does not concern itself with advancing the welfare needs of the people, but a tool for 
threatening and aggravating the well-being and livelihoods of the greatest majority of 
the citizenry.   
From the above discourse, it is apparent that before any positive socioeconomic and 
political development can be developed, where public policies are formulated that 
would positively impact on the socioeconomic welfare of the people; the state must 
undergo major structural transformation from a predatory state to a developmental 
state. This is fundamentally so, because it is the character of the state and the operators 
that ultimately determine to a large extent the nature of the country’s socioeconomic 
and development aspirations. Besides, the Nigerian state well as other states in the 
African continent should evolve an endogenous development project to which they are 
conscientiously committed. Furthermore, the political leaders in the various African 
states should refrain from seeing issues of development as mere ad hoc and 
opportunistic measures produced by a particular government in office and in the 
context of a determinate state and a historical configuration of social forces. 
With few exceptions, the African elites are more interested in political survival than in 
development, and the conditions of their survival have been inimical to development. 
As such they have largely ceded development strategy to external agents, but in 
exogenizing development they have also aborted it by their parochialism.  In all, given 
the pivotal role played by the state in the industrial development of the new industrial 
countries (NICs), we would posit that the position of the state in the context of 
development in Africa should be that of an enhanced institution, albeit a different and 
transformed one that is developmental in its orientation (Nyango’ro, 2002:78).               
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CHAPTER THREE 
RESEARCH METHOD 
3.1 THE STUDY AREA  
Lagos State was created on May, 27 1967 by Decree No 14 of 1967. As an old Yoruba 
town, Lagos was founded in the fifteenth century as a Portuguese trading post 
exporting ivory, peppers and slaves.  It subsequently fell into the hands of the British, 
who began exporting food crops (palm products) and other goods after outlawing 
slavery in 1807. In 1906, Lagos was joined with the British protectorate of Southern 
Nigeria, and, in 1914, when the Southern and Northern protectorate were 
amalgamated; it became part of the small coastal colony of Nigeria.  In 1954, most of 
the colony was merged with the rest of Nigeria, but Lagos was made a separate federal 
territory. From the late 19th century to independence in 1960, Lagos was the centre of 
Nigerian nationalist movement. It remained the political capital of Nigeria until 1991 
when the seat of the federal government was moved to Abuja on 12th December 1991 
(www.lagosstate.gov.ng). 
Lagos is the most populous city in Nigeria. The metropolitan area, an estimated 300 
square kilometers, is a group of island endowed with creeks and a lagoon. Lagos is 
known for its bursting business activities. It is Nigeria’s financial, commercial and 
industrial nerve centre with over 2000 manufacturing industries and over 200 financial 
institutions (banks, insurance companies) including the Nigeria stock exchange. 
Indeed, the headquarters of multinational conglomerates like UAC, Unilever, John 
Holts, Churchgate, Chevron, Shell, ExxonMobil and the nation’s public enterprises are 
all located in the state. The state alone harbour 60 percent of the federal trade industrial 
and foreign trade while also attracting 65 percent of commercial activities. It also 
account for more than 40 percent of all labour emoluments paid in the country. It 
therefore follows that Lagos state also provide the platform for the huge presence of 
informal sector activities.     
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It is also Nigeria’s chief port and economic and cultural centre. Apapa is the chief port 
district. With an area of 43 square kilometers, Lagos comprises several island and the 
adjacent mainland areas. Notable among the places on the Island are Victoria Island, 
Ikoyi and Isale-Eko; the mainland is made up of Ebute-Metta, Yaba, Surulere, Apapa, 
Ikeja and Agege among others. The capital of Lagos state is Ikeja. It takes the lion 
share of the location of industries, but Lagos Island has the highest concentration of 
retail and commercial outlets and bureaucracy (www.apps.atlantaga.gov/lagos).  
3.2 STUDY POPULATION 
The study population is the informal sector operations in Lagos State. The study was 
targeted at transport, production, wholesale and retail trade and social service operators 
involved in informal sector activities in Lagos State. Following the 1991 census, the 
population of Lagos state was put at 5.7 million people and 9 million in the 2006 
national census. The State is ranked as the most densely populated in Nigeria with a 
labour force that has doubled the 2.5 million reported in the 1991 census statistics 
(National Population Commission, 1992). In conducting this study, six of the Local 
Government Council Areas in Lagos State were chosen using the simple random 
sampling technique from which respondents were selected. The size of sample 
respondents chosen from each Local Government Area is roughly proportional to the 
population sizes of each Local Government using the 1991 census figure. The Local 
Government Areas chosen are Apapa, Ibeju-Lekki, Ikeja, Ikorodu, Lagos Island and 
Lagos Mainland.  
3.3 SAMPLE SIZE AND SAMPLING PROCEDURE 
Since the informal sector group in Lagos State is large given its huge population 
density, one cannot possibly study all the subjects or items in the population. Hence 
the researcher selected a sample from or a subset of the population of informal sector 
operators using the systematic sampling technique. The systematic sampling technique 
is a probability sampling type which involved the selection of the nth subject or item 
from serially listed population subjects or units: where n is any number usually 
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determined by dividing the population by the required sample size. The population is 
given by N which represents the total population from the six Local Government Areas 
(Asika, 1991:43). In this study, the random route walk method was used for selecting 
respondents. The random route walk method is a systematic procedure by which an 
interviewer moves in the field to select respondents while maintain a fixed sampling 
interval. By this method, the questionnaire was administered to respondents by six 
interviewers who were allocated different streets each and shown the direction to walk 
i.e. whether to the right or to the left of the random route by a supervisor. 
From the 1991 census for Lagos State, the six Local Government Council Areas 
chosen for this study had different population. It therefore, follows, that the degree of 
informal sector operations/operators eking their living in these Local Government 
Councils Areas would be different as well. As such, the percentage number of informal 
operators interviewed and administered the questionnaire across the six Local 
Government Council Areas was proportional to their corresponding population as 
shown in table 3.1: 
TABLE 3.1 DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS ACCORDING TO LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT COUNCIL AREAS 
Local Government 
Area 
1991 National 
Population 
Census Figure 
Proportion of 
sample allocation 
to each local 
Government  Area 
Distribution of  
administered 
questionnaire used 
Percentage (%) 
Apapa 154,477 92 88 15% 
Ibeju-Lekki 24,937 15 15 3% 
Ikeja 203,383 121 116 20% 
Ikorodu 184,674 110 105 18% 
Lagos-Island 165,996 99 95 17% 
Lagos-Mainland 273,079 163 156 27% 
Total 1,006,546 600 575 100% 
A sample size of 600 respondents was chosen from the population of informal sector 
operators across the six Local Council Areas for intensive study of the characteristics 
of the population, particularly on the levels of living and human development vis-à-vis 
government economic policy. Out of the 600 respondents which constitute our 
sampling frame (working population); 575 respondents were successfully administered 
the questionnaire by face to face contact in their places of work i.e. workshop, bus stop 
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junction, park and on the street. The approach involved the identification of an 
informal activity and a rapport is established between the interviewer and the 
respondent. Upon striking a common cord the interview then takes place. The choice 
of the sample size was determined by the capacity to effectively manage the 
respondents and minimize costs given available finance at hand. For instance, a larger 
sample size than the number selected would have incurred heavier costs in terms of 
time and finances. This sample size was considered adequate enough to ensure an 
adequate representative spread of respondents involved in informal sector operations 
so as to provide sufficient data base for analysis that will allow one the capacity to use 
the findings from the study to make generalization for the whole informal sector. 
Consequently, the choice of a sample size of 600 respondents chosen for this study 
was done in order to ensure that we have a large sample that is amenable/ applicable to 
the use of the chi-square test so as to provide the required level of statistical reliability.  
Besides, another factor used for selecting respondents was based on the attainment of 
secondary education and below. The rationale for using this level of educational 
attainment was to allow us deal specifically with those operators who constitute the 
core ‘urban poor’ that is actually meant to belong to the sector. This was to allow one 
to fully capture the essential national characteristics of informal sector groupings in 
order to avoid bias and obtain estimates with minimal error. The population 
characteristics examined were heterogeneous in terms of age, sex, household size, 
occupation and socioeconomic status and business conditions. The respondents chosen 
for the study were classified into categories such as married, single, divorced/separated 
or widowed. The common denominator of the population was that they were all 
engaged in informal sector activities. This study was carried out in the month of March 
2007. 
However, the administration of the questionnaire did not go without certain 
constraints. One major challenge initially faced was that some respondents were 
initially not too disposed to be interviewed seeing it as another routine study carried 
out by government officials with no end benefits to them. This impression was 
corrected by the interviewers who had to educate them that this study is not 
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government sponsored, but an academic research whose focus is to ascertain from 
them the challenges they were experiencing as operators in the informal sector with a 
view to finding solutions to them in order to improve their standard of living.     
3.4 METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION 
Given the nature of the study which is mainly a descriptive/explanatory survey used to 
collect descriptive information to assess the relevance, reliability and validity the neo-
liberal policy in promoting human development (see Haralambos, Holborn, and Heald, 
2000:998), the information required for the study was obtained using primary and 
secondary sources. The survey was conducted using the interview schedule 
(questionnaire administration) and the Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) methods 
which served as our primary sources of data collection. The questionnaire used for this 
study contained a 50 set of questions used to gather data on socioeconomic, 
demographic and other characteristics of operators to be used in the analysis of the 
research questions and objectives of the study. The questionnaire contained both 
closed and open-ended questions. The closed ended questions were rated in a four 
point Likert scale format with four types of responses. The interview (questionnaire) 
schedule was personally administered by means of face to face contact with the use of 
six field assistants (interviewers) who were trained on the details and nature of the 
study. These interviewers were supervised by two field supervisors to ensure quality 
control. Other measures put in place to ensure the highest standards were for the 
supervisors to engage on the spot field check of field interviewers to eliminate fraud, 
review of all completed questionnaire for accuracy and consistency so that those 
questionnaire that were not properly filled were removed before data entry.  
The interview schedule was organized into six sections. The first section centred on 
questions aimed at gathering information on respondents demographic composition: 
age, sex, level of education, occupation, marital status, religion, type of residence and 
household composition. The second section focused on questions regarding the living 
and working conditions of respondents in the sector. Here questions were raised on the 
socioeconomic conditions and overall well-being of operators. Issues regarding nature 
123 
 
of business earnings, ability to provide their basic social needs and household 
requirements were examined. The third section examined questions regarding 
respondents awareness of government economic reform policies and its implications 
for their business performance and social welfare. The fourth section dealt with 
assessing respondents understanding regarding the specific goals of government 
economic reform policies. The questions raised include whether the neo-liberal policy 
addressed their basic social needs as well as challenges associated with their 
businesses. In the fifth section, questions that focus on the human 
capabilities/empowerment of respondents were examined. Questions that centred on 
whether the neo-liberal policy has created the capacity for empowering the respondents 
to live better quality of life were raised. The final section dealt with suggestions on 
means of improving the business conditions and welfare of respondents.   
The interview schedule was complemented by the Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) 
method–to gather qualitative data on the study. It was used in discussions organized 
for small groups. A total of four FGDs sessions (made up of 8-9 respondents each) 
were held in four out of the six Local Government Council Areas. This decision for 
limiting the FGDs sessions to four out of the six Local Government Councils was 
necessitated by the demand to avoid duplication of efforts and waste of resources. This 
was based on the similarities of information gathered from earlier FGDs sessions 
carried. The discussants for the FGDs were made up of informal sector operators 
which constitute the study population. These discussants were different from those 
respondents used for the interview schedule, and they were selected on the basis of 
meeting the essential characteristics of informal sector groups chosen for the study. 
Each focus group was made of discussants with homogenous features based on similar 
socioeconomic and demographic criteria such as age, sex, occupation and education in 
order to allow for free discussion and exchange within the group. Persons with more 
than secondary education were excluded.  
The four Focus Group Discussion sessions were held in Ikeja, Apapa, Lagos mainland 
and Ikorodu Local Government Council Areas. All Discussants for the sessions were 
encouraged to freely express their opinions and perceptions on issues raised. To 
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control for domination by one or two discussants, questions were sometimes 
specifically directed at more reserved discussants to encourage them to contribute to 
the discussion. The discussions were conducted with the researcher being the main 
facilitator with a note taker and a tape recorder in all the four groups. Each session 
lasted for only ninety minutes. The configuration of the group was structured as 
follows: 
Group 1.  It consists of 8 males between the ages of 18-25years involved in 
occupations such as mechanic, phone booth operation, carpentry, musician and 
photography. This session was held in Ikeja Local Government Council Area. 
Group 2. It is made up of 9 males between the ages of 26-45 years and their 
occupations include mechanics, interior decorators, drivers, electrical and electronics 
repairer and panel beaters. This session took place at Ikorodu Local Government Area. 
Group 3. This group involves only 9 females between the ages of 18-25 years and 
their occupational breakdowns include hairdressing, trading and computer operators. 
This Focus Group Discussion session took place in Lagos Mainland.   
Group 4. This group had 9 females between the ages of 26-45 years and they were 
involved in occupations such as trading, catering, hairdressing. This session was held 
in Apapa Local Government Council Area. 
Although the use of the survey method has been criticized for being a superficial 
reflection of population sentiments offering the researcher little or no control over 
individual responses to surveys; subject to sampling error; data gathering may be 
faulty and lacking reliability and validity, respondents may provide biased and 
subjective information and so on (Obasi, 1999:132). The utility of using the method in 
this study lies in the significance of its benefits which emphasized why it is used by 
much of the existing studies on the informal sectors (Tokman, 1989; Hart, 1973; Amin, 
1987, Mabogunje and Filani, 1977). The advantages of the use of survey are as 
follows: it helps to permit generalization to be made to wider population when only a 
sample was studied, it permit the use of a variety of data collection techniques, it is a 
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useful tool for verifying theories and sensitizes researcher to potential problems that 
were originally unknown or unanticipated (Bowling, 1997:173; Neuman, 2000:301). 
Besides, the validity and reliability of survey instruments are enhanced through the use 
of pilot study, pre-test of instrument, jury opinion (Kerlinger, 1977:417-418). 
It is best used for studies of this nature where the researcher is asking questions on the 
subject-matter and learning about reported knowledge, attitudes or behaviours of 
individuals regarding the issues under investigation. This instrument was adopted to 
elicit some important information, which might be difficult to obtain by any other 
means. The nature of such information gathered is not only precise but also amenable 
to quantitative analysis. The responses so derived from the questionnaire formed the 
basis upon which analyses were made. Also, data was gathered using secondary 
sources which include: textbooks, periodicals, magazines, journals, internet sourcing, 
official records and statistical data from government establishments, regional and 
international organizations like Central Bank of Nigeria, African Development Bank, 
the World Bank/IMF, UNDP, ILO, UNO and others were used in the course of 
gathering data for the study.   
3.5 METHOD OF DATA MANAGEMENT AND ANALYSIS 
Different methods were used to analyze the two sets of data that were collected from 
the participants. The quantitative data, which was generated from the questionnaire, 
were coded and data entry was done using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences 
(SPSS). From this, univariate analyses were carried out describing the trends and 
patterns of the variables in percentages. Frequencies were also presented in tables to 
show major attributes. The tables were structured in line with the particular item(s) 
relevant to the issue being examined and tested to analyze the research questions and 
objectives of the study. After this stage, univariate statistical analyses were utilized to 
further interrogate the research objectives.  
The quantitative data derived were analyzed using the Chi-Square tests statistic which 
is most appropriate. The justification for this is that we are dealing with multinomial 
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probability distribution in which the respondents sample were randomly selected to 
establish the relationship between neo-liberal economic policy and human 
development imperatives. The chi-square tests enabled us to analyze the distribution of 
opinions by respondents according to their occupation in order to indicate whether or 
not it differ significantly from those which would be expected under certain set of 
theoretical assumptions. Unlike the quantitative data, the transcription of the 
qualitative data was carried out as soon as the FGDs sessions were conducted and 
contents analyzed descriptively. Responses were summarized and important quotations 
were reported verbatim to highlight individual and collective views. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 
‘The challenge of development in Africa is how to improve the quality 
of life for the citizenry’                                           Kofi Anan (1998). 
This chapter deals with data presentation and the analyses of data. It begins with the 
socio-demographic profile of the respondents. It presents the results of the survey and 
the FGDs which provide the platform for an analysis of the research questions raised 
and objectives advanced. It describes the social structural factors that hinder the 
promotion of human development among operators in the informal sector, including its 
low contribution to the economy within the framework of government implementation 
of neo-liberal economic policy. Besides, the study also used relevant data from 
secondary sources and statistical indicators to complement the analysis of the findings 
gathered from the survey and FGDs.  
4.1 SOCIO DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF RESPONDENTS 
The distribution of respondents’ socio-economic and demographic characteristics 
covers such measures as age, sex, occupation, marital status, household make-up, 
residence and educational levels. This data provides insight about the basic profile of 
respondents who took part in the study. On occupation, traders were 41 percent, 
artisans (35 percent), taxi/bus drivers (6 percent), motor-cycle riders (8 percent), 
service providers (9 percent) and others (1percent) as presented in table 4.1:  
TABLE 4.1 DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS BY OCCUPATION  
Occupation Number Percentage (%) 
Traders  234  41  
 Artisans 204  35 
Taxi/bus Driver 35 6 
 Motor Cycle rider 45 8 
Service Providers 53 9 
Others 4 1 
Total 575 100% 
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TABLE 4.2 AGE DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS  
AGE CATEGORY PERCENTAGE (%) 
20 – 30 years 47.8 
31 – 40 years  36.7 
41 – 50 years 12.6 
51 – 60 years 2.9 
Total 100 
Table 4.2 shows that respondents between 20-30 years were 47.8 percent, 31- 40 years 
had 36.7 percent, 12.6 percent for 41-50 age group and those within 51-60 years 
constituted 2.9 percent. This distribution indicates clearly that operators in the informal 
sector are generally made up of young persons in the prime of their lives, as 85 percent 
of them falls within the age of 20-40 years. The fact that those between 20-40 years 
cohort now dominates the informal sector in Lagos can be attributed to the neo-liberal 
policy of government non-interventionist role in the economy, large scale contraction 
in the public/private sectors following the liberalization and deregulation measures, 
lack of employment among youths who have left the secondary school and those that 
are yet to secure admission to tertiary institutions. The sex composition of respondents 
revealed that 65 percent were males and 35 percent females. Most of the respondents 
representing 68 percent were married, while 29 percent, 1 percent, 2 percent and 
percent were singles, divorced/separated and widowed in that order.     
On the basis of educational level, the distribution reveals that 71.8 percent have 
secondary school education, 19.6 percent with primary education and 8.5 percent with 
no formal education. These statistics paint a picture which reflects the fact many of the 
operators in the sector are young persons who on the completion of their primary or 
secondary education enter the informal sector in the absence of employment 
opportunities in the formal sector. This is in contrast with the past where people with 
primary education dominated the informal sector (see Mabogunje and Filani, 1977). 
Majority of the respondents (64 percent) were Christians; Moslems constituted 32 
percent while others (practicing traditional religion) were 4 percent. The distribution of 
respondents’ household composition shows that 83 percent of the respondents have 
five household members living with them, 6 percent with 8 members, 2 percent with 1 
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member, 5 percent with nine members and 4 percent with 10 members respectively. 
This shows an average of six members live in a household. The implication of this for 
the operators is that their per capita expenditure would be affected given the real 
incomes from their businesses which may ultimately affect the basic needs of their 
households.  
The types of houses occupied by the respondents include one room (face-to-face), 
room and parlour, self contained, flats and bungalows. However, majority of the 
respondents lived in one room (face-to-face) as well as room and parlour, both 
accounting for 52 and 46 percent respectively, with 1.4 percent in self contained flat, 
0.5 percent in two bedroom flat and 0.1 percent in 3 bedroom flat. In addition, most of 
the respondents share facilities such as toilets, bathroom and kitchen with their co-
tenants in the house. About 50 percent of the respondents live in houses with pit toilet. 
The popularity of pit latrines may be due to irregularity of water supply which makes it 
difficult to maintain a flush toilet, especially in large households. Furthermore, the 
distribution of respondents by occupational categories was as follows: Traders (234), 
motor-cycle riders (45), Taxi/bus-drivers (35), artisans (204), service providers (i.e. 
restaurant operator, phone booth operator, barbers) (53) while other occupation outside 
the ones identified were 4 persons respectively. 
 
In all the distribution of the sample respondents for each of the Local Government 
Areas was as follows: Ikeja (116); Ikorodu (105); Apapa (88) Ibeju-Lekki (15); Lagos 
Island (95) and Lagos Mainland (156). The target population for this study was made 
up of informal sector operators involved in transport, production, wholesale and retail 
trade and social service operations. 
 
4.2 SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONDITIONS OF INFORMAL SECTOR 
                                                OPERATORS 
Achieving egalitarian society through equitable distribution of income and poverty 
alleviation has been a major development goal evident in development plan since the 
1980s. As such, all development policies of governments are evaluated in terms of 
how far they have achieved these stated objectives. Over the past two decades the 
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Nigerian economy has undergone fundamental structural changes as a result of the 
government’s implementation of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) and 
economic reform measures. This has continued with the implementation of the 
National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategies (NEEDS) (2003-07) 
programmes, whose purpose was to promote growth and raise the standard of living 
through a variety of reforms, including macroeconomic stability, deregulation, 
liberalization, privatization, transparency and accountability. However, an assessment 
of these programmes has shown that they have had salient repercussions on the 
standard of living of the people.  
The SAP or economic reform measures have had negative influence on the human 
development of the people in terms of empowering them to meet basic needs, achieve 
improvement in their business activities and exercise of their human rights in making 
positive contributions to national development (World Summit, 1995). To ascertain the 
state of respondents’ social welfare, they were asked to describe how their living 
conditions have been over the last seven years (1999-2006). This period corresponds 
with the time when the Obasanjo government vigorously implemented neo-liberal 
reform policies of privatization, liberalization and deregulation of the economy. About 
22 percent said they were coping with the challenges thrown up by the government 
economic reform measures as it did not have drastic effects on their standard of living 
while 78 percent of the operators described their living conditions as frustrating and 
challenging. They said they were finding it extremely difficult to meet their social 
responsibilities to their families because of the high cost of living which have resulted 
in the decline in their overall standard of living. They particularly complained about 
the incessant increase in the prices of petroleum products (especially petrol and 
kerosene) which have driven up the prices of other goods and services beyond the 
reach of the poor. Coupled with this situation was the poor state of infrastructure, 
especially power supply which has increased the cost of doing business in Nigeria. 
These conditions ultimately have resulted in the worsening poverty level of Nigerians 
which has been on the upsurge over the years. 
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TABLE 4.3 DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS BY WHETHER CONDITIONS  
                    OF LIVING HAVE IMPROVED OR NOT IN THE LAST SEVEN YEARS 
X2   = 29.95, DF=15; P < 0.05. 
  Occupation 
Responses Trader 
 
Cycle- 
Rider 
Taxi/bus 
Driver 
Artisan 
  
Service 
providers 
Other        Total            % 
  f        % f           %       f          % f              %          f             %      f       %   
Yes 92       40  17         40 13      37 76           39 24          46 1     25           223          40 
No 129    56   26         60 22      63 109         56 26           50 2     50             314       56 
Don’t know 8         3      -             - -          - 6             3 2             4 1     25              17          3 
N /A 2         1     -             - -          - 4             2 -              - -       -                6            1 
Total      231    100 43        100 35       100 195        100 52          100 4      100        560      100% 
Table 4.3 shows 56 percent said their conditions of living had deteriorated over the last 
seven years. The reasons given by the respondents for this condition include low 
income returns from their businesses (40 percent), high costs of living (10 percent) and 
poor infrastructure (6 percent) which have made them to live deplorable and austere 
lives. In emphasizing the challenge of low income returns from business and the 
consequences it has for their living conditions, one of the female discussant in the 
FGDs made this remark:   
“If you don’t have money how will you buy food, pay for 
house rent, pay children’s school fees” “Without money you 
cannot live comfortably, and, also you cannot do anything in 
this world” (43 years old female trader in Apapa). 
Conversely, 40 percent of the respondents said that they have experienced some 
improvement in their living conditions over the last seven years. The reason adduced 
was that they have engaged in some trading activities of buying and selling of 
consumer goods from which they have earned some income to make a living. Some 
(10 percent) respondents also mentioned access to modern communication following 
the introduction of the Global System of Mobile (GSM) communication which had 
enhanced easy communication with their clientele as one benefit that has helped to 
keep their businesses going. Another 10 percent identified change of social status in 
terms of being married with children as part of what has made life meaningful for 
them.  
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With reference to the chi-square value of 29.95 for Table 4.3, it is imperative to note 
that there is significant evidence from the operators’ responses to indicate that the 
consequences of SAP or economic reform measures have aggravated their quality of 
life due to rising costs of living. For instance, following the currency devaluation since 
1986, the value of the naira to the dollar has depreciated from N22 to US$1 dollar to 
N85 in 1997 and N126 in 2007. The value of the naira over the years  have tended to 
push up the prices of goods and services and costs of production for local business 
enterprises which have invariably resulted in the rise of inflation leading to a decline in 
the peoples’ purchasing power due to fall in the value of their real income. Similarly, 
the reduction of government expenditures on the social sector has had devastating 
effects on the provision of education and healthcare; the contraction in the 
public/private sectors have led to increasing loss of paid employment which have 
affected peoples’ source of income. By 2003, the unemployment rates in Nigeria had 
reached 10.8 percent from 3 percent in 1999. Besides, the inflation rate in 2005 was 
estimated at 15.6 percent from 8 percent in 1999, with about 57 percent of the 
population living on less than 1US$ per day (Federal Research Division, 2006, CBN, 
2000).  
This information was further buttressed by findings from the Focus Group Discussions 
sessions where all the discussants indicated that their living conditions have been 
aggravated by problems arising from lack of access to funds to start a viable business 
or expand existing ones, increase in the prices of essential goods and services which 
have made it tough for them to meet their basic human needs. Some of the remarks 
expressed by some of the male discussants regarding the poor living conditions they 
were experiencing include:  
“We are only managing; we’re only struggling. Like me that 
is doing interior décor, I have no facility. I’m only 
managing…” (25 years old male interior decorator in Ikeja);  
“if you don’t have money, how will you buy food, pay for 
house rent, pay children’s school fees” (35 years old male 
mechanic in Ikorodu).                      
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TABLE 4.4  DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS BY CAPACITY TO MEET THEIR 
                   PERSONAL AND FAMILY NEEDS GIVEN THEIR EARNINGS  
 
 Occupation 
Responses Trader M-cycle 
Rider 
Taxi/bus 
Driver 
Artisan Service 
Provider 
Other          Total           % 
 F             % F          % F          % F         % F       %  F      %                  
Yes  37       16 6        14 5       14 26      13 3       6 0        -         77             14 
No 182      78 36      82 29     83 170    84 48     90 3       75       468           81 
Don’t Know 14        6 0         - 1       3 
 
4         2 1       2 1       25         21              4 
N/A  0          - 2        4 0        - 2         1 1       2 0        -          5                1 
Total 233       100 44      100 35     100 202     100 53     100 4        100    571         100% 
X2 = 26.95, DF=15; P < 0.05 
In order to ascertain the conditions of their household welfare, the respondents were 
asked if the incomes from the businesses could meet up with the demands of their 
personal and family needs. Table 4.4 shows 81 percent said the earnings from their 
businesses could not meet the demands of their personal and family needs in terms of 
accessing basic social necessities such as healthcare; quality education for their 
household members, living in a good accommodation, access to pipe borne water and 
sanitation, among others. Only 14 percent of the respondents said their income could 
meet their personal and family needs. The responses from the remaining respondents 
representing 4 and 1 percent were negligible. When asked to rate the level of their 
standard of living before 1999, 49 percent said they were fairly satisfied with their 
living conditions, 30 percent were living in poor conditions, 9 percent in very poor 
state of living and 12 percent had a satisfactory lifestyle.   
From the survey, the major effects of the economic reforms on the socio-economic 
conditions of operators in the informal sector have been the incessant increase in the 
prices of goods and services particularly food, utilities (transportation, housing), raw 
materials, inputs and cost of services like education and healthcare which have been a 
major threat to their overall well-being, individual dignity and freedom and those of 
their families. With the removal of subsidies on educational and healthcare services, 
user fees have been introduced which have increased the costs of people accessing 
these services, thus leaving them to seek alternative means toward meeting these 
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needs. These outcomes have brought a dislocation in the quality of education, health 
system and basic infrastructure that the respondents could afford, and this has had 
severe consequences for their individual capacity building, business performance and 
the overall well-being of their household members.  
This condition is very critical when one realizes that knowledge, skills and healthy 
living are the most vital variables that impact positively on any development agenda of 
a nation. It becomes incongruous to comprehend government’s position that the 
rationale for the removal of subsidies on essential goods and services was to make 
them competitive in order to attract potential investors; whereas it fails to put in place 
the institutional mechanism for the distribution of social benefits (health insurance, 
educational financing, price controls) that have been made by advanced capitalist 
states to reduce the burdens of ‘free market’ operations which have become the 
hallmark of our development strategy. Relating this information to the chi-square test 
value of 26.95 for table 4.4, it shows that the implementation of the neo-liberal policy 
by government has had significant negative repercussions on the quality of life of the 
people which negates the position of neo-liberal advocates that free market mechanism 
would improve the living conditions of the populace. For instance, United Nations 
sponsored National Millennium Goals update for Nigeria in 2004 found that the nation 
was lagging behind on the goals of eliminating extreme poverty and hunger, reducing 
child and maternal mortality and combating diseases such as malaria and HIV/AIDS.   
 
TABLE 4.5 DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS EXPERIENCES REGARDING 
                     THEIR BUSINESS PERFORMANCE 
            
 
 Occupation 
Responses Trader M-cycle 
Rider 
Taxi/Bus 
Driver 
Artisan Service 
Provider 
Other          Total        % 
 F        % F       % F       % F        % F         % F        % 
Yes (Satisfied) 38       25 5       17 7      27 25      18 2        8 2      100        79               76 
No(Not 
Satisfied) 
114    74 23    79 16    62 109    77 24     92 -          -         286             21 
Don’t Know 1      0.64 1    3.44 1      4 
 
6        4 -         - -          -          9                2 
N/A 1      0.64 -        - 2      8 1       0.7 -         - -          -        4                 1 
Total 154   100 29    100 26    100 141    100 26      100 2        100    387          100% 
                                              
135 
 
In responding to the question regarding the experiences faced by respondents in the 
performance of their business activities, Table 4.5 shows 76 percent were not satisfied 
with the performance of the business operations as they encountered varied challenges 
such as poor electricity, high cost of transportation, multiple tax charges and levies, 
constant harassment from government officials (state/local agents) collecting rates 
from them for operating their businesses and poor infrastructure, while 21 percent said 
they were satisfied with their business performance. The varying challenges 
experienced by the respondents was  also corroborated by findings from the FGDs 
sessions where majority of the discussants particularly those operators involved in 
social services operations described the condition as the bane of their businesses. This 
factor has had negative consequence on their daily incomes as they have to look for 
alternative source of power which involves the use of generator which has driven up 
the cost of doing business in Nigeria. Some of the remarks made by some of the 
discussants include:  
“It’s ‘light’ that is our major headache, because it affects us 
a lot, it affects my job a lot” (24 years old male tailor in 
Ikeja);  
“I need light so much, if you keep on telling your customer 
that you can’t deliver on time because of light, it is not 
good’ (30 years old female Hairdresser in Apapa).  
 
 
TABLE 4.6 DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS BY WHETHER THEY WERE 
                     SATISFIED WITH THEIR LIVING CONDITIONS 
 
 Occupation 
Responses Trader M-cycle 
Rider 
Taxi/bus 
Driver 
Artisan Service 
Provider 
Other          Total           % 
 F         % F        % F       % F          % F        % F        % 
Yes 33       14 3         7 2       6 16       8 4         8 0       -          58               10 
No 191     82 37      82 33     94 187     92 49      92 4     100       501             87 
Don’t Know  9        4 4        9 0        - 0          - 0         - 0       -          13               2.3 
N/A 0          - 1        2 0        - 0          - 0         - 0       -            1               0.2 
Total 233     100 45     100 35    100 203     100 53     100 4    100        573         100% 
X2 =39.50, DF=15; P< 0.05 
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In responding to the question of whether the respondents were satisfied with their 
living conditions since the Obasanjo administration began its economic reform 
programme, Table 4.6 shows 87 percent said they were not satisfied with their 
standard of living. Among the reasons adduced for their present poor state of living is 
the inability to take care of their children’s educational needs, live a decent 
accommodation, lack of access to good healthcare and inability to meet the nutritional 
needs for themselves and their household due to high costs of living. Accordingly, they 
observed that the incessant increase in the pump prices of petroleum products have 
fuelled inflation, thereby driving up the prices of basic needs particularly foodstuff 
which is essential to their existence. For instance, from 2000 to 2007, the Obasanjo 
administration raised the price of petrol from N22 naira to N75 per litre, which is over 
240 percent increase. Conversely, 10 percent of the respondents said they were 
relatively satisfied with their present living conditions, while the remaining 3 percent 
were undecided as to the nature of their present condition of living.  
This information which depict the state of their social well-being explain further the 
poor quality of life of the people as shown by the country’s low placing in the UNDP 
human development index ranking. For instance, the UNDP (2004) sponsored 
assessment report of the national millennium development goals for Nigeria (2000-
2015) showed that the standard of living in the country has not improved despite 
implementing a variety of economic reforms, including macroeconomic stability, 
deregulation, liberalization and the National Economic Empowerment and 
Development Strategy (NEEDS).  This was shown by measuring human development 
indicators such as life expectancy, infant mortality, maternal mortality, amount of 
malnutrition, access to clean drinking water, and the occurrence of diseases which 
could be prevented by inoculation and public health services. Furthermore, the IMF 
(2007:35) progress reports on NEEDS and MDG 2006 for Nigeria show that infant 
mortality rate (per 1000 live births) has deteriorated from 100 per 1000 births in 2003 
to 110 per 1000 in 2005, maternal mortality has increased from 704 in 1999 to 800 per 
100,000 live births in 2004, and a fall in life expectancy from 56 years in 1980 to 43 
years in 2005. These conditions have been identified as being influenced by underlying 
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factors of both biological and socioeconomic determinants, including poor sanitation 
resulting in such diseases as diarrhea, acute respiratory infections, measles, 
bronchopneumonia and others. This data goes to buttress the fact that the continued 
decline in the standards of living of the people since the introduction of the neo-liberal 
policy by government can be attributed to the removal of subsidies on essential goods 
and cut back of government expenditures in the social sector due to its neo-liberal 
policy of rolling back of the state and decline in the provision of infrastructure. This 
was perceptively acknowledged by one of the female discussant who remarked: 
“Things are very expensive, especially foodstuffs. Before a 
bag of rice was N3, 500, but now it is N6, 000; even some 
sell it N7, 000” (40 years old female in Apapa). 
 Also, within the two decades of Nigeria’s implementation of the neo-liberal policy, 
the proportion of Nigerian population living below US$1.00 (PPP) dollars a day for the 
period 1990-2004 was 70.8 percent compared to 38.3 percent between 1980-1989 and 
47 percent in 1997; 92.4 percent live on less than $2.00 a day (1990-2003). Similarly, 
in the UNDP Human Poverty Index, Nigeria is ranked in the 76th position, with a 
national poverty line of 34.1 percent, and in 2004, 52 percent of the population was 
without sustainable access to improved water source (UNDP, HDR, 2006). Relating 
this information with the chi-square test value of 39.50 for table 4.6, it shows that there 
is a significant interrelationship between the neo-liberal policy of government and the 
state of living of the operators in the sector. These findings clearly confirm 
Hoogevelt’s (1997) and Adedeji’s (1999) views of identifying economic adjustment/ 
reform measures as catalysts for the destruction of embryonic institutions, 
intensification of unemployment and poverty, declining quality of life and retardation 
of socio-economic development in sub-Saharan Africa. As such, many of the problems 
that the nation has faced over two decade ago such as corruption, poor leadership, 
unemployment and poverty have become more acute, while most of her potentials 
have yet to be fully realized (UN-NADAF, 1996). 
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TABLE 4.7  DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS BY WHETHER THE 
                     IMPLEMENTATION OF NEO- LIBERAL POLICY WAS  
                     DESIGNED TO IMPROVE THEIR LIVING CONDITIONS 
 
 Occupation 
Responses Trader M-cycle 
Rider 
Taxi/bus 
Driver 
Artisan Service 
Provider 
Other          Total           % 
 F          % F      % F        % F         % F        % F      % 
Yes 49        21 15    34 12   34.3 49       24 5        10 0       -         130             23 
No 156      67 27    61 19   54.3 135     66 46      88 4     100      387             67 
Don’t Know  28       12 2      5 4     11.4 20       10 1        2 0       -           55              10 
Total 233      100 44    100 35    100 204    100 52     100 4     100       572          100% 
X2 = 281.41, DF=10; P < 0.05. 
 In answering question on whether government neo-liberal policy was designed to 
improve their overall well-being, Table 4.7 shows 67 percent said government 
economic policy was not designed to improve their living conditions as reflected in the 
real income earnings from their businesses or occupational activities which could 
scarcely meet the demand of their basic needs. These respondents remarked that the 
deregulation policy of government in the oil sector which has resulted in the removal 
of subsidy on petroleum products have led to the frequent increase in the prices of the 
petroleum products particularly petrol as presented in table 4.8 below:  
4.8 FUEL PRICE INCREASES FOR PETROL (1982-2007) 
Source: Fawehinmi 2002; Daily Times, June 23, 2003; The Punch, May 28, 2007 P6.  
Date Price Per Litre Regime/Administration % Increase 
April 20 1982 20k Alhaji Shehu Shagari 31% 
March 31, 1986 39 ½   General Ibrahim Babangida 97.5% 
April 10, 1988 42 General Ibrahim Babangida 6% 
Jan 1, 1989 42k public, 62k private General Ibrahim Babangida  
Dec 19, 1989 60k for all General Ibrahim Babangida 43% 
March 6, 1991  70k General Ibrahim Babangida 16.6% 
Nov. 8, 1993 N5.00  Chief Earnest Shonekan 614% 
Nov. 22, 1993 N3.23 General Sanni Abacha  
Oct. 2, 1994 N15.00 General Sanni Abacha 361.5% 
Oct. 4, 1994 N11.00 General Sanni Abacha  
Dec. 20, 1998 N25.00 General Abdulsalami Abubakar 127% 
Jan. 6, 1999 N20.00 General Abdulsalami Abubakar  
June. 1, 2000 N30.00 Chief Olusegun Obasanjo 50% 
June. 8, 2000 N25.00 Chief Olusegun Obasanjo  
June. 13, 2000 N22.00 Chief Olusegun Obasanjo  
Jan. 1, 2002  N26.00 Chief Olusegun Obasanjo 18.2% 
June 20, 2003 From N26 to N40  Chief Olusegun Obasanjo 54% 
July 9, 2003 From N40 to N34 Chief Olusegun Obasanjo 17% 
Oct 1, 2003 From 34 to N42 Chief Olusegun Obasanjo 23% 
May 29, 2004 From 42 to N49.90 Chief Olusegun Obasanjo 19% 
Jan 2005 From N49.90 to 50.50 Chief Olusegun Obasanjo 1% 
August 25, 2005 From N50.50 to N65 Chief Olusegun Obasanjo 28% 
May 27, 2007 From N65 to N75 Chief Olusegun Obasanjo 15% 
June 2007 N70 Alhaji Umuru Musa Yaradua 7% 
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This situation has brought about a hike in inflation rate which average 14 percent 
(1990-2006) has resulted in the skyrocketing prices for goods and services as well as 
inputs (raw materials/equipment) for their businesses. The same situation was 
manifested in the public sector where although the minimum wages of workers were 
raised from N3, 500 to N7, 500, but the multiplier effects of fuel price increases have 
eroded the real income of workers. This position was evidently affirmed to by the 
Central Bank of Nigeria (2007:14; 2005:41), when it observed in its annual report that: 
“The phenomenal rise in oil prices; however have some negative impact on the 
economy. The upsurge in the global price level, especially for petroleum products and 
manufactures, which Nigeria imported in large quantities, drive up domestic prices…”  
This fact contradict the arguments canvassed by previous administrations, including 
the Obasanjo government for the deregulation of the downstream sector of the oil 
industry where it has argued that removing ‘subsidy’ was to make the products readily 
available by attracting foreign and domestic investment into the industry, curtail 
smuggling as well as use the revenue which would have been used to subsidize the 
petroleum sector to provide education, health, water supply, roads, security and food. 
As such, since 1999, the Obasanjo government has continued to import petroleum 
products while the four national refineries are operating below capacity utilization with 
the result that Nigerians have been made to bear the costs of importation through 
repeated increase in the prices of fuel, kerosene and diesel which has had negative 
impact on their consumption. In the same vein, the government has failed to put in 
place the institutional mechanism for the distribution of social benefits (health 
insurance, educational financing, price controls) and the provision of basic 
infrastructure that have been made available by advanced capitalist states to reduce the 
burdens of ‘free market’ operations. 
Furthermore, it is also necessary to note that most of government economic reform 
policies have continually been focused on issues of privatization, deregulation, 
liberalization, banking/financial reforms, monetization policy, health insurance 
scheme, ports and custom reforms rather than address itself to matters of high 
unemployment, poor infrastructure and deteriorating social services. Consequently, the 
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continued implementation of the reform measures have been used as a medium for 
creating room for “rent seeking” activities in which persons in private firms, 
government and its agencies engage in “directly unproductive profit seeking” that 
favour the rich and the elites by corruptively enriching themselves through inflated 
contract awards and looting of the national treasury at the expense of the welfare of the 
masses. Such as is the case with the deregulation of the oil sector in which government 
officials have consistently failed to make the refineries to work or build new ones in 
order to promote the proliferation of “windfalls” through fuel importation which takes 
precedence over pursuit of collective goals that would benefit the masses (see Evans, 
1995:12, 248).  
While the government has initiated a number of poverty alleviation programmes and 
projects for the poor which include Operation Feed the Nation (OFN), Green 
Revolution, Universal Primary Education (UPE), Directorate of Food, Roads and 
Rural Infrastructures (DFRRI), National Directorate of Employment (NDE), the 
erstwhile People’s Bank of Nigeria, among others. These programmes for the poor, 
apart from those directed at particular sectors of the economy had multi-sectoral 
programmes as well. A look at the sectors that were targeted under the poverty 
alleviation programmes indicates that some of them remained on paper, others 
collapsed after their initiation. For instance, the Bank of Industry was put in place to 
put in place to grant loans to small and medium scale enterprises (SMEs); the 
collapsed People’s Bank of Nigeria, the Community Banking Scheme which had 
recently been converted to Microfinance Banks were intended to make funds available 
to micro enterprises. However, the underfunding of the bank of industry by the 
government has not helped in revamping the activities of small and medium size 
companies. Besides, out of the N50 billion budgeted as takeoff grant for SMEs, only 
N5 billion (10 percent) was released. Also, there is difficulty in assessing the over the 
N20 billion equity investment funding for Small and Medium Industries Equity 
Investment Scheme (SMIEIS) from the financial institutions (see The News, 2005:34).  
In the same vein, the poverty alleviation schemes have rarely been able to tackle the 
various problems confronting microenterprises, many of which are found in the 
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informal sector due to the same problem of underfunding, poor execution of projects 
and mismanagement of funds, corruption and bad governance. The failure of the state 
to ensure the successful implementation of various poverty related programmes, 
projects and policies has been identified as the factor that have made poverty to loom 
large in Nigeria.  
These conditions align with what Osabu-kle (2000: 515) perceptively pointed out in 
his work “Politics of one sided Adjustment” that; the neo-liberal policy is not primarily 
concerned with making decisions for organizing resources (materials and capital) for 
human development projects, but rather about who gets what, when and how, which 
have now become the source of power struggle between competing political elites in 
Africa. Furthermore, the significant ideological shift by government from earlier 
development concerns designed to achieve redistribution with growth, in order to 
ensure the satisfaction of peoples’ basic needs and enhance their participation in 
governance (UNDP, 1996:47-48) to the SAP or economic reform policies have 
produced serious negative implications and outcomes for human centred development 
among operators in the informal sector.  
Besides, the implementation of the neo-liberal policy has brought about increased 
inequalities among various income groups which have worsened the poverty situation 
even further as a result of the drop in the standards of living of the people in spite of 
the huge revenue accruing to the country from the sales of crude oil. This 
reemphasizes the fact that increases in the level of income earned or resources 
available to a country’s GDP does not necessarily lead to economic development as 
evident in the case of Nigeria with huge foreign reserves. The crux of the matter, 
however, has to do with the positive utilization of such revenue or resources in socio-
economic development process such that it would impact positively on the citizenry by 
improving their standards of living as well as create employment opportunities. 
Also, the expectations by the neo-liberal advocates that trade liberalization would 
bring about low exchange and interest rates which would boost the nation’s export 
base as well as  galvanize the positive informal sector supply response with finances 
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has not been realized (see Becker, 1986:164). If anything, the informal sector operators 
have had to depend on the market distortions to access most of the equipment and 
inputs that they need at higher costs because there are no substitutes. Similarly, the 
structure of entry into the informal sector since the implementation of the neo-liberal 
policy shows that a greater percentage (80 percent) of entrepreneurs are involved in 
low income activities due to lack of capital and the high costs of inputs needed to 
engage in high-income activities. This tendency has brought with it the attendant 
problem of increased competition and declining returns in the lower end of the 
informal sector, thus eroding the productive capacity of the majority of informal actors 
and generation of employment opportunities.  
These conditions have compelled most of the low-income operators in the informal 
sector to devise survival strategies in adjusting to the strain of the economic reform 
measures which has worsened the living conditions of the people (Oladeji and Abiola, 
1998; Dawson and Oyeyinka, 1993:60). Thus, coping with the pressures and 
challenges of economic reforms by informal sector operators revolve around stressful 
economic activities at the level of the household which manifests itself in the attempt 
to maximize their real incomes. In most cases, the income maximization strategies 
have not been able to compensate for the dramatic rise in the costs of living, and this 
has reduced their purchasing power.  
With regard to the data gleaned from the survey interview schedule and FGDs, a good 
proportion of the respondents (75 percent) said they have employed the measures of 
cutting back on the quality, quantity and variety of food requirement as well as other 
consumables that they need. Some of them (50 percent) claimed that they only eat 
once or twice a day not because they don’t want more food, but because they can 
hardly afford it. As two of the female discussants in the FGDs recounted in their own 
words:  
“We eat moderate now… not fully, because of high cost of 
foodstuffs. It’s no longer ‘my child are you full?  You will 
not eat excess but moderate (40 years old female trader in 
Apapa);  
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“Before, children will eat to their full. They will not ask you 
for more. I will even ask them do you want more. But now I 
cannot” (24 years old female hair dresser in Lagos 
Mainland). 
Majority of the respondents (65 percent) remarked that they have had to reduce their 
consumption of luxury foods such as tea, eggs, and bread. Also, the consumption of 
protein nutrients such as meat, fish has been reduced as well by majority of the 
households.  Also, 60 percent of the respondents now buy their staple foodstuffs in 
small quantities where the unit costs are higher than if they were bought in bulk. In 
addition, the people because of the high cost of kerosene (which is a basic energy 
source for majority of the households) tend to revert to the use of firewood and 
charcoal pot which are strenuous and time consuming, and hence pushing up the price 
of firewood due to their high demands. The patterns of coping with high cost of 
clothing were fairly uniform across various respondents’ households. Many of the 
respondents (80 percent) have cut back on purchasing new clothing since government 
economic reform programmes began and majority now patronize second hand clothes 
popularly called ‘Okrika.’  
Furthermore, expenditures on shelter and health have also suffered. Strategies for 
managing high rental costs include moving to cheaper lodgings/accommodation or 
cutting down on the numbers of rooms rented, creating a situation that makes them 
easily vulnerable to contagious diseases. As for those who need shops for their 
businesses, they either squat with a friend, share the cost with them or simply organize 
make-shift structures by the wayside or take to street trading which is now very 
common in most major city centres in Nigeria. A large proportion (65 percent) of the 
respondents said they go to hospitals or clinics for medical care less often than they 
used to because of the high costs of accessing healthcare services. About 25 percent 
said they have shifted to traditional medicine, although they also pointed out that 
traditional medicine has become extremely costly as well due to the shift. A common 
strategy among low-income informal households was to seek medical advice directly 
from chemists.   
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The commitment to formal education for the operators’ household members remains 
strong despite the rising cost of education and the urgent need for the children to 
contribute to income generation. Majority of the respondents (65 percent) said they 
still sent their children to public primary schools (which could no longer deliver 
qualitative education due to poor infrastructure and personnel) as they could not afford 
the fees charged by private institutions. At the secondary level, many operators (55 
percent) are still struggling to educate their children due to exorbitant fees. The 
foregoing discourse lends credence to Hoogevelt (1997:179) perceptive argument that 
the implementation of economic reforms has been very much tied in with the spread of 
the poverty and the “new racism” which have come to underpin popular explanations 
for the growing political instability, inter-communal conflicts, and declining quality of 
life in Africa. These facts were attested to by the World Bank (2000/2001:46-47) 
development reports which state that national economic development processes is 
pivotal to effective poverty alleviation, as poverty, inequality and deprivations among 
the rich and poor nations and peoples is an outcome of economic, social and political 
processes that interact with and reinforce each other in ways that can worsen or ease 
the deprivation poor people face every day. The information thus highlighted gives 
substance to the chi-square test value of 281.41 for table 4.7 which provide sufficient 
evidence to buttress the position that the neo-liberal policy of government has 
significantly weakened informal sector operators’ capacity to attain positive 
improvement in the sourcing of the basic necessities of life.  
 
 
4.3 THE ANALYSIS OF THE INFLUENCE OF NEO-LIBERAL POLICY  
       ON HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IN THE INFORMAL SECTOR 
In this context, we evaluate the extent to which the neo-liberal policy has induced 
human development, in terms of reducing incidence of poverty among operators in the 
informal sector and advancing their standards of living. This is fundamentally so 
because the basic success of any development policy anchors on its capacity to meet 
human needs through providing them access to health services, education, comfortable 
housing, affordable food and decent employment so that they can enjoy long, healthy, 
and creative lives (UNDP, 1996). 
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Since the 1990s, the annual UNDP Human Development Report has been published to 
compare the levels of promoting human development among countries of the world. 
This is done by using the Human Development Index (HDI). The HDI combines a 
measure of purchasing power with measures of physical health and educational 
attainment to indicate progress or retrogression in human life. This approach gives a 
more comprehensive and reliable information regarding development as the critical 
components of poverty indicators is taken into consideration. Accordingly, the Central 
Bank of Nigeria (1999:11) captures the HDI thus: “the building blocks of the HDI are 
data on longevity, knowledge and income. Longevity is measured solely by life 
expectancy at birth, while knowledge is measured by the adult literacy rate and mean 
years of schooling weighted at 2:1 respectively. For income, purchasing power parity 
(PPP) (based on real GDP) per capita adjusted for the local cost of living) is used.” It 
further stated that “these three measures are combined in a 3-step process to arrive at 
an average index.” There is a minimum and maximum rate for each component of 
measures in HDI.  It expresses the ranking of nations in values that range between 0 
and 1.  
TABLE 4.9 DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS BY WHETHER NEO-LIBERAL 
POLICY ADDRESSES THE PROVISION OF BASIC SOCIAL NEEDS 
 
       X2 = 39.50, DF=15; P < 0.05 
 Occupation 
Responses Trader M-cycle 
Rider 
Taxi//bus 
Driver 
Artisan Service 
Provider 
Other          Total          % 
 F          % F          % F          % F           % F         % F      % 
Yes 10         7 4         14 3         12 18       13 1        4 0       -        36               10 
No 113      76 22       76 17       65 103     73 22      85 2     100     279            75 
Don’t Know 24        16 3         10 6         23 20       14 3        11 0        -         56             15 
No Answer  2         1 0           - 0          - 0           - 0         - 0        -        2              0.5 
Total 149     100 29      100 26       100 141      100 26       100 2     100      373         100% 
Table 4.9 shows 75 percent said government neo-liberal policy has not addressed their 
basic social needs of housing, transportation, food provision, infrastructure, healthcare 
and qualitative education. Only 10 percent of the respondents said that government 
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economic policy did address some of their basic social needs with specific reference 
made to the introduction of mobile communication which has afforded them the 
opportunity to make a living through the sales of recharge cards and commercial 
telephoning centre. Nevertheless, they expressed their ill-feelings with regard to the 
high tariff charged on calls.  
 
TABLE 4.10 DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS BY WHETHER NEO-
LIBERAL POLICY PROMOTES IMPROVEMENT IN INFORMAL SECTOR 
ACTIVITIES 
 
 Occupation 
Responses Trader M-cycle 
Rider 
Taxi/bus 
Driver 
Artisan Service 
Provider 
Other          Total            % 
 F          % F        % F        % F            % F          % F       % 
Yes 47         20 12      27 5        14 50       25 21        40 2     50         137                24 
No 133       57 27      60 19      54 109     54 25        47 2     50          315                55 
Don’t Know 44        19 6        3 9        26 32       16 6          11 0       -           97                 17 
No Answer 9          4 0        - 2        6 10       5 1         2 0       -           22                 4 
Total 233     100 45     100 35     100 201     100 53       100 4      100      571              100% 
X2 = 75.3, DF=15; P < 0.05 
Table 4.10 shows 55 percent indicated that government neo-liberal economic policy 
was over-concentrated on institutional/structural reforms such as deregulating the oil 
sector (i.e. petroleum pricing); privatization; monetization policy; tax reforms; pension 
reform; financial sector reforms; procurement/due process reforms, among others. 
These policy measures according to the respondents are not pro-poor policies targeted 
specifically to address their immediate basic needs of food, education, healthcare and 
other infrastructure which have direct outcome on the standards of living of the 
populace, particularly those operators in the informal sector.    
Thus, 50 percent of the respondents observed that government cut-back of funding on 
the social sectors and removal of subsidies on essential social services including 
petroleum products (fuel and kerosene) have been detrimental to their well-being as a 
result of their inability to purchase the necessities of life. This was further compounded 
by the problems of double taxation, harassment from state/ local government officials 
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over indiscriminate rates charged them for operating business centres (legal/illegal) 
and use of equipment. They also mentioned the seizure of their wares by various 
government regulatory bodies for operating in prohibited areas, all of which have 
adversely affected the real incomes from their businesses. In contrast, 24 percent of the 
respondents said their business activities have witnessed relative improvement in terms 
of the income they earn from their daily business, while the remaining 17 percent said 
they don’t know.   
While it is acknowledged that the urban poor have used the sector as means of survival 
strategy, all this has changed following the advent of the neo-liberal policy measures in 
Nigeria since 1986. As such, the form and content, as well as the types of activities and 
services provided by the sector have been altered. Given the escalating cost of living 
amidst declining real value of the naira that have made the income earned 
insignificant, many persons have found easy entrance into the sector. As such, many 
working class people as well as those in the middle and upper income social groups 
have now turned to the informal sector in order to supplement their official incomes. 
This trend has now affected the survival strategies of operators in the informal sector 
where the relatively better off middle and upper class persons are increasingly joining 
in activities which were traditionally the domain of the desperate urban poor. This has 
increased competition in the sector to the detriment of the poor.  
These conditions have now altered the structure of social relationships with regard to 
ownership of enterprise, class and social status of informal sector participants. As 
such, the desperately urban poor and low income earners have now found themselves 
perpetually stuck in low and marginal income generating activities such as street 
hawking, petty trading, among others where the returns they get can barely suffice 
beyond subsistence. In a virtual “zero sum game,” the informal sector has now become 
an arena of competition, exploitation and struggle between the desperate “chronic 
poor” and other better off participants who have relegated them to the position of 
labourers rather than owners. In using the data from the foregoing discourse to 
examine the question regarding the informal sector operators’ capacity to achieve 
better livelihood and participation in socioeconomic activities in the face of 
148 
 
government implementation of economic reform programme, the chi-square test value 
for table 4.9 (39.50) and 4.10 (75.3) indicates that there is significant relationship 
between the neo-liberal policy and the incapacity of operators to achieve better 
livelihood and lack of empowerment to make positive contributions to national 
economic development. Many of the respondents observed that given the imposition of 
government economic programme of liberalization, deregulation, they have faced 
difficulties in accessing their basic needs for livelihood due to price increases for basic 
goods and services. Besides, the high cost of raw materials and equipment has 
hampered their economic capability and business sustainability. The direct 
consequences of the neo-liberal policy aggravating the social welfare of informal 
sector operators have been associated with government cut-back expenditures on 
health and education (two factors that are vital to economic growth and development) 
and the elimination of subsidies on basic commodities and key raw materials and 
equipment. This is exemplified by the nature of government recurrent expenditure 
where greater attention is given to servicing public debt (Internal/External) than 
education and health in budget allocation as presented in the table below: 
TABLE 4.11 FEDERAL GOVERNMENT RECURRENT EXPENDITURE 
                               (=N=’MILLION) 1999-2004 
 
Year 
Education Health Defence Debt 
Serving 
% of Total 
Expenditure 
for 
Education 
% of Total 
Expenditure 
for health 
% of 
Total 
Expend 
for 
Defence 
% of Total 
Expenditure 
for Debt 
services 
1997 12,136.0 3,179.2 11,607.2 56,000.0 7.5 1.9 7.2 34.8 
1998 13,928.3 4,860.5 15,130.8 66,000.0 7.6 2.6 8.2 36.1 
1999 23,047.2 8,793.2 28,019.4 16, 300.0 10.4 3.9 7.7 7.3 
2000 44,225.5 11,612.6 33,119.4 100,000.0 12.5 3.2 9.3 28.3 
2001 39,884.6 24,523.5 47,071.6 155,424.0 6.8 4.2 8.1 26.8 
2002 100,240.2 50,563.2 86,053.8 203,902.9 11.5 5.8 9.9 23.5 
2003 64,755.9 33,254.5 51,043.6 363,363.0 6.5 3.3 5.1 36.9 
2004 76,527.7 34,198.5 76,324.4 397,315.2 7.2 3.2 7.1 37.3 
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria Statistical Bulletin 2004. 
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 The data presented shows that Nigerian government is more committed to promoting 
the interests of the World Bank/IMF and bi-lateral organizations like the Paris and 
London Clubs through debt servicing than to meet up to its statutory responsibility of 
providing for the welfare of the people. This fact was brazenly manifested in 2006 
when it paid over US$ 12 billion to the Paris club in order to secure debt relief while 
over 70 percent of Nigerians live below the poverty line of US$ 1 dollar per day. This 
occurrence was a complete negation against the recommendation in the 1996 Human 
Development Report on Nigeria (1996) that not less than 20 percent of its annual 
budget was to be spent on both education and health if it is to achieve any progress in 
its anti-poverty objectives. The data on Nigeria’s recurrent expenditures for 1999-2004 
reveal that Nigeria has not complied with these requirements.   
Despite the CBN (2007) report that the nation has achieved a GDP growth rate of 6.0 
percent, the real growth rates have remained low relative to her development goals, 
particularly on the issue of human development of the populace over the last two 
decades.  This buttresses the fact that “although economic growth is a prerequisite for 
poverty alleviation, it is not by itself a sufficient condition, especially where growth is 
accompanied by inequity in income distribution.” This position clearly attest to the 
realization that basic human requirements involve not only physical and financial 
resources, but also human and social resources, which substantiate the relevance of the 
UNDP human development approach to development which states that people are the 
real wealth of a nation and hence the basic objective of development (UNDP, 1990:9).  
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TABLE 4.12  DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS BY THEIR PRESENT LIVING  
                       CONDITIONS DUE TO GOVERNMENT IMPLEMENTATION OF 
                       NEO-LIBERAL POLICY. 
 
 Occupation 
Responses Trader M-cycle 
Rider 
Taxi/bus 
Driver 
Artisan Svc 
Provider 
Other          Total           % 
 F         % F          % F        % F        % F           % f         %     
Yes (Positive) 34       21 8         28 8        32 47      32 5        18 0         -        102           26 
No (Negative) 108     66 21       72 17      72 90     61 18      64 2      100       56             65 
Don’t Know 18       11 0          - 0        - 9       6 2         7 0        -         29             7 
No Answer 4         2 0          - 0        - 2       1 3        11 0        -           9              2 
Total 164     100 29       100 25   100 148   100 28      100 2      100      396          100% 
 
Table 4.12 shows 65 percent have experience a decline in quality of life since 
government began implementing the neo-liberal policy of liberalization and 
deregulation. They express their inability to earn sufficient incomes which have 
hindered their opportunity to access the basic necessities of life. Specific reference was 
made to the persistent increase in the prices of basic foodstuffs, housing, education for 
their children, among others. This situation has reinforced the vicious cycle of poverty 
and deprivation among the people which represents a lack of command over basic 
consumption needs, thus bringing to fore the policy-poverty nexus discourse in which 
Nigeria has been described as a “land of plenty where the people live in poverty”. To 
buttress the gravity of the peoples’ poor conditions of living, one of the male 
discussant in the FGD sessions made this remark on the issue of fuel price increase:    
“The increase in fuel price affects all aspects of our life,  
from food, transport, house rent and other things” (35 years 
old male carpenter in Ikorodu).  
This fact has been consistently underscored by the increasing incidence of poverty in 
Nigeria which has grown from 28 percent in 1985 to 46 percent in 1992, 66 percent in 
1996 and over 70 percent in 2006. In contrast 26 percent of the respondents stated that 
their conditions of living have witnessed improvement as the income they make from 
their businesses could sustain them and their households. Furthermore, all the 
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respondents blamed bad governance for the state of the peoples’ poor living 
conditions, claiming that the government at all levels have neglected their 
responsibilities to the people following the continued implementation of economic 
reform programme which has failed to provide them with the basic necessities of life 
and security that would improve their standard of living. This fact was confirmed by 
one of the female discussant in the FGDs who remarked that:  
“A bag of rice was N3500 but now it is N6000; even some 
sell it N7000”, “Foodstuffs are very expensive”. Before I 
use to buy a tin of evaporated milk for my children, But now 
I cannot buy it as the price has gone up from N200 to N400 
hundred naira. I now buy 10 naira sachet milk” (39 years old 
female trader in Apapa). 
All the respondents accused the political elites in government of plundering away the 
wealth of the nation through mismanagement of resources and massive corruption. 
These factors have been blamed for the increasing poverty and human development 
problems in the nation (FRN, 1997; 2001).  For instance, within the last three decades, 
the country has earned over US$ 300 billion dollars from the exportation of petroleum 
alone, but the huge resource earnings has not reflected in improved living conditions 
for the people. The above situation substantiates the notion regarding the predatory 
character of the Nigerian state where the apparatus of government has been high 
jacked by a few group to siphon our national commonwealth, while neglecting the 
discharge of their statutory responsibility to the people. This affirmed the position of 
scholars who hold the views that African regimes have always been more interested in 
individual accumulation than national development. It is evident from historical 
evidence that from the inception of the Nigerian state, neither the colonial nor the post-
colonial operators had any interest in development, endless policy declarations 
notwithstanding. Rather, the political ‘leaders’ are only self-serving individuals 
perpetually trapped in the dilemma of choosing between endogenous agenda that they 
cannot find the means to implement and exogenous agenda that they cannot bring 
themselves to accept such as is the case with the neo-liberal policy which has further 
worsened the living conditions of the Nigerian people rather alleviate it.   
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Consequently, a broad evaluation of Nigeria’s standing in the UNDP Human 
Development report Index ranking for measuring average life expectancy, literacy rate 
and purchasing power parity does reveal how the standard of living of the citizenry in 
the nation which have significantly declined over the last decade. This goes to show 
the extent to which the neo-liberal policy implemented by the Nigerian state has 
aggravated the social welfare condition of Nigerians. The state has become oblivious 
to the fact that providing the citizenry access to basic social services is a fundamental 
human right that is enshrined in the United Nations (UN) Convention on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights to which governments are obliged to serve. Since 1986, 
when Nigeria began implementing the neo-liberal policy measures till the present time, 
there has always been obvious discrepancy between the nation’s economic indicators 
such as GDP and per capita income which is its main focus and the corresponding 
increase in the living conditions of the people. This is shown by comparing the 
nation’s GDP growth rate (2001-2005) and per capita income (1980-2006) with the 
level of human development of the people as presented in following tables:   
Table 4.13 NIGERIA’S REAL GDP GROWTH RATES 2001-2005 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Real GDP 
Growth Rates % 
4.7 4.6 9.6 6.6 6.2 
Oil sector 5.2 5.7 23.9 3.3 0.5 
Non-Oil Sector 4.5 8.3 5.2 7.8 8.2 
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria Annual Report, 2005. 
Table 4.14 NIGERIA’S GDP PER CAPITA (US$) 1980-2006  
1980 
 
1990 1999 2003 2004 2006 
2,262.68 699.59 463.23 621.15 673.01 1,011.73 
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria, 2007. 
Table 4.15 NIGERIA’S REAL GDP AVERAGE GROWTH RATES (1980-2006) 
Year 1980-83 1984-85 1986-93 1994-99 2000-02 2003-2006 
Total GDP 
Growth Rate 
4.17 4.99 6.23 2.33 4.75 7.07 
Oil GDP 
Growth Rate 
-9.76 10.18 7.84 0.51 3.55 5.76 
Non-Oil 
Growth Rate 
-1.94 3.30 5.77 3.00 5.23 7.61 
 Source: Central Bank of Nigeria, 2007.    
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A look at the table on the Gross Domestic Product growth rates indicate that the nation 
is experiencing economic growth which has reflected in the rise in per capita income 
from US$ 463 to 1,011 dollars (1999-2006). Besides, between 1999 and 2006, the 
three-tiers of government received N6,047 trillion. However, within the same period, 
the UNDP Human Development Report for Nigeria showed that the nation has 
consistently remained in the low human development ranking. Since 1999, the 
country’s position on the HDI has been on the decline from her 146th position to 151st  
in 2000, 153rd, 154th, 157th and 159th in 2003-2006. The HDI value has remained 
below 0.5 point which indicates that she is not making progress in advancing the living 
conditions of the people, and this has been the trend for over two decades. This is 
further evident when compared with other nations like China, Singapore and Malaysia 
which were in similar economic state with Nigeria in the 1960s and 1970s, but have 
progressively improved their HDI value over the years in tandem with their improved 
economic development as presented in the table 4.16: 
 
Table 4.16 COMPARISON OF NIGERIA, SINGAPORE, MALAYSIA AND CHINA 
                   ON THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX (1975-2004) 
Source: UNDP, Human Development Report, 2006. 
Year 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2004 
Nigeria 0.317 0.376 0.387 0.407 0.419 0.433 0.448 
Singapore 0.727 0.763 0.786 0.823 0.862 0.897 0.916 
China 0.527 0.560 0.596 0.628 0.685 0.730 0.768 
Malaysia 0.616 0.659 0.696 0.723 0.761 0.791 0.805 
Furthermore, other human development indicators lend credence to this critical reality. 
For instance, the number and proportion of poor people in Nigeria has been increasing, 
and the gap between the rich and the poor has also been increasing. Accordingly, the 
Federal Office of Statistics report in 1999 indicated that, “with a national population 
estimate of 102.3 million there were at least 67.1 million poor people in Nigeria, 
compared to only 18 million in 1980” (FOS, 1999:8). The proportion of the “core 
poor” increased from 6.2 percent to 29.3 percent in 1996 and over 70 percent of 
Nigerians live below the poverty line presently. According to the UNDP Report 
(2003:257), only 62 percent of the population has sustainable access to improved water 
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source in 2000. But this has reduced to less than 50 percent in 2007(ADB, 2007). 
Besides, the health status of Nigerian citizens is relatively poor, with adults and 
children often dying of common ailments and infections such as malaria. Life 
expectancy at birth has fallen from 54 years in 1990 to 52 years in 1999 to 51 years in 
2001 and 43 years in 2006 compared to 57 years for Ghana, 72 years for China and 74 
years for Malaysia (UNICEF, 2007). Furthermore, Infant Mortality Rate (per 1000 live 
births) has remained high, having increased from 85 in 1990 to 191 in 1993 and 110 in 
2001; maternal mortality rate was 1,100 per 100,000 live birth (UNDP, 2003:257), 
while under five mortality (per 1000 live births) in 2005 stood at 194 compared to 27 
and 12 for China and Malaysia. All these indicators therefore have serious implications 
for the quality of life of the people. 
 
4.4 THE ANALYSIS OF PERFORMANCE AND EMPOWERMENT OF 
             OPERATORS IN THE INFORMAL SECTOR 
The issue of business performance and growth is central to the social and economic 
life of every country. It provides the framework that constitutes the vicious cycle 
which explains the endemic nature of poverty in developing countries. Therefore, it is 
the continuous growth and expansion of businesses or enterprise that provides the basis 
for the adequate supply of goods and services, thereby improving the welfare of the 
people and social progress, in addition to reducing the incidence of poverty and 
unemployment. For without it there would be no growth in per capita income and 
inflation would be all the more difficult to control (Rensburg and Nande, 1999).  It is 
within this context that we evaluate the implications of neo-liberal policy for 
empowering the dynamic development of informal sector enterprises toward making 
positive contributions to the national economy.   
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TABLE 4.17 DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS BY WHETHER THEIR 
BUSINESSES HAVE IMPROVED FOLLOWING GOVERNMENT 
IMPLEMENTATION OF NEO-LIBERAL POLICY 
 
 Occupation 
Responses Trader M-cycle 
Rider 
Taxi/bus 
Driver 
Artisan Svc 
Provider 
Other          Total          % 
 F          % F        %   F        % F         % F        % F        %       
Yes 28        19 5        17 2         8 20        14 6        23 0         -         61          16 
No 115      77 24      80 22      88 117      84 18      69 2       100    298           80 
Don’t Know 4           3 1        3 1        4 3           2 2        8 0          -        11           2.9 
No Answer 2           1 0       - 0        - 0           -  0        - 0          -       2              0.5 
Total 149    100 30    100 25    100 140     100 26    100 2       100    372          100% 
X2 =171.47, DF=15; P < 0.05 
Table 4.17 shows that 80 percent reported that their businesses have not witnessed 
positive improvement due to the harsh economic environment occasioned by 
government implementation of economic reform policy measures. The reasons for this 
include high cost of raw materials, increase in the prices of petroleum products, 
epileptic power supply, high cost of rents (business and residential), low business 
patronage which results in low income returns, among others. They also mentioned 
that the cost of utilities have also gone up. Conversely, 16 percent said they were 
making progress while the remaining responses were negligible. Majority of the 
respondents (70 percent) remarked that since the implementation of economic reform 
programme by government, the activities in the informal sector have been 
marginalized by the embargo government has placed on the importation of second 
hand consumables such as foodstuff (oil, turkey and chicken, rice), electrical and 
electronics appliances, clothing, parts and equipments which have denied them of the 
social means of existence. These anecdotes confirm that things are very difficult with 
the operators in the sector in terms of making a living for themselves.  
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TABLE 4.18 DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS BY WHETHER THEY RECEIVED 
ANY GOVERNMENTAL ASSISTANCE TO START THEIR BUSINESS. 
 
 Occupation 
Responses Trader M-cycle 
Rider 
Taxi/bus 
Driver 
Artisan Svc 
Provider 
Other          Total         % 
 F        % F        % F        % F          % F          % f         %      
Yes 2       1.32 1       3.44 1         4 4          3 1          4 0         -        9               2 
No 145     96 27      93 22      92 126     97 25       96 2       100    347          96 
Don’t Know 2        1.32 0         - 1        4 0          - 0          - 0         -        3              1 
No Answer 2        1.32 1        3.44 0         - 0          - 0          - 0          -        3               1 
Total 151    100 29      100 24     100 130     100 26     100 2      100     362          100% 
X2 = 310.00, DF=15; P <0.05. 
Table 4.18 shows that 96 percent did not receive any form of assistance from the 
government in terms of credit facilities, equipment provision, skill empowerment or 
provision of social infrastructure, among others. Only two percent said they had 
received some assistance with the provision of transportation facilities through the 
‘Keke NAPEP’ tricycle acquisition scheme which has provided them employment with 
which they have been able to get the means to feed themselves and their families. 
When asked how they sourced for funding to start their enterprise, 75 percent said they 
got their funds from personal savings through the “Esusu” or “Ajo” scheme, with 
about 10 percent receiving assistance from their relatives and friends. When asked why 
they did not go to the bank to seek for loans or financial assistance, most of the 
respondents remarked that they did not bother to apply for bank loans because of the 
demand for collaterals which they could not afford, coupled with the uncertainties that 
characterized the productivity of their typical businesses etc. As regard belonging to 
Cooperatives Societies which could provide them the avenue to pull their resources 
together, the respondents were of the view that most existing Cooperative outfits have 
not earned their patronage due to their lack of reliability in giving them back their 
money whenever they needed it.   
These reports have, therefore, raise the fundamental question about the reach of 
government poverty alleviation programmes and projects in getting to the intended 
157 
 
beneficiaries and the success it has recorded. This is measured by the increase in the 
number of persons who fall below the poverty line in Nigeria. For instance, in the 
poverty line at the national level in 1980 stood at 27.2 percent. By 1985, the level went 
up to 43 percent and by 2006 it has increased to over 54 percent (IMF, 2007). With 
regard to the question of whether the respondents have benefited from government 
poverty alleviation schemes, an overwhelming 85 percent of the respondents said they 
have never benefited from any of the schemes, while 9 percent said they had benefited.   
It is necessary to note that the objectives of the NEEDS programme pioneered by the 
Obasanjo administration in 2004 which has as its core elements the reduction of 
poverty, creating wealth and generating employment in order to raise the country’s 
standard of living have not been achieved. The government has not been able to create 
the suitable environment through the provision of basic social services particularly 
electricity that will empower persons in the informal and other sectors to take 
advantage of the economic opportunities available to boost their business performance. 
Even the government’s goal of providing 7 million new jobs, diversification of the 
economy and improvement of agricultural productivity is yet to be seen. These 
conditions, therefore, re-emphasize the inadequate policy initiatives put in place by 
government over the years which have not been able to break the low performance trap 
that characterized informal sector operations. This is depicted by lack of access to 
capital resource, skills development and social incentives required by them to develop 
the capacity for producing higher quality consumer and intermediate/light capital 
goods that will immensely contribute to the development of the nation’s economy.      
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4.5 THE ANALYSIS OF SUPPORTIVE EFFORTS FOR INFORMAL  
                                         SECTOR ACTIVITIES 
 
TABLE 4.19   DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS BY THE NEED FOR  
                        SOLICITING ASSISTANCE TO IMPROVE THEIR BUSINESS 
 
 Occupation 
Responses Trader M-cycle 
Rider 
Taxi/bus 
Driver 
Artisan Svc 
Provider 
Other          Total      % 
 F          % F         % F          % F        % F          % F       %       
Yes(Need 
Assistance) 
127      79 26        84 22        85 132    85 21        66 1       50      329          81 
No(Don’t 
need Asst.) 
31       19 5          16 3         11 21      14 11        34 1       50       72            18 
Don’t Know 3         2 0          - 1          4 2        1 0           - 0         -        6            1 
Total 161    100 31       100 26      100 155   100 32       100 2       100    407         100% 
                                                                 
Table 4.19 shows that 81 percent needed assistance from the government which would 
ultimately enhance the performance of their business, while 18 percent said they don’t 
need assistance. The desired assistance required by the respondents varied, including 
financial assistance (60 percent), easy access to buying equipment and raw materials at 
affordable rates (70 percent), provision of shops and workshop space(s) (60 percent), 
efficient infrastructure especially electricity, pipe borne water and security (95 
percent). Looking at their current conditions of living, the respondents expressed the 
desire for government to design pro-poor policies and welfare programmes that will 
directly touch their lives such as the provision of social security benefits such as 
affordable housing, low-priced foodstuffs, free healthcare, free and qualitative 
education for their family members, pipe borne water, good roads, transportation and 
effective sanitation. It is these provisions that set the platform for effective social 
impact assessment of any public policy by looking at the extent to which government 
in its implementation of the neo-liberal policy has been able to mobilize resources to 
meet the basic social needs of the citizenry.  
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This position substantiate the fact that the provision of social welfare is a key factor in 
the human development of people as it has a positive multiplier effect on both 
economic productivity/performance and basic needs required by the people. This 
position was affirmed by majority of the respondents who said that living a healthy and 
functional quality of life was central to their functioning as well as the sustainability of 
their businesses and satisfaction of their basic needs, including those of their families. 
By and large, the foregoing findings highlight that the lack of access to employment 
opportunities, credit facilities, market, inadequate physical assets such as land and 
capital  have had adverse consequences for the socio-economic well-being of 
operators. Besides, the continued implementation of economic reform programme by 
the government has further aggravated the situation, having deleterious effects on 
business performance and capacity building in the informal sector. 
Firstly, the liberalization of the economy has reduced the growth of the informal sector 
to the demands of market forces which has had severe implications for operators’ 
access to equipment and inputs. For instance, most of the equipment and inputs used 
by informal sector operators have no local substitutes i.e. vanish and glue, gums used 
by carpenters and shoe makers, films by photographers, hair products by hair dressers, 
spare parts (car/motorcycle) by mechanics, dryers, bending machines, electric rods for 
welding and so on. This buttresses the fact that the operational activities of operators in 
the informal sector are susceptible to the fragilities of the market given the disparity in 
the exchange rate of the naira to the dollar which invariably lead to high costs of 
production of goods and services provided by the sector.  This is particularly so as they 
have to pay high prices for these raw materials and inputs without subsidies provided 
by government. 
Secondly, under the present economic condition in the nation, the entry of new 
enterprises into the informal sector has mostly been concentrated in the low income 
activities such as the operation of phone booth centres, trading, hawking, barbing, 
restaurants which have the least potential for employment and income generation. 
Besides, they are also characterized by cases of increased competition and declining 
returns. In the same vein, the decline in the entry into high income activities by 
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entrepreneurs owing to rising capital costs poses further threat to the absorptive 
capacity of the informal sector to adequately cater for the huge daily influx of persons 
entering the sector. This occurrence contradicts the belief held by the World Bank/IMF 
and our national policy makers that the policies of deregulation and liberalization 
would eliminate the privileged access to resources enjoyed by inefficient state 
enterprises, and free up resources that would allow for a more dynamic 
entrepreneurship to thrive (Liedholm, 1990:39).  
Thirdly, the issue of capacity building and skill acquisition through apprenticeship 
training has been distorted following the implementation of the neo-liberal policy by 
the government. This has resulted in the low availability of apprentices which is 
further complicated by the varied coping strategies devised by would be apprentices 
and their families to meet their survival needs. On the one hand, the pressure to get out 
and start earning income, either for their own needs or to supplement the household 
incomes of their families is causing most apprentices, wherever they are available, to 
rush through their training without acquiring the requisite knowledge which negatively 
affects their competence on the job. In the same vein, high level skill development 
within the informal sector has been undermined by lack of adequate tools and shortage 
of business enterprises engaged in construction and fabrication of consumer 
goods/inputs from which apprentices could acquire training and gain experiences in 
the process. Besides, financial pressures on apprentices have also become an obstacle 
to training. Among the new entrants into the informal sector, the prevailing economic 
environment has intensified the tension between the need for immediate earnings and 
the desire to enter long term lucrative occupational activities which require 3-5 years 
training. Most of the informal sector enterprises like tailoring, mechanic, carpentry and 
others that usually depend on the use of apprentices for labour now complain of acute 
shortage of apprentices who are ready to learn a trade. 
4.6 DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS  
From the data presented and analyzed, we have brought to the fore the fact that the 
neo-liberal policy cannot succeed in Less Developed Countries (LDCs) like Nigeria 
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whose economy is not based on the exportation of manufactured goods, but primary 
products (agricultural and natural resources) orientation whose objectives are not 
guided by a development process that is internally generated and sustained from 
within. With particular reference to the neo-liberal policy implemented by the Nigerian 
government, it is obvious from the findings of the study that its social costs 
implications on the socioeconomic conditions of the people working in the informal 
sector has worsened over the last two decades. This is profoundly so as the economic 
reform programmes of government have failed to address the myriad of social 
problems confronting the nation, especially poverty, unemployment which has resulted 
in the proliferation of the sector.  
The problems of unemployment and underemployment have not abated, while the 
poverty incidence among Nigerians has been on the increase with the young people 
(aged 20-44 years) mostly affected. A look at the demographic characteristics of 
respondents reveal that composition of operators in the informal sector are made up of 
mostly persons within the ages of 20-40 years which amounts to 85 percent. This fact 
indicates that the number of dependants in each operators households would have 
increased, thus placing greater demand on their incomes for the maintenance of 
expenditure required by their household members. The resultant consequence of this 
condition is a drop in the standards of living of this class of persons. As such, many of 
the respondents (over 90 percent) live in either one room or one room and parlour 
accommodation without the requisite social facilities to match, thus resulting in the 
poor quality of life and individual dignity.  
These conditions thus explain the persistence of poverty in the country as revealed by 
Nigeria’s ranking in the UNDP human development index reports which has been on 
the increase over the last two decades, rising from 27 percent in 1980 to over 54 
percent in 2006. Besides, UNICEF (2007) report indicated that over 70 percent of the 
population living below the 1 US$ dollar per day, which is an increase from 27.2 
percent in 1980, 43.6 percent in 1985 and 42 percent for 1992. This data shows that the 
effects of the neo-liberal policy on the poorest groups, many of whom belong to the 
informal sector have been hurting and deplorable. This was confirmed by the survey 
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data in Table 4.6 which showed that majority of the respondents were not satisfied 
with their living conditions which have been further aggravated with the 
implementation of SAP measures. For instance, the general emphasis of the neo-liberal 
policy measures on drastic devaluation, removal of subsidy on essential goods, 
particularly petroleum products have been decried for having too many negative 
effects, including inflation, high cost of goods/ services and inputs and the decline in 
the purchasing power of the operators. These conditions have resulted in many of them 
operators (75 percent) lacking access to society’s productive resources, particularly 
human capital assets like education, healthcare and skill acquisition/training. This fact 
substantiates the major criticism against the World Bank/IMF neo-liberal development 
agenda in sub-Saharan Africa which have shifted the burdens of the economic reforms 
to the poorest and vulnerable groups in society. This stance is often viewed as an irony 
of fate given the Bretton Woods institutions involvement in sponsoring researches on 
poverty and its reduction strategies aggravated by its neo-liberal policy approach.  
Furthermore, the study also emphasized the fact that the nation has not fully developed 
the requisite social institutions (a developmental state) equipped with the capacity to 
accommodate such economic policy programme as well as deal with the disruption 
associated with its implementation particularly with regard to its severe consequences 
for the well-being of the people. Associated with this dilemma is the top-down 
imposition of the conditionality of the neo-liberal policy which has generated serious 
repercussions for the well-being of the people. This is evidently manifested in the 
manner with which the government has shown little or no regard for addressing the 
core issues of development objective such as issues of employment or promoting 
equity in terms of a fair and just distribution of income. This has brought to the fore 
the conclusion reached by many scholars that the economic model of neo-liberalism 
cannot be conceived as a development strategy as it has not been matched with 
transformation with regard to satisfying basic human needs (Ake, 2001:92). These 
facts openly challenge the ‘Washington consensus’ view that “the combination of 
democratic government, free markets, a dominant private sector, trade liberalization 
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and foreign direct investment is the recipe for prosperity and economic growth that 
will “trickle down” to the poor in LDCs (Christopher and Vines, 2000:16).  
It is obvious with the Nigerian case that the economic reform measures was not 
conceived with the informal sector as a prime target, in spite of the fact that it has had 
direct and indirect consequences on the sector. This goes to explain government non- 
recognition of the enormous challenges hindering the growth of the sector and the 
well-being of the operators and the need to urgently focus attention on addressing 
them. For instance, the Nigerian government has consistently argued that the incessant 
increase in the domestic prices of petroleum products due to oil subsidy removal was 
necessary to provide additional revenue for development, avoid perennial fuel scarcity 
and check smuggling of the product to neigbouring countries. Also, the process was to 
allow for private sector participation and foreign investment in the sector. But the same 
government also fails to realize the reality that the persistent price increases have 
worsened the inflationary situation, imposed higher factor costs on productive 
activities and aggravated the sufferings of the people. 
Consequently, scholars have rejected the ‘trickle-down’ strategy of neo-liberal 
ideology, regarding it as an approach that has made most governments in Less 
Developed Countries not to allow room for local participation in the formulation and 
implementation of pro poor policies targeted at addressing the needs of the people. It 
also creates lack of responsibility on the part of the government in neglecting its 
primary task for improving the welfare of the people given its perceived minimalist 
role in development. This belief has critically affected its capacity to provide crucial 
infrastructures such as transportation, communication, electricity and social services 
such as education, healthcare and sanitation facilities which are essential public goods 
required for development (Riddell, 1992:67). It is not surprising to most enlightened 
minds that the Nigerian governments have consistently failed to channel our 
commonwealth resources for the betterment of the populace and other aspects of 
human capital necessary for industrialization as shown in the Federal Government of 
Nigeria recurrent budget expenditures (1997-2004) for the key social service sectors 
which include education, health as presented in table 4.11. The data reveals that during 
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this period, the health sector consistently received the lowest share of budget 
allocation.  
Thus, an assessment of the impact of government expenditure on education and health 
indicate plainly why the Human Development reports on Nigeria have continuously 
been on the decline over the years. For instance, average life expectancy which was 58 
years in 1980 dropped to 54 years in 2002 and further down to 43 years in 2005. Infant 
mortality rate has increased from 75 per 1000 live birth in 2002 to 100 in 2003 and 115 
in 2005. This data exemplify government inconsiderate concern for focusing on 
fundamental issues of health and education which are of vital benefits to the people. 
From the foregoing, it is obvious that expenditure in the social sector and infrastructure   
have been of least concern to governments in Nigeria, while a huge percent of its total 
budget expenditures are expended in servicing debts and administration. This, 
however, has serious implications for human development efforts which bring to fore 
the point that has been canvassed by some development experts that to effectively 
stimulate human development and combat poverty alleviation; all nations including 
Nigeria needs to commit not less than twenty percent of their recurrent and capital 
budgets to the provision of key basic social services (UNDP, 1998).   
In the same context, the neo-liberal policy of government divestiture from the 
economy through privatization, deregulation and liberalization has been criticized as 
an incorrect policy. This is because a strong state is an essential prerequisite for Third 
World economic development, just as the earlier industrializers such as the United 
States and Germany did in the 19th century, as well as the East Asian NIEs from the 
1950s to the 1980s requiring a large degree of governmental intervention in order to 
catch up with the leading powers. Accordingly, scholars have rejected the neo-liberal 
policy preference for a minimalist state, arguing that state minimalism “is at odds with 
the evidence of the world’s development success stories, as government has been an 
important agent of economic transformation and success” (Stiglitz, 2001:17-56). The 
evidence from the most economically successful countries in the past fifty years such 
as the newly industrialized countries (NICs) of East Asia supports extensive state 
intervention as been beneficial to economic growth and development.  
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In view of this fact, Development, therefore, requires an effective state, one that plays 
a catalytic, facilitating role, encouraging and complementing the activities of 
public/private businesses and individuals. This position contradicts the World Bank 
(1997) development report which attributed sub-Saharan Africa’s severe development 
problems to deterioration in the effectiveness and legitimacy of the state. The issues 
we must, therefore, address our minds to should be how to create a developmental state 
rather than a predatory one which has been the bane of our development aspiration as a 
nation. Similarly, the neo-liberal policy measures has over the decades subordinated 
peripheral governments in sub-Saharan Africa to the control of International Financial 
Institutions such as the IMF/World Bank, Multinational Corporations and core 
Western nations such as the United States and Britain.  
This has been profoundly so since Nigeria’s independence where the political 
leadership in the quest of struggling for power and survival, coupled by their betrayal 
for nationalistic revolution always opted for dependent development strategy rather 
than launch a national development project. Thus, the various development strategies 
we have implemented which include import substitution industrialization, export 
promotion, structural adjustment and the present economic reforms have little concern 
for addressing the realities of Nigeria’s socioeconomic crisis since they are 
exogenously formulated development agendas. These development agendas have 
consistently widened the increase in the inequalities of income between classes as well 
as the gap between the rich and poor. For instance, in the UNDP (2004) Human 
Development Report on Nigeria, the distribution of per capita income between the rich 
and the poor was highly inequitable. With a per capita income of US$ 860 dollars, the 
ratio of richest 20 percent to poorest 20 percent was 12.8 percent, while the share of 
the income going to poorest 20 percent was 4.4 percent as against 56 percent for the 
richest 20 percent. As such, it has become difficult to sustain the position that 
structural adjustment or economic reforms will benefit the poor in the medium and 
long term as development ‘trickle down’ to them or the expectation that its social 
impact will be effectively cushioned.    
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Consequently, the neo-liberal policy measures have also been faulted on the ground 
that it views the economy as a whole rather than looking at individual sectors, firms or 
households that are viable and have the capacity to make contribution to the economy 
other than just the organized private sector. The over emphasis on market oriented 
policies to the neglect of looking at the social and human aspects of peoples’ 
conditions of living causes the burden of the policy to fall heavily on the poorest 
groups in societies (see Wade, 1990). Therefore, the World Bank in its 1991 
development report had to acknowledge that “governments need to do more in those 
areas where markets cannot be relied upon such as health, education, informal sector 
and poverty alleviation, and less in those areas where markets work or can be made to 
work (World Bank, 1991:9). This emphasizes the fact that for any economic 
development strategy to succeed, it must strike a realistic balance between the state 
statutory responsibilities to its citizens and the markets so as to stimulate a positive and 
dynamic interaction between them. The World Bank (2000/2001) development report 
further emphasized that: Third World governments need to take a much broader 
approach to development that goes beyond reforms, emphasizing linkages among 
financial, social and institutional aspects of development. This comprehensive 
development framework was to “substitute a top-down approach to development with 
a consultative mechanism by establishing a partnership between the government and 
the civil society to collectively discuss and negotiate government policies for 
socioeconomic development.”  
It is this strategy which reinforces the developmental state approach of embedded 
autonomy that helps to explain the economic success of the East Asian NIEs of South 
Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, among others. Similarly, it also proposed a three 
pronged strategy for attacking poverty which involves promoting opportunity, 
facilitating empowerment and enhancing security which was a marked departure from 
the traditional focus on economic issues of growth which forms the core of the neo-
liberal policy. In Africa, however, state/private sector interactions have been typically 
individualized. Governments still exercise considerable discretion in the application of 
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rules and regulations, coupled with the array of bureaucratic controls characterized by 
corruption, inefficiency and maladministration. 
It is within this framework that we incorporate the human development approach 
discourse to development which is people centred. This approach, therefore, has 
helped to expose the pitfalls associated with focusing on the growth aspects of 
development to the relative neglect of the latent social and human strains/experiences 
which the implementation of neo-liberal policy measures have brought on the overall 
welfare of the people. In this regard, the UNDP (1996) human development report 
emphasized the fact that there is no automatic link between growth and human 
development, stating that it is only by taking into consideration human issues that 
involve promoting opportunity, facilitating empowerment and enhancing security that 
we can understand that the main purpose of economic development is to improve 
human well-being (UNDP, 1996:1).  
In the light of these happenings, there has been a growing clamour on the World 
Bank/IMF as the main multilateral development agency and governments of African 
nations since the 1980s to devote significant attention to the distributional effects of 
economic reforms in order to give it a human face (Cornia, Jolly and Steward, 1987). 
This call has, therefore, raised the continued conflict that exists between the vigorous 
pursuit of the economic reforms, on the one hand, and the concerns with African states 
and its preparedness to solve the problem of poverty, hunger, unemployment, disease, 
squalor and social inequality on the other. This was confirmed by the data in Table 4.4 
which show that the impact of the economic reform policies have had severe 
repercussions for the earnings of operators which could barely meet their personal 
demands as well as those of their household members. 
Despite the measures taken by government through the institutionalization of poverty 
alleviation programmes to cushion the harsh impact of the neo-liberal policy, its 
implementation has led to the deterioration in the overall wellbeing of the populace. 
This is  shown by the fall in the real minimum wage (1990-2007) of workers from 
N2,837 in 1980 to N1,633 in 2007 (CBN, 2007:16), the collapse of the social sector 
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and infrastructure, including water supply, electricity and sanitation facilities. This 
development is having serious negative effects on the informal sector’s absorptive 
capacity to accommodate the large numbers of unemployed persons who have lost 
their jobs as a result of the neo-liberal economic policy which creates ‘jobless’ and 
‘ruthless’ economic growth.   
Besides, a close evaluation of the various poverty alleviation programmes such as the 
National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy programme, National 
Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP), National Directorate of Employment 
(NDE), the closed People’s Bank of Nigeria, Community Banks (now transformed to 
micro-finance bank) and others show that they were deficient in capacity building with 
regard to reaching out to the intended beneficiaries. Besides, the sustainability of these 
poverty alleviation programmes are suspect as there is little or no involvement of the 
actual beneficiaries in the design, selection and implementation of programmes and 
projects targeted at them.  This fact was confirmed by the data in table 4.18 where 
more than 70 percent of the respondents said they have not received any assistance 
from any of the poverty alleviation schemes. Also, these programmes are not given 
adequate publicity by the government agencies in the print and electronic media on 
how the operators can avail themselves of the various packages that the programmes 
offer.  
Besides, many of the poverty alleviation programmes do not adequately address the 
demands of informal sector activities given the diverse nature of varying occupations 
in the sector and their peculiar challenges. For instance, the challenge of an automobile 
mechanic in terms of inputs requirement and working space cannot be the same as that 
of a carpenter or a petty trader or restaurant operator. In the same vein, the 
implementation of the neo-liberal policy in Nigeria has brought to the fore the 
criticism by some scholars who regard it as a process of economic recolonization of 
the African economy. For them, SAP or economic reform measures has exacerbated 
the conditions of increased social dereliction, worsening social problems and 
increasing social inequalities in countries such as Nigeria, Benin Republic, Ghana, 
Cote d’Ivoire, Mexico, Chile etc where it has been implemented (see Cypher, 2001b). 
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This was attested to in the data from the survey in table 4.12 where more than 60 
percent indicated that their living conditions has been undermined following 
government implementation of the neo-liberal economic policy.   
It is the recognition of this fact that SAP or economic reform measures of government 
from its inception was resented by the vast majority of Nigerians who believed that its 
objective was not in their best interests, particularly in the area of enhancing their 
social welfare needs. This fact has been manifested in the incessant conflict between 
government and the civil society, especially among organized labour organizations and 
the academia, who continuously opposes its intensification, particularly the issue of 
deregulation in the downstream oil sector of the economy. For instance, since 1999, 
the Nigerian Labour Congress has called six general strikes to protest increases in 
domestic fuel prices that occurred ten times within the 8 years period of President 
Obasanjo’s imperial rule. 
Similarly, the proposition by the advocates of the neo-liberal policy that free market 
economy will promote the needed economic growth which would translate to a better 
standard of living for the people is yet to be realized. Available statistics indicate that 
the neo-liberal policy has contributed to widening the levels of social inequality 
between the rich and the poor, failed to combat unemployment rate which has led the 
increasing proliferation of informal sector activities. Furthermore, the neo-liberal 
policy measures has for over two decades been anchored on the use of aggregate 
economic performance measures such as growth of GDP, trade, foreign investment 
and per capita income as a tool for measuring the levels of development of nations that 
will translate to better advancement in people’s well being. This position has always 
been a disputed issue as regards its bearing on human development.  
It has been argued that where economic growth as measured by macroeconomic 
aggregates of GDP and per capita income are not accompanied with inclusiveness in 
terms of creating the enabling conditions that enhance the standard of living of the 
people, such growth may lead to a lopsided development which cannot establish an 
automatic link between it and human welfare. While economic growth may be one 
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aspect of economic development, it is not a measure of the level of human welfare for 
the majority of the people in the society (CBN, 1999:7). It is the need to resolve this 
dilemma that informed the clamour by development scholars to Seers (1969:3-4) to 
signal the shift of focus away from the goal of growth to issues of human welfare and 
empowerment (Seers, 1969:3-4).  
It is this demand that eventually brought about the creation of the UNDP human 
development index report since the 1990s and the United Nations Millennium 
Declaration in 2000 which set up the Millennium Development Goals that provides the 
benchmark for assessing national development targets of nations in terms of promoting 
human welfare. These positions were also re-echoed at the United Nations (1995) 
World Social Summit, where world leaders agreed that the main themes upon which 
development strategy should focus upon are: elimination of unemployment, alleviation 
of poverty and enhancement of social integration. In line with the above, the record of 
economic growth and human development over the past 30 years in Nigeria shows that 
the nation has followed a course of lopsided development for a long time, where the 
level of economic growth has not been matched by advancement in human 
development. For instance, in 2005, Nigeria’s GDP rose by 6 percent in real terms 
over the previous years as shown in table 4.15 in this study. However, using the Atlas 
method based on a three year exchange rate, the per capita income was US$390, a 
figure lower than that of US$ 778 in 1985, thus leading to a fall in the standards of 
living of the populace.  
This condition goes to buttress the fact that high GDP growth rates, budget surpluses, 
and foreign exchange reserves are of limited value if they are not accompanied by a 
more equitable distribution of resources and access to basic social welfare and 
infrastructure, and the empowerment of the people, among others. Thus, establishing a 
link between growth and improvement in human development however requires a 
concerted actions and good will on the part of government as observed in the UNDP 
(1996) Human Development Report which states that: Unless governments take timely 
corrective action, economic growth can become lopsided and flawed. Determined 
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efforts are needed to avoid growth that is jobless, ruthless, voiceless, rootless and 
futureless (p2).   
Putting all these facts into proper context, available data on Nigeria’s economic growth 
during the Obasanjo administration as presented by the CBN (2007) statistics, tend to 
show some appreciable profile in its real GDP growth rate and per capita income as 
presented in table 4.13 and 4.14. Within the same period, Nigeria’s human 
development trend as shown by the UNDP Human Development Report revealed that 
the nation has dropped in the Human Development Index ranking from 146th in 1999 
to 151st in 2000, 153rd position in 2003, 154th in 2004, 157th in 2005 and 159th position 
in 2006, with a life expectancy which had fallen from 58 years in 1987 to 52 years in 
1999 and 43 years in 2006 (UNDP, 1997; 2006). Furthermore, the human development 
progression for Nigeria (1975-2004) has declined when compared with other countries 
such as Singapore, China, and Malaysia which at a time were at the same economic 
conditions with the nation in the 1960s and 1970s as presented in table 4.16. While 
these countries have over the years become industrialized economies, their levels of 
economic progress have correspondingly reflected in their human development trend. 
But the same cannot be said in the case of Nigeria where the HDI values has 
consistently remain below the 0.5 benchmark which shows that she has not made 
progress in the promotion of human development of the citizenry. 
Similarly, within the two decades of Nigeria’s implementation of the neo-liberal 
policy, the proportion of the population living below $1.00(PPP) a day for the period 
1990-2004 was 70.8 percent, 92.4 percent live on less than $2.00 a day (1990-2003). 
In addition, in the UNDP (2006) Human Poverty Index, Nigeria is ranked in the 76th 
position, with a national poverty line of 34.1 percent, 52 percent of the population are 
without sustainable access to improved water source.  These data present a paradox 
which stresses the fact while GDP growth rate seems to be growing; the poverty 
incidence is also increasing instead of declining.  
In the same vein, high level of social inequality has permeated the Nigerian nation 
since the implementation of the neo-liberal policy started in 1986.  For instance, the 
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UNDP (2004) measurement of income distribution between the rich and the poor in 
Nigeria showed that her per capita income was US$ 860. However, the percentage of 
this annual income that is earned by the poorest 20 percent was 4.4 percent compared 
to the share of 55.7 percent going to the richest 20 percent, while the ratio of incomes 
for those in the richest 20 percent of the population to those in poorest 20 percent is 
12.8 percent. Accordingly, it has been argued that over the past twenty years of 
implementing the neo-liberal policy measures, the government goal has always been to 
balance national budgets, service external debts while neglecting the issues of human 
development of the people which is supposed to be the instrument of development 
objectives as presented in table 4.11. As a result, the neo-liberal policy implemented 
by government has not been able to restore economic prosperity and development; 
rather it has resulted in several unfortunate social welfare maladjustments, failing to 
build human capacity and capabilities for the people, particularly among the vulnerable 
groups which constitute the majority in the informal sector in Nigeria.  
This trend reaffirms Galbrait’s (1999) claim that no “economic improvement is 
possible with unimproved people”. This position emphasizes the critical fact that the 
merits of any economic reforms programme should be judged by the efficiency with 
which it corrects the factors underpinning economic imbalance, and by their 
ramifications and side effects on the well-being of the people. Therefore, the success 
of the neo-liberal policy in Nigeria should be judged on the basis of increased 
production which is translated into both increased earnings and improved standards of 
living for a significant cross section of the population. It is within this context that one 
is increasingly perplexed as to how the seemingly huge funds allocated to government 
at all levels have failed to translate to improved human development for the populace, 
particularly the vulnerable and poor groups. This is exemplified by the dearth of basic 
social services and infrastructure in the country which portends formidable challenges 
to sustainable human development, particularly for those persons in the informal 
sector.  For instance, the Vanguard of May 29, 2006 reported that between 1999 and 
2006, the Federal, State and Local Governments and the Federal Capital Territory got 
N6,047 trillion, which represent 54 percent of revenue allocation, with the balance 
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accruing to the federal government. With such huge allocations to the three-tiers of 
government, it was expected that basic social necessities like food, water, electricity, 
healthcare, education, roads, housing and transportation would be adequately provided.  
But this is not the reality on ground as the funds have been plundered away through 
bad governance, mismanagement and corruption at the three levels of governance. 
Even where some social services are available they are either grossly inadequate or 
lacking in quality due to poor project execution.  All these reasons explain while many 
development scholars have attributed the increasing incidence of poverty and human 
development deficiency in the nation to bad governance and corruption (Aliyu, 
2001:1). This is predicated on the view that the wealth of the non-poor is significant 
only because the poor exist and the preservation of the status-quo serve to perpetuate 
the process. More often than not, the political elite do not provide good leadership for 
the people to follow. They are guilty of exhibiting behaviours that are more inimical to 
objectives of national development. For instance, it is the elite more than any other 
category of people who violate the self reliance principles through their consumption 
patterns and lifestyles, as they are the ones with high taste for imported goods. Herein, 
lies the political economy of poverty and human development dilemma in Nigeria.     
With regard to the issue of diversifying the economy, the government lack of 
recognition of the contribution of the informal sector as a survival zone for millions of 
Nigerians has been responsible for its non-incorporation into the mainstream of the 
economy. This is shown by the nature of hostile institutional, political, social and 
regulatory environment within which the operators operate that stifles the growth of 
the sector. This results from the belief that with modernization and economic growth in 
the Nigerian economy, the sector will disappear. Coupled with this is the realization 
that only few governments believed that the informal sector is capable of contributing 
to national output. This is in contrast to the ILO estimation that the proportion of the 
urban labour force engaged in the informal sector is the highest in sub-Saharan Africa, 
accounting for more than 50 percent of the urban employment in more than two-third 
of the countries surveyed in 1999, and therefore, emphasized that the sector should be 
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given adequate attention through legislations for effective performance (Population 
Reports, 2002). 
Contrary to what the advocates of deregulation and liberalization had presumed, the 
economic recession of the 1980s and the subsequent implementation of the neo-liberal 
policy measures by government has affected the informal sector adversely both on the 
demand and supply sides as markets contracted and input costs rose. Besides, there are 
varied numbers of regulations and bureaucratic procedures from different institutions 
and levels of government which tend to stifle entrepreneurship potentials in the 
informal sector. These constraints range from public policy bias in favour of the formal 
private sector, under funding of programmes and projects targeted at the informal 
sector, land use regulations (regarding rental, tenure and land transaction). Others 
include lack of fixed location for business operations, poor infrastructure, lack of 
access to resources and markets, as well as training institutions which exacerbate the 
vulnerability of operators in the informal sector and their inability to participate in 
development.    
More than any time before, it is now understood today that the general “one-fits-all” 
growth policies embedded in macroeconomic stabilization and second generation 
economic reform programmes will not help the Nigerian economy. Besides, to sustain 
the nation’s macroeconomic stability, the economy needs to tailor its fiscal and 
monetary policies to promote domestic investment, employment generation and 
growth through diversification. Moreover, it is necessary to identify binding 
constraints to growth as well as sources of growth potentials at a disaggregated level 
and design incentive mechanisms to channel resources to selected sectors such as the 
informal economy, manufacturing, agriculture and social services with the potentials 
for growth and employment generation, but these sectors have suffered severe neglect 
over the years. 
Economic diversification is, therefore, imperative for an oil exporting economy like 
Nigeria to reduce vulnerability to oil price shocks and to achieve sustainable growth. 
High commodity dependence such as oil exposes the Nigerian economy to trade 
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fluctuations and exchange rate volatility which undermines labour supply and 
productivity. Historical evidence indicates that countries that promote diversification 
first before specializing enjoy higher and more sustainable levels of welfare. As such, 
the institutional environment is critical for diversification which is deepened by 
industrialization. It requires good institutions and good governance to provide an 
enabling environment for diversification. Thus, providing the right regulatory policy 
framework both at the macro level (e.g. the legal system) and at the micro level (e.g. 
business and resource/capital regulation) for the informal sector is required. This will 
allow for the effective expansion of the sector in order to make effective contributions 
to the economy.  
Even though, the formal private sector still monopolized much of the support that 
government provides in the course of implementing the neo-liberal policy, it has made 
little or no effort to foster formal-informal sector linkages in the promotion of 
economic development. Given the limited scope of the formal sector to enhance the 
growth rate of employment due to poor resource availability to establish high capital 
investment, the burden of employment generation has fallen on the informal sector. As 
such, many formal sector enterprises have forged links, sometimes exploitative links 
with the informal sector to cope with the difficulties of the economic crisis. This 
occurs through involvement in informal activities like food processing, fabrication of 
tools, shoe making, sales of packaged sachet water and others. Nonetheless, the 
contribution of the informal sector to economic development can be viewed from the 
interaction between the various operators in the sector and between the informal 
sectors operators and the formal sector operators which the government has not looked 
into critically when formulating and implementing poverty alleviation programmes for 
the nation.  
As for the informal sector, its form, content, operations and social relationships 
existing in the sector have been completely altered since the introduction of the neo-
liberal policy over two decades ago. Consequently, the size of the sector has enlarged 
over time following the contraction in the public/private sectors as a result of the 
economic reform measures. However, many of the new entrants into the sector often 
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locate themselves in the low rank of activities such as petty trading or service 
provision which require simple skills and/or no much capital investment. Also, there 
has been a rise in the entry of better educated entrepreneurs. Others have engaged in 
various kinds of sub-contracting arrangement either to lease equipment/machines from 
its owner, obtain credit in form of raw materials or working on a piece rate basis, from 
which they are being exploited.  
Finally, the greatest drawback in the implementation of the neo-liberal policy in 
Nigeria is its authoritarian imposition by the political elite in government. This is 
coupled with their tendency for public corruption and lack of transparency by the 
leadership about its policy direction which has made it impossible to realize the goals 
of economic reforms. This is fundamentally so because they are neither in the habit of 
subjecting public policy to democratic determination nor are they willing to expose 
governance record to public debate. With respect to the formulation and 
implementation of economic reform policy, only two groups namely the International 
Financial Institutions (IFIs) and the ruling elite make decisions about how and when to 
pursue policy reform as well who gets what, when and how.  Besides, economic 
reform programme is pursued by the ruling elite when convinced by the IFIs that their 
political longevity depends on pursuing reforms and not the concern for improving the 
life of the masses. Moreover, it is political expediencies that have consistently 
dominated the implementation of economic reform/adjustment and the manipulation of 
its benefits and liabilities.  
Conclusively, the pursuit of economic reform goes in hand in hand with the 
militarization of the society as was seen during the Babangida and Obasanjo 
administrations. This concern has, therefore, raised the question regarding the social 
contract that exists between the government and the governed on one hand and the 
statutory responsibility of government to develop and implement public policy that 
will enhance the social welfare of the people rather than impoverish them. The 
conclusion to be drawn from this discourse is that while Nigeria has been 
implementing the neo-liberal policy for over two decades, it is still faced with serious 
economic and social problems that are impacting negatively on the overall well being 
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of the populace.  At present, what the free market enterprise policy has done is to 
narrow the scope of democracy by alienating the people from the political process (as 
they do not see themselves as having anything to gain through political participation), 
widens the gap between social classes and pits the state against its own citizens. In all, 
what the neo-liberal policy had done in Nigeria is to merely change the mode of 
operation of the economy while leaving its operators intact to continue to milk the 
national wealth to the benefits of a ‘few’ at the detriment of the bulk of the population.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 SUMMARY  
The importance of appreciating what development ought to be and the course it should 
follow provides the platform for devising appropriate strategy(ies) to address the 
social, economic and political challenges of humanity. As such, both quantitative and 
qualitative methods were employed in the course of this study to gather relevant data 
on the socioeconomic and structural realities of informal sector operators within the 
purview of government’s implementation of the neo-liberal policy since the 1980s. 
This has given us insight to determine the extent to which operators in the sector have 
been able to advance the promotion of their human development in terms of having the 
resources and means for self development and command over basic consumption 
needs. Based on the objectives and research questions of this study, the following 
findings of the research were as follow: 
Generally, the socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents showed that 
majority of them were young individuals between the ages of 20-40 years which 
constitute about 85 percent. The fact that this age cohort permeates the informal sector 
reiterates the incidence of unemployment and underemployment which the 
government’s liberalization and deregulation policy have thrown up in the economy. 
The gender distribution of the respondents showed that we had more males (65 
percent) than females (35 percent). The educational qualification of respondents 
revealed that 71.8 percent have secondary education, 19.6 percent have primary 
education and the remaining 8.5 percent have no education. This situation showed that 
the operators in the informal sector have need for adequate skill development and 
training for them to be able to function in society. There low education and limited 
skills means that they lack access to opportunities for meaningful incomes and 
incomes generating activities which have had negative effects on their social welfare 
conditions. The results showed that majority (64 percent) are Christians, 32 percent are 
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Muslims while the remaining 4 percent are traditional worshippers. In the same vein, 
the marital status of the respondents showed that 68 percent are married, 29 percent are 
single and 3 percent are either divorced/separated or widowed. Majority of the 
respondents (83 percent) have an average of 5 household members, 15 percent have 
above 5 members, while 2 percent have 1 member only. Majority of the respondents 
(52 percent) lived in one room, 46 percent in one room and parlour.          
In assessing the socioeconomic conditions of operators, the study revealed that the 
standard of living of the respondents have been on the decline over the last two 
decades. The neo-liberal policy has had negative consequences on the human 
development of operators as they lack the required empowerment and capacity to meet 
the basic necessities of life. Specifically, the respondents mentioned the high cost of 
living, especially the escalating prices of basic foodstuff, petroleum product (kerosene 
and petrol) and poor infrastructure as having negative repercussions on the quality of 
life that they are living.     
The study also revealed how government continued cut-back expenditure spending in 
the social sectors and removal of subsidy on essential goods and services have 
deleterious effects on the quality of education, healthcare, skill development and 
infrastructure available to the people, particularly majority of the poor which belong to 
the informal sector. Available evidence shows that since Nigeria began the 
implementation of the neo-liberal policy of free market enterprise, liberalization and 
deregulation of the economy, the country has not performed better in the various social 
indicators (national and international) such as life expectancy at birth, infant mortality, 
maternal mortality, adult literacy, sanitation facilities, access to clean drinking water, 
purchasing power capability of the populace, among others that is used to measure the 
level of human development promotion by nations. Furthermore, the study also 
showed that the government economic reform programme has not induced human 
development among informal sector operators by providing them social benefits in 
terms of access to health services, education, comfortable housing, affordable food and 
decent employment opportunities. Besides, the neo-liberal policy has been criticized 
for over-concentrating on institutional and macroeconomic reforms to the utter neglect 
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of formulating and implementing pro-poor policies which should form the anchor of a 
pragmatic development policy that have direct effect on the welfare of the people.  
In the same vein, the study also brought to front burner a striking association between 
the informal sector and poverty which have been consciously induced by the neo-
liberal policy. The study focused on the livelihood based activities of informal sector 
operators which are the substantial constituents of the social welfare which was a clear 
departure from previous studies which have tended to focus on the economic measures 
of enterprises, wage based employment in exploring the many dimensions of informal 
sector. The study also showed that given the limits of industrialization, increasing 
growth of urban centres and the economic crisis since the 1980s, the country has 
witnessed the proliferation of the informal sector in the labour markets, following the 
severe cuts in the rate of expansion of employment within the public/private sectors 
following the implementation of the neo-liberal policy model.   
Consequently, the study revealed that the form, content, and structure of the informal 
sector have completely been altered since Nigeria began the implementation of the 
neo-liberal policy. Many working class people who have either been retrenched or 
retired as well as those still in paid employment have all turned to activities in the 
informal sector. As such, the informal sector has now become the arena of 
competition, exploitation and struggle between the desperate poor who has using the 
sector as their domain for survival and the middle and rich entrepreneurs who have 
now relegated them to the position of labourers rather than owners of their business.  
Besides, many of the new entrants into the sector have been completely related to low 
income activities which have the least potential for employment and income 
generation. Similarly, the study showed that the operational activities of operators in 
the informal sector are susceptible to the fragility of the market system which has 
resulted in the high cost of production of goods and services provided by the sector as 
most of the raw materials, equipment used by them have no local substitutes.   
 The study also showed that the informal sector is still characterized by features of low 
productivity, poor working conditions, lack of access to funds, limited markets, 
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business vulnerability and marginalization. In the same vein, the institutional theory of 
the state was used to give theoretical backing to the major arguments of the thesis that 
the neo-liberal policy has served as a catalyst that has exacerbated the intensification of 
unemployment, poverty and retardation of socio-economic development in the nation. 
It also revealed that bad governance, corruption and mismanagement of resources by 
the political elite in power that should held responsible for the poor state of human 
development in the nation. The study showed that in spite of the huge resource 
endowment, the people are living in squalor, malnutrition and destitution. The same 
concern of bad governance and corruption has also been traced to the lack of success in 
the implementation of the various poverty alleviation programme which are grossly 
underfunded. Finally, the findings of the study have advanced further the frontiers of 
knowledge in the study of human development with particular reference to the 
activities in the informal sector which government must consider as a crucial engine 
for driving development given its absorptive capacity for employment and income 
generation.  
5.2 CONCLUSION 
For many years, macroeconomic policies and planning in Nigeria have emphasized 
growth rather than development. We have not pause to ask Growth for whom? The 
time has come to focus development efforts on what happens to poverty, 
unemployment, societal attitudes, institutional structures, infrastructures, basic needs 
and general social welfare of the populace. Following the major findings from this 
study, it is imperative to state that any credible development strategy aimed at reducing 
urban poverty and promoting human development in Nigeria must pay due attention to 
the human needs of operators in the informal sector. This is so as experience from 
national economies such as South Korea, Malaysia and Indonesia that has made 
successes in developing the informal sector shows that micro-enterprises are a major 
catalyst in stimulating industrial and commercial development. Besides, the informal 
sector businesses also contribute important connecting points between the various 
sectors of the economy. So, neglecting this sector in the schemes of government 
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development planning policy and implementation will be counterproductive. Thus, the 
significant findings of this study are therefore enumerated as follows.  
1. It has been strongly emphasized in the study that socioeconomic and 
political based reform programme would work better if the country has 
decided on its own to reform by setting the agenda for such economic 
reforms and not adopt one that is externally created and for which it has no 
absolute control.  
2. The state must acknowledge the dynamics of employment generation and 
growth in the urban informal sector. It must come to grip with the reality 
that the informal sector will continue to be a major absorber of labour, and 
therefore deserve due recognition and incorporation into the mainstream 
economy. This is in the light of the high rate of growth of the labour force, 
high and increasing level of poverty, low and dwindling labour absorptive 
capacity of the formal sector, among others. As such, the government needs 
to consciously fund research into the informal sector to effectively tap into 
its potentials.  
3. The study concludes with the position that all socioeconomic development 
strategies should be measured by the benefits they bring to the majority of 
citizens, while the value of a particular development model should be 
measured by the extent to which they will contribute to that end. This, 
therefore, raises the question regarding the essence of economic reform 
programme in a developing country like Nigeria, where the majority of the 
population is engaged in comparatively less productive agricultural and 
informal sector activities.   
5. 3 RECOMMENDATIONS 
The results of this study have both policy and academic implications for the utmost 
development of the informal sector as a crucial engine in the nation’s quest for 
economic development. It is, therefore, imperative to emphasize that the Nigerian 
nation and its people need a developmental state that puts the individual in the very 
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centre of the development policy formulation and implementation. Based on the 
findings of the study, the following vital recommendations are given below: 
Firstly, the Federal Government of Nigeria must create a ministry of informal sector 
development to specifically see to the needs and requirement of the sector like it did 
for issues that bother on women affairs rather than lump it with the activities of the 
National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP). This is significant so when one 
realizes that more than 60 percent of the nation’s economically active labour force 
population depend on the sector for their main source of employment.  
Secondly, government must develop legislation that will channel at least 20 percent of 
her budgetary expenditures to the funding of the social sectors and provision of 
infrastructure specifically targeted at improving the quality of life of the greatest 
majority of the people. This is critically so as contemporary development strategy has 
transcended the emphasis on macroeconomic growth to the needs of enlarging 
peoples’ capacity to live healthy, flourishing and good life. This fact today forms the 
fundamental raison d’être for measuring the viability of any economic system as a tool 
of social engineering, which centre on the capacity to effect positive changes in the 
well-being of the individuals, their families and communities. And this has not been 
achieved with the nation’s implementation of the neo-liberal policy as what we can 
count among its social costs are rising unemployment, fall in standard of living, 
hunger, malnutrition and official corruption.  
Thirdly, the government must come to terms with the truth that engaging in a thorough 
evaluation of any of its economic policy, weighing the social cost on the welfare of the 
people and taking decisions in the overall interests of the populace will go a long way 
to ensure the success of such policy. For instance, the government can borrow a leave 
from what the Ghanaian government has done by funding research in the various 
universities of technology in the country to produce the equipment and other ancillary 
tools required by operators in the informal sector. This will help conserve scarce 
resources expended in their importation from the developed nations. 
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Fourthly, the various sub-groups in the informal sector must be properly structured and 
organized into viable bodies by the operators. This will help give them a voice to 
engage the government and other players in the economy particularly the financial 
institutions about the challenges confronting the activities of the sector and collectively 
working out ways to find solutions to them. Besides, the operators in the sector can 
establish their own bank by pool their resources together through clusters which 
involves the use of the Etsusu schemes which has been found to be the most viable 
means of savings and sourcing for funds by operators rather than the use of public 
banks or cooperatives. Furthermore, the government must be a key player in the 
financial sector by partnering with selected microfinance banks through equity funding 
or channel such funds through existing banks branches across the six geopolitical 
zones in the country for the exclusive use of those in the informal sector that truly need 
funds to acquire equipment to start or expand existing business operations.  
5.4 CONTRIBUTIONS TO KNOWLEDGE 
This study adds to the frontier of knowledge in the political economy of development. 
It brings to fore the critical role that states play in national economic development 
contrary to the prescriptions by the Bretton Woods Institutions and its proponents. This 
was clearly shown by reference to the pivotal role that states in the Western world and 
South East Asia have played in the development outcomes of countries in those parts 
of the world. The study stressed that the development of Nigeria cannot be different if 
her desire to be a major world economic giant is to be realized. The study further 
emphasized that the development of the Nigerian nation must begin with the 
transformation of the state, as it is the character of the state that ultimately influence 
the course of economic and social change even as it is shaped by it. On this basis, the 
study rejects in totality the neo-liberal policy position on the role of the state as an 
obstacle to development in sub-Saharan Africa. After all, state-centrism was not 
manufactured by the African state; rather it was a legacy of colonialism. Prior to the 
1980s, development economists from the west reposed faith in the state as the engine 
of economic development, using it to achieve its objectives of promoting state-centric 
modernization projects and peripheralization of African economies. 
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The study states that the main objective that underlines the neo-liberal policy must not 
be misplaced from the purview of political economic discourse. It is as much a 
political as an economic issue. The study stressed that neo-liberal policy couched in 
economic reform programme was not designed for the development of African 
economies, but a stop-gap strategy to ensure that the debtor nations pay the debt owed 
to the Bretton Woods institutions and other Bi-lateral bodies. Besides, almost all of the 
economic development strategies for Africa’s development have always been dictated 
by the industrialized nations using their perspective, thus making Western 
development strategies the foundations of politico-economic decisions in post colonial 
Africa. To buttress this fact, the Bretton Woods institutions on many instances have 
consistently been antagonistic to attempts by African governments to develop their 
independent self-reliance economic restructuring model that would alter Africa’s 
position in the existing international division of labour and change their pattern of 
production from primary commodities to manufacturing goods i.e. The Lagos Plan of 
Action. The neo-liberal policy is primarily used by the Western World as a 
smokescreen to shift emphasis from the discussion of broader development issues such 
as world trade imbalances, trade protectionism, the promotion of equity and social 
well-being to economic growth.  
On the one hand, the advocates of the neo-liberal policy takes little account of the 
specific sociopolitical conditions in a country before prescribing its measures for 
adoption. On the other hand, the kind of development model prescribed for Africa by 
the west has offered no solution to Africa poverty, its poor majority or its 
underdevelopment. For instance, the African Economic Outlook (2004) report showed 
that of the 31 countries at the bottom of the UNDP Human Development Index 
ranking, 28 of them are in Africa, specifically sub-Saharan Africa.  Also, since the 
1950s, the drive for economic development pursuit in Africa has been employed as an 
instrument of control by the industrialized nations in an effort to change the 
socioeconomic and political structures of African societies for their own interests. As 
such, the introduction of the neo-liberal policy is not different. It is a second scramble 
after the first one that came with the infamous Berlin Conference (1884-85) for control 
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of Africa’s labour, resources and land through the aegis of capitalist globalization that 
rely on measures of free market mechanism rather than direct political control.   
The study point out that in all of the theoretical evaluation that centres on the neo-
liberal discourse, one finds a consistent asymmetry with their prescriptions. There is 
always a powerful predisposition when African government interventions in the 
economy are working badly to reject such activism (rather than reform it) and 
substitute it with the market. On the other hand, when the latter produces poor results, 
there is equally strong tendency to urge that marketization should be reformed (i.e. 
carried out better) rather than rejecting it for some form of government involvement. 
This position amounts to clear bias, inconsistency and lack of transparency on the part 
of the Bretton Woods Institutions which underscore the covert interests that the 
economic reform programme is serving, including the real beneficiaries and ultimate 
losers. It is the position of this writer that striking a balance between the 
complementary roles to be played by the government and those to be undertaken by 
the market is an important part of sound economic decision management and balanced 
pragmatism.  
The study exposed the facade  that belie the neo-liberal policy as it failed to recognize 
that promoting human capital is a vital key to attaining sustainable development and 
productivity. It was evident from the start that the core objectives that underlined the 
neo-liberal policy couched in economic reform programme in Nigeria were not 
oriented toward the peoples’ welfare by tackling the pervasive problems of poverty, 
unemployment, social inequality that permeate the nation. Rather, the reform 
programme focused primarily on promoting economic growth such as GDP, per capita 
income, budget surplus and favourable balance of payments as regard terms of trade 
without giving priority to investment in human capital which would empower the 
peoples’ quality of life. The open bias was manifested by such anti-poverty measures 
such as subsidy removals, government cut-back expenditures on the social sectors, 
currency devaluation and introduction of user fees.  
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This position was a complete negation against the prime status accorded human 
development as the most important of all productive resources. This is fundamentally 
so other factors are generally dormant and cannot make contributions to production 
until humans actuate them. It is on this premise that human development is considered 
vital to the prosperity of nations as reflected in the skills and methods that drive 
production and productivity. It is this differential in the level of knowledge, skills and 
the commitment to it that clearly explain one of the seeming paradoxes in 
contemporary development discourse where countries with fewer resources have often 
prospered more than others that are much more richly endowed. Available evidence 
have shown that countries that have been most successful in tackling poverty and 
achieving sustainable economic growth and development have done so by making 
efficient use of labour through investing in people i.e. Malaysia, Singapore and India. 
This vicious cycle of low investment in human capital as shown in the table on 
Nigeria’s recurrent expenditure for education and health relative to defense and debt 
servicing is one issue too many that we must address very urgently if we are to make 
any head way in our quest for economic development. The failure to squarely address 
these needs have consistently reflected in the country’s low human development index 
rankings and social indicators which mirrored the socioeconomic status of the people 
over the past decade.  
With regard to the informal sector, it has over the years become the survival zone for 
millions of Nigerians to make a living following the neo-liberal policy of free market 
system, privatization, liberalization and deregulation which produced considerable 
privation and discontents across the society. However, the impact of the economic 
reform programme on the informal sector has been extremely unsettling. With the 
implementation of the neo-liberal policy in Nigeria, there has been an upsurge in the 
number of operators into the informal sector which has changed the form, content and 
profiles of the sector. Besides, the policies of currency devaluation, removal of 
subsidies on essential commodities and cut-back expenditures in the social sector have 
caused the urban poor involved in this sector to spend more on consumption, thus 
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causing their real incomes to decline, thus having devastating consequences on their 
living standards and human development concerns.  
The study also wish to highlight the erroneous policy bias undertaken by the 
government regarding its prime focus on the organized private sector as the engine of 
growth to the exclusion or underestimation of the importance of the informal sector. 
As a result, the activities in the informal sector has been undermined by lack of access 
to resources, insufficient investment capital, low technology, lack of infrastructure due 
to limited government involvement in its operations. It is the view of this study that the 
national economy be diversified, with the informal sector given adequate attention as a 
key contributor to national development. This is because of the immense benefits that 
abound in the sector which includes creating important connecting points between the 
various sectors of the economy as well as having the desirable quality of been home-
grown enterprises. The study also emphasized that since the economy is essentially 
monolithic (depending on oil) and the belief that free market will ultimately create the 
necessary conditions for sound development has not been realized, it would be sound 
economic sense to develop the informal sector as a viable alternative sector that can 
create employment and generate wealth for the country.  It is now general 
acknowledged in contemporary development discourse that the one-fits-all growth 
policies embedded in macroeconomic stabilization and second generation economic 
reform programme cannot revitalize the Nigerian economy.          
Finally, in the course of accomplishing this study, certain research gaps were identified 
with particular reference to the informal sector and promotion of human development 
which calls for further scholarship. Among the issues identified include the following: 
i. There is the need to further investigate how the linkages between the 
Informal and formal sectors can be properly developed and harnessed. 
ii. Further investigation should be carried out to know the actual size of 
the informal sector.  
iii. The need to focus on the structural causes of poverty which permeates 
the sector rather than focusing on poverty alleviation programmes.  
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iv. The need to propagate bottom-up approach to development. 
5.5 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
Given the stage of development in Nigeria, with its concomitant level of sophistication 
in the recording of socioeconomic data, this study encountered certain constraints in 
the process of its execution. The major limitations experienced in the course of 
conducting this research has to do with the dearth and inadequacy of official data from 
relevant government establishment on the state of the economy and human 
development indicators. Also, the issue of limited finance did not allow for the 
broadening of the scope of study to include other major states in Nigeria. Nonetheless, 
these limitations did not in any way blur the import of the study as concerted efforts 
were made to surmount them and ultimately achieve the goals of the study.  
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APPENDIX I 
 
Department of Sociology 
Covenant University Ota 
P.M.B 1023 
Ogun State, Nigeria 
 
Neo-liberal Socio-economic policy and human development in the informal sector of 
Lagos State 
                                                           Questionnaire 
 I am from Covenant University Ota. I am presently conducting a research titled: 
“Neo-Liberal Socio-Economic Policy and Human Development in the Informal Sector 
of Lagos State.” This questionnaire is administered in order to obtain factual 
information from you on the study under investigation. All answer provided to the 
questions will be treated with utmost confidentiality. Your earnest response to the 
questions will be greatly appreciated.   
 
Thank you. 
Egharevba Matthew 
 
Part 1: Demographic Data Information 
Q1.  Gender:        Male…….1     Female ………..2 
Q2.  Marital Status:      Single…1        Married ……2        Divorced ….. 3    
            Separated ….3          Widowed……4  
Q3.   Religion:        Christianity ….1     Islam … 2  Traditional Religion …3    
             Other: specify ……..4 
Q4.   Level of Education attained: Primary school …1 Secondary school ….2 Other: 
           specify …….3  
Q5.   How many children do you have? ………………………………………. 
Q6.   How many of you are in your household?........................................................... 
           
……………………………………………………………………………………… 
Q7.   What is your present Age? 20 - 30… 1 31 -40…. 2  41 – 50…….3 51 -60…..4 
Q8.   What is your state of Origin?  ……………………………………. 
Q9.    What is your Occupation?  Trader … 1 Motor cycle rider … 2 Taxi driver…3  
           Artisan: Specify ……….4      Service provider: specify ……… 5    Commerce:  
            Specify …….6      Other: specify ……7 
Q10.  Type of residence: One room (face to face) …..  1 room and parlour …. 2    
           Flat: Please specify ……3 
Part 2: Determining Conditions of Living 
Q11.   What is your experience concerning meeting the daily basic social needs of  
            your family? 
      
…………………………………………………………………………………………... 
Q12.  Has there been any improvement in your living conditions in the last seven 
          years?  
221 
 
           Yes…. 1   No ….2      Don’t know ….3   N/A……4  
Q13.  Does what you earn from your occupation adequately take care of your family 
daily requirements?        Yes…. 1  No…... 2   Don’t know…… 3    N/A 
………4 
Q14.  Rate your present financial standing?  Very good….. 1  Good …. 2 Fair…. 
3 Poor … 4    Very poor ……5  
Q15.  Are you satisfied with your present level of living?  
          Yes…. 1    No …. 2     Don’t know…3    N/A ………4 
Q16.  If not, why not?................................................................................................... 
         …………………………………………………………………………………….. 
Q17.  Does anybody contribute to help in meeting the basic needs of your household?    
          Yes….. 1         No……… 2       Don’t know……3     N/A ………4 
Q18.      If Yes, who 
……………………………………………………………………….. 
          
………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
Part 3:  Awareness of government economic policy 
Q19a.  Are you aware of any government economic policy that can make life better  
            for the people?   
                Yes….1            No …. 2             Don’t know……3             N/A ………4 
Q19b.  If yes in Q10a ask:   What policy are you aware of? ……………………….. 
             
……………………………………………………………………………………..  
Q20.   How did you come to know about these policies, I mean what are your sources 
           of information?    Radio…. ..1      Television… 2 Newspapers…3 Word of 
           Mouth…. 4  Others: (specify)……….5 
Q21.What is your understanding of government economic policy?  
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………. 
Q22. Have your living conditions improved since the introduction of government  
         economic reform policy? Yes…. 1    If yes, ask, How? ___No …. 2   
           Don’t know …….3    N/A…..4  
Q23a. What is your comment about increase in the price of fuel in Nigeria?  
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
………… 
 
Q23b. How are you coping with the increase in the price of petrol and kerosene?           
Petrol Kerosene 
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Q24a. Are you aware of government economic policy designed to address the basic 
social needs of life?  
        Yes…..1    No …. 2   Don’t know ……. 3   N/A……….4.  
Q24b.  If yes, ask which one is that? 
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
……….. 
Q25.  Have you ever benefited from any of the government poverty alleviation 
schemes like NDE, NOAS, NAPEP?    Yes…. 1 Which One? ___ No…... 2            
Don’t know……3    
            N/A ………4 
Q26.  If yes, of what benefit was it to you? …………………………………………… 
Q27.  If not, why? …………………………………………………………………….. 
Q28.  What are the things required by you now to help your business go better?          
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………. 
Q29.  Are there specific problems you currently face in the conduct of your work /  
             activities?  
            Yes…. 1            No …. 2             Don’t know……3              N/A ………4  
Q30.   If yes mention them 
……………………………………………………………… 
Q31.  How do you get money to run your business?         
Personal Savings…..  1      Cooperative/Thrift…2   (Esusu/Ajo)…… 3         Bank 
Loan…….4          Other: (specify) ………5 
Q32.  Do you make enough income from your occupation that can take care of your  
            family? 
             Yes…. 1        No …. 2        Don’t know…… 3         N/A ………4 
Q33. What are the problems you face in meeting the needs of your family?  
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
………………. 
Q34.    Are you better-off working for yourself or for another person?   
      For myself…. 1       For another person …. 2         Don’t know……3           N/A 
……4 
 
Q35a.  Are you presently working for yourself or for another person?   
                  For myself…. 1       For another person …. 2          
Q35b   Apart from your main job, do you engage in any other activity/other job in  
             order to meet the needs of your household?  Yes….. 1 No……… 2  
                Don’t know……3  N/A ………4 
Part 5: Human Capabilities/ Skill Development in Informal Sector    
Q36a. Do you think government is interested in making your living conditions 
          comfortable?  Yes…. 1       No …. 2       Don’t know……3           N/A ………4 
Q36b.If yes ask, in what way?……………………………………………………… 
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Q37.      How long have you been doing this job? 1-3years …. 1  4-6 years….. 2 7-10  
              years……..3,  11years and above…….4 
Q38.       Did you undergo any training for the job you are doing presently? 
                Yes……1   No……2   
Q39.     If yes, how long did this take? ……………………………………..  
Q40.  Does the job you presently do require any particular skill/ assistance for 
           effective for effective performance [for example; particular expertise, access to 
           credit, inputs]? Yes…. 1 No ….2   Don’t know……3 N/A ………4 
Q41a.  Did you receive any government assistance in starting your business? 
                         Yes…. 1         No ……2           Don’t know……3            N/A ………4 
Q41b. If yes what kind of assistance did you receive…………………………….. 
 
Q42.   Are you doing something that is different from what you were trained for? 
                   Yes….1            No …….2           Don’t know……3           N/A ………4 
Q33. If yes to Question 32; what business were you doing before now? 
…………………………………………………………………………………………
……. 
Q44.   Are you satisfied with the progress you are making in your business?  
                    Yes……1     No ………2       Don’t know……3         N/A ………4 
Q45.  Do you need any assistance to improve your skill in what you are doing 
           presently? Yes…… 1      No ……….2  Don’t know……3 N/A ………4 
Q46. If yes, which kind of assistance? 
…………………………………………………… 
         
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
Q47. If no, give reasons ……………………………………………………………….. 
         
……………………………………………………………………………………… 
Q48. What basic things do you need to live a happy and fulfilled life?......................... 
          
……………………………………………………………………………………… 
Part 6:   Means of Improving Your Business Activities 
Q49. In what ways do you think your business activity can be improved?................... 
         
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
Q50. What do you want government to do for you as a citizen of Nigeria? 
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…… 
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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APPENDIX II 
MODERATOR’S GUIDE FOR FOCUS-GROUP DISCUSSION 
Introduction & Warm-up 
 
Designed to put respondents at ease, to allow the moderator develop some rapport with 
respondents, and provide a brief explanation of the interview process to the respondents. 
• Moderator will introduce self and observer(s), if any. 
• Respondents introduce themselves (ask a few questions about each person’s 
background). 
• Explain that all opinions are relevant.  Like to hear from everyone. 
• No right or wrong answers. 
• Explain the use of a recorder; session is being audio taped and notes also taken. 
• Explain format and likely length of discussion. 
 
Part 1:  Conditions Of Living 
 
• What are the typical needs of your family on a day to day basis? What do you do 
to meet these daily needs of your family?   
• What basic things do you need to live a happy and fulfilled life? 
• Looking at the last seven years, has there been any improvement in your 
lifestyle?  Is there anything you could buy then, that you cannot afford 
nowadays?  Probe:  in what areas have there been improvements/deterioration? 
• Does what you earn from your occupation adequately take care of your family 
daily requirements?               
• Are you satisfied with your present level of living? Why/Why not? 
225 
 
• Does anybody contribute in meeting the needs of your household?   If Yes, who?   
How far does the assistance go? 
• How would you rate your present financial standing? Are you financially ok, or 
not? 
• What are the problems you face in meeting the needs of your family?   
 
Part 2:         Awareness of Government Economic Policy 
 
• Are you aware of Government policies that can make life better for the people?  
If yes, what policies are you aware of? Allow respondents explain in their own 
words 
 
• How did you come to know about these policies, I mean what are your sources 
of information?      
- Radio 
- Television 
- Newspaper 
- Word of Mouth   
- Others 
• What is your understanding of these policies?   
• Has your lifestyle improved since the introduction of Obasanjo’s government 
economic reform policies?  If yes, ask, HOW?  
• How do you feel about fuel increases in Nigeria? Do you feel affected in any 
way? Is that positive or negative? Explain 
• How are you coping with the increase in the price of petrol and kerosene?  Probe 
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Part 3:      Measuring Government Development Goals 
 
• Is there any government economic policies addressing the basic needs of your  
           livelihood? If yes ask which one is that? 
• Generally, how do you see these policies? 
• Have you ever benefited from any of the government poverty alleviation schemes like 
NDE, NOAS, NAPEP etc?   
                WHICH ONE?  Of what benefit was it to you?     If not, why not?  
• What are the things required by you now to help your business go better?   
• Are there specific problems you currently face in the conduct of your work / 
activities?    If yes mention them 
• How do you get money to run your business?   Check for:      
 Personal Savings 
 Cooperative/Thrift 
                                                      Esusu/Ajo 
                                                       Bank Loan           
                                                        Others  
 Also ask for the difficulties/challenges and advantages they have encountered 
with each of these (Briefly) 
• Do you make enough income from your occupation that can take care of your 
family? 
• Are you better-off working for yourself or for another person?   
• Apart from your main job, do you engage in any other activity/other job in order 
to meet the needs of your household?     
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Part 4: Human Capabilities/ Skill Development In the Informal Sector    
 
• Do you think government is interested in making your life comfortable? 
• If yes ask, in what way?  
• How long have you been doing this job? 
• Did you undergo any training for your present job 
• If yes, how long did this take? 
• Does the job you presently do require any particular skill?  
• Did you receive any government assistance in starting your business?   If yes 
what kind of assistance did you receive?  Explain 
• Are you doing something that is different from what you were trained for?  If 
yes, what business were you doing before now?  
• Are you satisfied with the progress you are making in your business? Probe 
• Do you need any assistance to improve your skill in what you are doing 
presently?    If yes, which kind of assistance?     If no, give reasons  
Part 5:   Means Of Improving Your Business And Job Activities 
         
• In what ways do you think your business can be improved?  
• What do you want government to do for you as a citizen of Nigeria? Check for: 
- In your business? 
- In your personal life 
 
 
